Figures in black do not look like Syrian army uniforms
Red truck is not army truck
Who are figures in red berets?
There is a transporter with a red crane
The launcher is another vehicle with a hydraulic lift
Launch at 8:32
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Missile unit is very similar to our BM-30. Well, in general, to combat anything shoved probably even written about the gas in the first link.
"Those rockets, dubbed" Volcano, "came in three sizes - light (see Figure 8), medium (see Figure 9) and heavy (see Figure 10). All three rockets seem to consist of standard artillery rocket motors mated with oversized warheads . " In short called "Vulcan", there are three types (sizes), are composed of a standard rocket motor and warhead. This is the second link
bellingcat - Volcanoes in Damascus
https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/case.../volcanoes-in-damascus/
Jul 15, 2014 - It wasn't until weeks after the August 21st attack that the name for these munitions used by the Syrian military was known, “Volcano” rockets.
bellingcat - A “Poor Man's” Volcano?
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2014/07/.../a-poor-mans-volcano...
Jul 13, 2014 - Among the weapons used in the Syrian conflict the Syrian military's “Volcano” rocket has become one of the most notorious. Linked to chemical ...
of the chemical rocket attack of August 21 the Syrian Army was deployed in, and controlling part (if not all) of, the Jobar Industrial Zone, literally a stone’s throw away from the center of the Zamalka and EinTarma districts. Although no official data is available on the precise location of the impact point, the Human Rights Watch report shows 12 impact points concentrated in a 2,100 by 600 meter footprint with its major axis inclined in a north east direction (see figure 5).
Figure 5: Aug. 21 CW rocket impact footprint in EinTarma and Zamalka [4]
The open sources indicate that no other suburb east of Zamalka suffered chemical attacks that night, but that some of the victims from Zamalka and EinTarma were treated in the hospitals of neighboring communities to the east and north. The UN inspection team identified the weapons used in this attack and dubbed them“330 mm” rockets (see Figure 6). In their January 2014 study, Postol and Lloyd calculated the maximum range of those “330 mm” rockets as 2 Kilometers, arguing Zamalka and Ein Tamra were therefore out of range from Regime dominated areas.
Figure 6: “330mm Rockets” used in CW attack on EinTarma and Zamalka
(based on the UN Inspectors Report)
(based on the UN Inspectors Report)
However, as can be seen on the larger scale map provided by the Human Watch Report (see Figure 7), the distance from the Jobar Industrial Zone to the center of the impact footprint is about 2 km. This means that Syrian Army deployed there was capable of hitting Zamalka and EinTarma from regime-controlled areas in spite of the short range of the weapons used in this case. Therefore, allegation of U.S. “erroneous intelligence” on account of the short ranges of the rockets employed is groundless.
When seen in the context of the Syrian Civil War and the regime’s methods and needs to overcome the opposition, and when compared to similar weapons used by the regime in other instances, it is more likely than not that it was the Syrian Army that launched the Zamalka and EinTarma chemical rockets.
With the onset of the Syrian Civil War and the fighting for control of urban areas, the Assad regime sought to overcome resistance by indiscriminate bombardment of opposition-controlled neighborhoods by air dropped bombs. When the fighting intensified and when opposition’s man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) started to pose a threat to the Syrian Air Force, the regime reverted to the use of heavy rockets and ballistic missiles – including SCUDs – in its attacks. According to a ranking officer in Israel, by May 2013 the regime may have consumed almost one half of its ballistic missile arsenal in the attacks against opposition-held cities and neighborhoods.
