Volume I
Monographs 1 and 2
The Tale of Two Bridges and The Battle for the Skies Over North Vietnam
from http://archive.org/stream/USAFSoutheastAsiaMonographs/vitale_of_two_bridges_djvu.txt
Major A.J.C. Lavalle
General Editor
New Imprint by
OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, B.C., 1985
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-PubUcation Data
Main entry under title:
The Tale of two bridges. And, The Battle for the skies over North Vietnam.
(USAF Southeast Asia monograph series; v. 1, monographs 1 and 2)
A.J.C. Lavalle, general editor.
Reprint. Originally published: Washington: Dept. of the Air Force, 1976.
Includes index.
1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975 — Aerial operations, American. 2. United States. Air
Force— History— Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975. I. Lavalle, A.J.C. (Arthur J.C.),
1940- . II. Battle for the skies over North Vietnam. 1985. III. Series: USAF Southeast
Asia monograph series; v. 1, monograph 1 and 2)
DS558.8.T34 1986 959.704'348 85-18896 ISBN 0-912799-26-9
This volume is a reprint of a 1976 edition originally issued by the Air University.
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402
Foreword
Many documents, articles, and stories have been written about
U.S. Air Force operations in Southeast Asia (SEA) . However, none
have giyen the critical in-depth coverage commensurate with our
level of involvement. This volume, the first in a USAF Southeast Asia
Monograph series, is an attempt to document the story of AIR-
POWER— and the people behind it— in our nation's longest armed
conflict.
For eight years American airmen fought with a multitude of mis-
sions, evolving weaponry, ever-changing tactics and maybe most
notable— constantly changing constraints. In this volume, authors
from the Air War College and Air Command and Staff College who
actually fought there have combined for two excellent monographs
of the people and weapons in SEA. The authors' breadth of combat
experience provides a penetrating account of airpower brought to
bear— with all the emotion, frustrations, bravery and confusion of
real life.
For the general reader, these stories tell of airpower in human
terms and should give some understanding of the spirit, courage, and
professionalism of our U.S. airmen. To the student of airpower in-
terested in improving the effectiveness of our Air Force, the
monographs make an excellent case study of tactical air doctrine.
The entire series is dedicated to ALL who served.
DAVID C.JONES, General, USAF
Chief of Staff
1 January 1976
III
^..TO ALL v;ho served
MONOGRAPH 1
The Tale of Two Bridges
Authors : Colonel Delbert Corum
Lt Colonel Glenn Griffith
Lt Colonel James Jones
Lt Colonel Keith Krause
Lt Colonel Ronald Lord
Lt Colonel Robert Martin
Lt Colonel Malcom Winter
Lt Colonel David Young
Monograph Edited by
Colonel Dewey Waddell
Major Norm Wood
Authors' Acknowledgements
The facilities at Maxwell AFB offer a rich variety of source
materials for the study of airpower in Southeast Asia. We are grate-
ful to Mr. Robert B. Lane and his staff at the Air University Library ;
Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm S. Bounds of the Maxwell CORONA
HARVEST office; and Mr. Lloyd H. Cornett, Jr., and his staff at the
Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center.
Dr. Kenneth R. Whiting of the Institute for Professional Develop-
ment reviewed the manuscripts and provided valuable assistance in
the final editing.
Finally, we are indebted to the many Air University personnel who
provided support and assistance throughout the project.
— The Authors
Prologue
This is a story of war. A parable of men and machines, of friend
and foe. A drama of moves and countermoves, played out in the skies
over North Vietnam and having for its backdrop two bridges—the
majestic Paul Doumer and the infamous bridge at Thanh Hoa.
These bridges know well the script of war. The silent contrails high
in the blue, the growing dialogue of anti-aircraft fire, the scream of
engines, the thunder of bombs, all building to a crescendo. Then
subsiding, only to start again in another act on another day. An old
play that reopens regularly with new actors — and therein lies our
tale.
The curtain went up at the Thanh Hoa Bridge in April 1965, and,
as the Vietnam drama unfolded, many new players made their act-
ing debut. Fighters named "Thunderchief ' and "Phantom," missiles
knovm as SAMs and SHRIKEs, bombs called "Walleye" and
"Smart," and the credits go on. Wild Weasel, Jolly Green, Young
Tiger, and MIG Cap— all starred in our long running play as did
such names as Carolina Moon and Flaming Dart. Names that flashed
brightly across the stage and then were gone.
Actors in a historical play that has now passed into history —
leaving us to tell THE TALE OF TWO BRIDGES.
IX
Table of Contents
Prologue ix
Chapter I. THE SCENE 1
The Bridges 6
Chapter II. The STRIKE AND SUPPORT Forces 11
The Strike Aircraft 11
F-105 Thunderchief 12
F-4 Phantom II 21
The Navy Birds 23
Support Aircraft 23
Wild Weasel 24
Aerial Reconnaissance 25
Combat Air Patrol 26
Air Refueling : The Tankers 28
Chapter III. EARLY USAF ATTACKS ON THE THANH
HoA Bridge 31
Chapter IV. THREE LONG YEARS 45
Navy Strikes the Thanh Hoa Bridge .... 46
Defense Continues to Improve 50
Interdiction of the Thanh Hoa-Vinh Rail
Line 52
Project "Carolina Moon" 52
Strikes Continue Through 1966 56
The Walleye Glide Bomb 57
Limited Strikes Through 1967 59
A Big Strike Ends the First Round 63
Bombing Halt Comes in Early 1968 63
Chapter V. THE PAUL DOUMER BRIDGE GOES DOWN . 67
Chapter VI. BOTH BRIDGES FALL 78
The Bombing Halt (1968-1972) 78
Doom of the Dragon 79
Operation Freedom Dawn 84
The Dragon Goes Down 85
Strikes Continue Against the Thanh Hoa
Bridge 86
Doumer's Demise 88
xi
Chapter I. The Scene
The background of the story begins as far back as late 1946 with the French engaged in open warfare with a communist-backed nationalist coalition of guerrillas known as the Viet Minh. Although the struggle was intense, United States attention in those days was focused on Europe. It was not until the triumph of Mao Tse-tung in China that U.S. policy -makers were jolted into extending the on- going containment of communism to the Far East. Several events fol- lowed swiftly — the invasion of South Korea by the North in 1950; U.S. entry into the conflict in Korea, accompanied by massive mili- tary assistance; and finally, the defeat of the French by the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu on the 7th of May 1954. Thus, U.S. attention
was focused on the Far East in almost hypnotic myopia.
The significance of the communist victory in Indochina was that there were now two Vietnamese states— the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in the north, and the State of Vietnam in the south (later to become the Republic of Vietnam [RVN] ) .
To most everyone's surprise, the South Vietnamese began pulling themselves together and were soon receiving considerable American support. A U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group took over the
equipping, training, and advising of the South Vietnamese armed forces which enabled the French military to withdraw completely by early 1956. But, all was not well for the fledgling RVN.
Infiltration of communist guerrillas from the north began to in- crease and a National Liberation Front was organized in the south to provide an organizational structure for the communists. It appeared to be obvious that Ho Chi Minh and the other leaders in North Viet- nam were determined to bring the south under their control.
In November 1963 a coup took place in South Vietnam in which President Ngo Dinh Diem was slain. A parade of inept successors in- flicted political chaos on the struggling state and the military situa- tion worsened. In the meantime, U.S. mihtary strength had in- creased from 685 advisors in 1961 to over 17,00 by 1964.
Officials in Washington felt that more direct military action was needed. The deteriorating situation in South Vietnam persisted and there was a growing conviction that only by carrying the war to North Vietnam— to punish and dissuade the North Vietnamese from supporting the insurgency — could the cancer be arrested.
In a major policy decision, Kennedy sent the carrier "Core" to Saigon late in 1961, with helicopters and U.S. advisers. The idea of putting direct pressure on North Vietnam was well re- ceived by President Johnson. Early in 1964 the President directed that contingency plans be drawn up for air strikes and overt military
pressure against North Vietnam! The stage had been set and it would appear that the curtain was about to go up. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed the Commander of all U.S. forces in the Pacific thea-
ter (CINCPAC) to select appropriate targets.