Towards the end of 2013, reports of ballistic missile attacks started tapering off. It stands to reason that the Syrian regime, considering missiles as the core of its strategic deterrent against Israel, was reluctant to squander them in the Civil War. Cheaper, mass producible, non-strategic but nevertheless heavy weapons were needed for the job. Parallel to the onset of ballistic missile attacks, new types of “popsicle” shaped short range rockets started to make an appearance in the battlefields. Those rockets, dubbed “Volcano,” came in three sizes – light (see Figure 8), medium (see Figure 9) and heavy (see Figure 10). All three rockets seem to consist of standard artillery rocket motors mated with oversized warheads. The light version is based on the standard 107 mm rocket and is spin stabilized, while the medium and heavy versions seem to be based on the 122 mm Grad rocket motor, and (possibly) the Russian designed but Syrian manufactured 220 mm artillery rocket, respectively. The latter two possess enhanced stabilizing tail assemblies similar in design to the tails of the “330 mm” rocket.
Figures 8-10: The Three sizes of “Volcano” rockets
All three types seem to be designed for simplicity and mass production, providing the Syrian Army with heavy firepower at close ranges where accuracy was not too important – that is, for urban warfare. Significantly, they have all been observed in operation by the Syrian regime forces.
The medium and heavy “Volcanos” are launched from fairly complex truck mounted assemblies with mechanical traversing and hydraulic elevation mechanisms. The trucks are equipped with leveling stabilizers. Their design bears the fingerprints of professional, experienced missile engineering teams, rather than jury rigged piecemeal improvisations made in local machine shops. The similarity between the double-barreled medium “Volcano” launcher to the Iranian “Falaque” mine clearing rocket launcher is striking.
It seems that all three types of “Volcano” rockets are normally equipped with explosive warheads (the heavy “Volcano’s” warhead might weigh one ton, comparable to a SCUD B warhead). The fact that the Assad regime freely advertises their existence indicates that the regime views them as legitimate conventional weapons.
The “330 mm” CW rockets discovered in Zamalka and Ein Tarma are virtually indistinguishable from the medium “Volcano” rockets, save for the adaptation of the warhead sections for filling with liquid payloads (Sarin chemical agent). Their motors consist of the rear half of standard Grad 122mm rockets. However, instead of the original free standing double-base (“smokeless powder”) propellant, the “Volcano” motor is cast from more powerful, aluminized composite propellant, as can be clearly seen from its white exhaust flame and thick smoke trail (see a comparison with the reddish flame and thin smoke of a regular Grad rocket in Figure 11). Furthermore, at least one video clip of a medium “Volcano” flight indicates that the new propellant is faster burning than the original one, presumably to compensate for the reduced burning surface of a “half length” motor. All these are indicative of proficient engineering and production means of its makers.
Figure 11: Comparison between “volcano” and “Grad” rockets flame
While all this does not preclude the possibility that the opposition has managed to procure or build up a fairly professional rocket R&D and production infrastructure in the remarkably short time of three years, its likelihood seems remote. It is more likely that the medium “Volcano” aka the “330 mm” CW rocket with its customized motor and elaborate launcher is the product of the selfsame experienced Syrian missile industry that have evolved and produced the heavy 300 km range GPS guided “Tishrin” smart rocket – the likes of which are clearly beyond the capability of the opposition’s rudimentary machine shops.
Conclusions
There is enough evidence in the public domain to conclude, with a fair degree of certainty, that the Syrian Army could and did launch the chemical rocket attacks on Muadamieh, Zamalka and EinTarma on August 21, 2013. In the case of Muadamieh, the Assad regime possessed 140mm rockets with enough range to hit the town from the “Heart of the Regime’s territory.” In the case of Zamalka and EinTarma, the Syrian Army was deployed close enough to hit those neighborhoods with the shorter range “Volcano”/ “330 mm” rockets from regime controlled territory. The “330 mm” rockets discovered in Zamalka and Ein Tarma were not improvised, jury rigged devices that could be casually made in any workshop; rather, they were part of a well designed range of weapon systems contrived to fulfill Syrian Army’s operational needs. Therefore, Secretary Kerry’s statements did not reflect “erroneous intelligence,” but rather a sensible conclusion that, in fact, could be largely derived from information in the public domain. Whatever assessment U.S. intelligence provided the Administration with, there is no reason to believe that it was “erroneous.”