In the aftermath of the Diem coup, Gen Duohg Van Minh announces the formation of ruling junta. At rear, second from right, is Nguyen Van Theiu, later to become President.
Gen Earle Wheeler briefing the President at the White House. At left is Gen John McConnell, at rear Gen Harold Johnson.
The plan which was drawn up, and approved by the JCS on April 17, 1964, contained a list of 94 of the most important targets in North Vietnam. CINCPAC felt that destruction of these targets was
essential if an air campaign against North Vietnam was to be effec- tive. The twelfth target on the list was the Paul Doumer Rail and Highway Bridge located on the outskirts of Hanoi ; the fourteenth was the Thanh Hoa Rail and Highway Bridge located just north of the city of Thanh Hoa, seventy miles south of Hanoi. Both of these bridges were key links in the North Vietnamese transportation sys- tem, and they were destined to become two of the most famous— or infamous — targets in North Vietnam. Little did one realize that the lights were dimming, the orchestra was in place, and all that remained was the hush of anticipation that
precedes the conductor. ...
The baton was lifted; on the 2nd and 4th of August, North Viet-
namese patrol boats attacked the U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of
Tonkin. Act I began. Reprisal attacks were launched by the Navy
from aircraft carriers against the enemy torpedo boats and their fuel
storage facilities. Two days later both Houses of Congress passed a
near -unanimous "Tonkin Gulf Resolution" which authorized the
President to use armed force in the area.
For the next several months, isolated reprisal attacks were made
against North Vietnam just north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) .
It was not until February 13, 1965, that President Johnson made the
decision to inaugurate a sustained, but in maijy ways limited, air
campaign against North Vietnam. This program bore the code
name "Rolling Thunder." Truly the thundering percussion vrould
appear to roll on and on and on in the next few years.
The initial series of Rolling Thunder air strikes were both political
and psychological in nature. Target selection, forces, munitions
used, and even timing of the strikes were decided in Washington.
Targets struck were barracks, radar sites, ammunition depots, and
military vehicles — all in the southernmost part of North Vietnann.
Meanwhile, the JCS stressed the need to interdict the North Viet-
namese lines of communication (LOG) if there were to be any re-
duction of the flow of men and material into South Vietnam. The
destruction of the southern portion of the railway system becamie the
highest priority. Military planners pointed out that south of the 20th
parallel there existed 115 miles of useable rail line; the vulnerable
points on this line were five large bridges and the rail yard at Vinh.
The JCS recommended that this rail system be attacked and de-
stroyed immediately. Since the DRV could reasonably be expected to
take both passive and active defensive measures, the entire southern
portion of the rail system should be hit in a single effort. The Dang
Phuong Rail and Highway Bridge and the Thanh Hoa bridge should
be the first targets attacked in order to trap the maximum quantity
of rolling stock south of the 20th parallel where it could then be de-
stroyed.
The Secretary of Defense accepted the JCS' recommendation. The
Joint Chiefs, and Air Force Chief of Staff General McConnell in par-
ticular, believed that the most successful interdiction strategy would
be one of short duration and broad scope. General McConnell
argued for a 28 -day air campaign in which all of the 94 targets on the
JCS list would be destroyed, including those around Hanoi.
On March 27, 1965, the JCS submitted a four-phase program to
Secretary McNamara which incorporated some, but not all, of
General McConnell's views. This was to be a twelve -week program in-
tended to isolate North Vietnam from all external sources of resup-
ply, and then to destroy her internal military and industrial capaci-
ty-
Phase 1 (three weeks) aimed at interdicting all LOCs south of the
20th parallel , beginning with an attack on the Thanh Hoa Rail and
Highway Bridge.
Phase 2 (six weeks) called for severing all rail and highway links
with China, including the destruction of the Paul Doumer Rail and
Highway Bridge.
Phase 3 (two weeks) visualized air attacks against all port facili-
ties, the mining of seaward approaches during the ninth week, and
the destruction of ammunition and supply dumps during the tenth
week.
Phase 4 (two weeks) was the wind-up phase, devoted to restriking
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all the previous targets as necessary, as well as attacks on industrial
targets that were outside populated areas.
The initial targets in this four -phase, twelve -week air campaign
were to be the key bridges in the North Vietnamese railroad system
which comprised five major lines? as follows :
#1 : The 140 -mile northwest rail line connecting Hanoi with
the south -central Chinese rail system; '^: ^
#2: The 82 -mile northeast rail line providing an important
rail link between the southeastern Chinese supply concentra-
tions and Hanoi ;
#3: The 40 -mile eastern rail link between Hanoi and North
Vietnam's major port city, Haiphong;
#4: The 165-mile southern rail line, extending from Hanoi
south through Thanh Hoa and Vinh to the DMZ ; and
#5: A 45 -mile stretch of track from a mining area north of
Thai Nguyen to the northeast rail line ten miles north of Hanoi,
which served the Thai Nguyen iron and steel complex.
The Achilles' Heel of this rail system lay on the outskirts of Hanoi
where four of the five major rail lines came together to cross the Red
River on the Paul Doumer Railroad/Highway Bridge. The destruc-
tion of this bridge would sever Hanoi from southwest China,
southeast China and the major North Vietnamese seaport at
Haiphong. It would also interdict National Route 1, the most im-
portant highway leading north from Hanoi. With this route in-
terdicted all truck traffic would have to be rerouted from National
Route 1 to routes 2 and 3 located northwest of Hanoi and served by a
ferry across the Red River. Haiphong to Hanoi road traffic would
also have to be ferried across the Red River. The JCS emphasized
that any delay in authorizing the destruction of this key bridge would
allow time for the building of an extensive by -pass system of river
ferries and the development of an effective air defense system for the
bridge's protection.
The second bridge marked for early destruction was located 70
miles south of Hanoi, the Thanh Hoa Railroad/Highway Bridge
(knovm to the Vietnamese as the Dragon's Jaw) that funneled men
and material toward the battlefields in South Vietnam and southern
Laos.
For whatever reason, the JCS twelve -week bombing program was
never put into effect. However, a campaign against the southern rail
line was begun in March 1965. In the ensuing years the Paul Doumer
and the Thanh Hoa Bridges were to be among the most famous tar-
gets in the Vietnam War.
The Bridges
The 1,300 mile railway system was conceived by the Governor
General of French Indochina, Paul Doumer, and built between 1896
and 1902. The system was never used effectively by the French. For
the North Vietnamese in the 1960's, however those 1 ,300 miles of rail
line were a major factor in the movement of military supplies from
China and Haiphong into Hanoi and thence south to the battlefields.
All the supplies coming into Hanoi by rail passed over the Paul
Doumer Bridge, while those moving southward crossed the Thanh
Hoa Bridge. Both bridges also served as funnels for truck and other
vehicle convoys.
The Paul Doumer Bridge, on the outskirts of Hanoi, originally
served as the rail entry to Hanoi for both the east (Haiphong) and
the -west (Lao Cai) lines. Lat^, it also serviced feeder lines from
Kep, Thai Nguyen, and Dong Dang t6 the north. The nineteen -span
steel bridge crosses the Red River in an area of low, flat flood plains.
With the exceptions of Hanoi to the west and s&uth, and the in-
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dustrial area near the Gia Lam airport to the east, the bridge is set in
the midst of compact villages and small towns scattered throughout
the rice paddies.
The bridge — 5,532 feet in length and 38 feet wide -was the
longest in North Vietnam, with a one -meter gauge railway track in
the center and a ten-foot highway on each side. Resting on eighteen
massive concrete piers, there were ten thru-thrust spans (eight of 350
feet and two of 250 feet) and nine cantilever spans (each 246 feet) .
Since the approach viaducts measured 2,935 feet, the total length of
the structure was 8,467. Although these figures are impressive in
their own right, no one realized just how profound they were until
the attacks began.
The Thanh Hoa Bridge, which spans the Song Ma River, is
located three miles north of the town of Thanh Hoa, the capital of
Annam Province. It is a replacement for the original French -built
bridge which was destroyed by the Viet Minh in 1945— they simply
loaded two locomotives with explosives and ran them together in the
middle of the bridge.
In 1957, the North Vietnamese, with the assistance of Chinese
technicians, undertook the task of again spanning the swift -flowing
Song Ma. Using construction methods that were crude by western
standards, the project moved along ponderously until 1961 when the
regime in Hanoi, needing the bridge to facilitate the movement of
supplies to the insurgents in the south, put on the pressure. By
working 24-hours a day, the builders completed the bridge in 1964,
and Ho Chi Minh himself presided at the dedication.
The new bridge at Thanh Hoa was called the Ham Rung (or
Dragon's Jaw) by the Vietnamese. It was 540 feet long, 56 feet wide,
and about 50 feet above the river. The Dragon's Jaw had two steel
thru-truss spans which rested in the center on a massive reinforced
concrete pier, 16 feet in diameter, and on concrete abutments at the
other ends. Hills on both sides of the river provided solid bracing for
the structure. Between 1965 and 1972, eight concrete piers were
added near the approaches to give additional resistance to bomb
damage. A one -meter gauge single railway track ran down the 12-
foot wide center and 22-foot wide concrete highways were can-
tilevered on each side. This giant would prove to be one of the single
most challenging targets for U.S. air power.
Thus in early 1965, as President Johnson and his top advisors pon-
dered the JCS plan to pressure Hanoi into a cessation, or at least an
attenuation, of its support for the insurgency in South Vietnam, the
Paul Doumer and Thanh Hoa Bridges stood out as vital links in the
enemy's transportation system. The American forces destined to
strike at the North Vietnamese logistical system were gathering at
bases throughout South Vietnam and Thailand. The long and ar-
duous air war against the bridges was about to begin.
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Chapter II. The Strike and Support Forces
As will become evident when the attacks on the Paul Doumer and
Thanh Hoa Bridges are described in detail, modern airpower in-
volves a very close relationship between men and machines, between
the airmen and their vehicles and weapons systems. In addition, the
whole effort must be backed up by adequate ground support. Thus it
would seem fitting at this point to describe the considerable array of
aircraft, weapons systems, and sophisticated electronic gadgetry used
to "bust the bridges." This is not the description of a static situation ;
between 1965 and 1972 a bitter contest evolved between Hanoi's
Soviet -supplied defensive weapons and the US offensive means.
Russian MIGs, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) , and better radar
elicited more sophisticated US offensive weapons and new evasive
tactics. The high explosive (HE) bomb, a seeming constant in the
ever changing offensive -defensive counterpoint, made a quantum
jump with the advent of the guided bomb .
The Strike Aircraft
Throughout the long and often frustrating Vietnam war, tactical
aircraft were called upon to carry the primary strike burden against
highly defended targets in North Vietnam. Many of the combat
missions could be considered as strategic bombardment rather than
as tactical interdiction because of the type of targets attacked, the
desired long range effects, and the aerial refueling required for deep
penetration. However, the extremely hostile environment in and
around the important North Vietnamese targets plus political reser-
vations about committing strategic bombers made the use of fight-
ers a necessity. Tactical fighters— with their superior speed,
maneuverability and weapons delivery flexibility — proved to be well
suited for this critical role.
The two primary strike aircraft used by the USAF against targets
in North Vietnam were the F-105 "Thunderchief" and the F-4
"Phantom." These aircraft, and US Navy tactical fighters, will be
long remembered for the outstanding contributions they made to the
11
"out -country •" war in SEA and, in particular, as the Paul Doumer
and Thanh Hoa "bridge busters."
F-105Thunderchief
The Thunderchief first entered the Air Force tactical inventory in
1959. Designed and built by Republic for high speed, low-level
delivery of weapons, the F-105 was a technologically superior
fighter -bomber aircraft. The design model progressed from the YF-
105A2 in 1955 through the F-model in 1962. The significant
technologies were the "coke bottle" design which reduced airplane
drag at supersonic speeds, and a highly sophisticated, precision
navigation and weapon -delivery system. The F-model offered the
two -seat configuration which was to play a signal role in the "Wild
Weasel" SAM and radar suppression mission during the Vietnam
war.
For the Thunderchief the air war in North Vietnam began on 2
March 1965, when F-105s took part in a strike against the Xom IBong
ammunition storage area near the DMZ. This and other early
missions were flown by aircrews and aircraft placed on temporary
duty (TDY) in Thailand from other bases in the Pacific. At that
time, PACAF possessed three kinds of aircraft that could be used in a
tactical strike role — the F-105, F-lOO and B-57. Largest in number
were the F-105s with approximately 150 aircraft available.
As the tempo of the war increased, additional F-lOO and F-105
squardons were deployed to SEA from bases in the US. It was soon
obvious that the F-105 was superior to the F-lOO for the strike role
against targets in North Vietnam, especially those in the country's
highly defended interior. With its size and range, the F-105 could
carry twice the bomb load, farther and faster than the F-IOO. By
early 1966, two wings of F-105s were permanently statione;d in
Thailand -the 355 Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) at Takhli and the
388 TFW at Korat. During the RoUing Thunder Campaign, 1965-
1968, the F-105s performed more than 75 per cent of all strike
missions against North Vietnam. Throughout the campaign, the
Thunderchiefs were the primary USAF weapons delivery system em-
ployed against both the Thanh Hoa and Paul Doumer Bridges. The
F-105 Thunderchief was one of the largest and heaviest single seat
fighter aircraft in the world (maximum take off weight over 50,000
pounds) . This immense size prompted pilots to tag the F-105 with
some of the most unflattering nicknames ever given to a fighter
'"Out -country" was the popular term for the air war against North Vietnam.
"In -country referred to the conflict within South Vietnam itself.
'"Y" prefix denotes prototype and "A" suffix denotes first model design; sub-
sequent models are identified alphabetically.
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plane. The most famous and one that is synonymous with the F-105
today is simply the "Thud," a term first used sarcastically and, later,
with affection. Others acquiring some degree of notoriety were
"Lead sled," "Ultra-Hog," and "Squash bomber." Even some of the
names painted on its fuselage, such as "25 Ton Canary" and "Iron
Butterfly," were brilliantly descriptive. Obviously these names were
An F-105D enroute to a target deep in North Vietnam being refueled by a KC-135
tanker. "*■-,:- ,,
15
used in jest, as few aircraft will ever command the admiration, af-
fection and respect that the F-105 earned from its pilots and ground
crewmen.
The F-105 could carry an awesome array of armaments and other
stores on five external stations, including fuel tanks, conventional
bombs, rockets, missiles, and tactical nuclear weapons. To com-
plement the external armament, a 20mm "Vulcan" cannon was
mounted inside the aircraft to provide greater air-to-air and air-to-
ground capabilities. This fantastic gun operated on the rotating
barrel principle and could fire 6,000 rounds per minute.
The F-105, however, did have some limitations which tested the
mettle of both pilots and ground crews. Fully loaded, it required an
uncomfortably long takeoff roll. Hydraulic lines of the dual iElight
control system running side-by-side, made it possible for enemy fire
to knock out both systems at once and render the aircraft un-
controllable. To alleviate this, an emergency system was instaMed
while the aircraft were in Thailand, which enabled the pilot to get
back over friendly territory for bail out. The 105's relatively small
wing area (385 square feet and 45 -degree sweep) created high wing
loading during maneuvers. Old-time fighter pilots mumbled about
the Thunderchiefs inability to turn effectively during air-to-air
engagements. They soon learned to depend instead upon the F-105's
great speed to outrun MIGs which attacked while inbound to target
and to use that speed to chase MIGs after bomb delivery.
The "Thud's" unbelievable toughness endeared it to the hearts of
the pilots who flew it against heavily defended targets. Because of its
ability to absorb punishment, many a Thunderchief returned to a
friendly base despite gaping holes in wing, stabilizer, or fuselage.
The experience of Major William McCelland testifies vividly to the
"Thud's" ruggedness. On 28 June 1966, Major McClelland attacked
a heavily traveled highway bridge in North Vietnam and as he pulled
off on his dive bomb pass, an 85mm shell hit the 450-gallon fuel tank
beneath the right wing. The shell exploded in the pylon and con-
tinued laterally along and through the wing tearing out everything
for about four feet. In spite of the great drag generated by the enor-
mous hole and protruding wing sections, Major McClelland was able
to "nurse" his Thud some 500 miles to his home base and made a suc-
cessful landing. Another F-105 was hit by an air-to-air missile which
lodged in the aft section of the aircraft. Although the entire rear por-
tion of the Thunderchief was heavily damaged, the aircraft landed
safely with its unique cargo.
3y 1972 most of the "Thuds" had been replaced by the F-4 Phan-
toms. Nevertheless, some still remained to see action in a SAM killer
and flak suppression role. General William Momyer, former com-
mander of the Seventh Air Force, paid special tribute to the F-105's
overall contribution to the war in Vietnam. He pointed out that its
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An F-105 after being hit by an air-to-air missile. Booster is visible imbedded in aircraft
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outstanding speed and ruggedness helped the USAF carry the war to
the heart of the enemy. In his opinion, its speed at low altitudes and
its high performance made it the finest aircraft in the war.
F-4 Phantom II
The other USAF fighter to carry the war into North Vietnam was
the McDonnel -Douglas F-4 Phantom, which proved to be the most
versatile combat aircraft employed during the Southeast Asia con-
flict. It could perform the diversified roles of air superiority, close air
support, interdiction, air defense and long range bombardment with
devastating effectiveness. With this flexibility, the Phantom was used
for practically every purpose in SEA— from delivering weapons with
the timely and pin-point accuracy required to support ground troops
in the south to performing the critical and demanding strike role in
the north. It was superb also in the specialized roles of recon-
naissance. Wild Weasel, and MIG CAP. Although the Phantom got
most of its publicity as a "MIG killer," it was its excellent bombing
capability, especially its many trips "to the bridges," that is pertinent
to our story.
A camouflage-painted F-4C in flight over North Vietnam.
The F-4, initially an all-weather, high-altitude, two-place in-
terceptor used by the Navy for fleet defense, made its maiden flight
in May 1958. With two powerful engines, it easily reaches speeds over
Mach 2, and has a maximum altitude near 60,000 feet.
Because of its bent -up wing tips and drooping horizontal tail (both
for aerodynamic stability) , the,j|-4 has been described as "brutishly
ugly in appearance." But the aircrews who flew the Phantom in com-
bat, shot down MIGs, bombed heavily defended targets, and made it
home in severely crippled machines, thought it a beautiful bird.
21
The F-4 became the first jet fighter fathered by the Navy to go into
the Air Force inventory when it was acquired by the Tactical Air
Command in 1962. A long-range inertial navigation system, air-to-
ground missile capability, and flight controls in the rear cockpit
where the main changes required in the Air Force model, the F-4C.
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USAF Lt Col Gene Levy (left) and Lt Bob Hand climb into the cockpit of their F-4 for a
combat mission.
22
This Phantom could carry 8 tons of munitions, or other com-
binations of fuel tanks and armaments— a most impressive strike
capability.
The F-4D, which followed, incorporated an improved accuracy in
air-to-ground delivery and an air-to-air gunnery capability. It was
not until late 1967, however, that the F-4E with its internal cannon
came into the inventory, too late for the Rolling Thunder operations,
but used extensively in the Linebacker campaign of 1972.
The first Phantoms arrived in SEA in April 1965 and by the end of
1966 there were three F-4 wings in the area. Initially employed to
augment the F-105s in Rolling Thunder, the Phantom became the
USAF's primary strike aircraft in the 1972 Linebacker campaign.
As with any aircraft, the F-4 had some limitations. Like the F-
105, the F-4 hydraulic systems were vulnerable to ground fire and
could result in loss of flight controls if hit. Cockpit visibility wbls
restricted due to the structure of the aircraft causing a blind spot in
the rear. The engines produced a heavy black smoke, which helped
both enemy MIG pilots and ground gunners to see, identify, and
track the F-4. The positive features — two engine reliability, a tvro-
man crew, high power-to-weight ratio, and moderate wing
loading— more than made up for any deficiencies.
The Navy Birds
The US Navy played the major role in the war on the Thanh Hoa
Bridge and a lesser one against the Paul Doumer Bridge, flying
their sorties from aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Six different
aircraft were used in the Navy's bridge -busting operations: the A~3,
A-4, A-6, A-7, F-4, and F-8. The Navy's workhorse against the
bridges was the A-4 Skyhawk, a single -engine, single-seat attack air-
craft. The A-4 flew some 208 sorties against the Thanh Hoa Bridge,
more than three times that of any other Navy aircraft. The A-6 In-
truder, a twin-engine, two-phase attack bomber, was the Navy's only
all-weather attack plane and was kept busy. The F-4B Phantom II,
basically the same as the Air Force F-4, was used extensively in an at-
tack role. The A-3 Skywarrior, a twin -engine attack bomber saw
little action against the bridges, going at Thanh Hoa only twice. The
F-8 Crusader, a single-engine, single-seat all-weather interceptor,
saw action against Thanh Hoa only nine times— its main role was
that of a MIG killer. Finally, the A-7 Corsair II, designed as the
replacement for the A-4, was introduced in the theatre in late 1967
and did not get into bridge -busting until 1972.
Support Aircraft
The complex of SAMs and radar-directed anti-aircraft artillery
(AAA) in North Vietnam evolved from a fairly primitive capability
23
in 1965 to the most concentrated and deadly air defense in history by
1972. Since the heaviest concentrations of SAMs and AAA were
around key areas, both the Paul Doumer and Thanh Hoa Bridges
got very generous allotments. Again, there was a technological
escalation on both sides ; as the enemy's air defense system evolved
quantitatively and qualitatively, the US offensive capabilities grew
ever more sophisticated. The strike pilots, flying against the most
heavily defended areas in the history of aerial warfare, needed lots of
help in accomplishing their missions.
This help came from supporting aircraft and crews that ac-
complished those missions so essential in getting strike pilots to the
target and home again. Reconnaissance crews to find and
photograph targets ; tankers to supply fuel ; the MIG CAP to parry
enemy interceptor aircraft ; and search and rescue forces to pick up
downed airmen — all are vitally important and well established sup-
porting players in the scenario of an air battle. Albeit, these better
known participants were overshadowed in Southeast Asia by a new
entry in the field of combat support —the Wild Weasel.
Wild Weasel
This new weapons system combined a pilot and an electronic war-
fare officer (EWO) in a tactical fighter aircraft, a combination
descriptively called "Weasel" because its job was to ferret ovit and
suppress or destroy the enemy's SAM, AAA, and AW (automatic
weapons) installations.
The strike pilots relied heavily on the Wild Weasels throughout the
Vietnam war, especially in heavily defended areas such as those
around the Paul Doumer and Thanh Hoa Bridges. The "Weasels"
took on the SAMs while the strike force went for the targets. The
courage of the Wild Weasel provides us an excellent example of sup-
porting forces that are invaluable in air operations.
Obviously, the Wild Weasel mission was not an enviable one, and
American flying men often say that the call of the Wild Weasel is,
"How in the hell did I get into this business?" But that jibe is only a
respectful salute from fellow aviators who saw the Weasels vrrite a
glowing chapter of heroism in the SAM filled skies of North Vietnam
while adding a new dimension to the art of tactical air warfare.
Clear proof of the high risk factor associated with the Wild Weasel
I tactics came early, 20 December 1965, when Captains John Pitch-
ford and Bob Trier became the first Wild Weasel crew shot down.
On this occasion. Captain Pitchford, flying a specially-fitted F-IOOF,
was guiding four F-105s inland. Just north of Haiphong, the rattle-
snake sound of a "Fan Song" radar was detected. As the F-IOOF crew
stalked the quarry, the flak became extremely heavy and a 37 mm
shell exploded in the aft section of the "hunter."
24
Unable now to press the attack, John pulled up and fired his mark-
ing rockets into the suspected SAM area before turning toward the
Tonkin Gulf, sixty miles away. The Thunderchiefs fired their rockets
into the area marked by the Weasel and then streaked toward the
crippled F-IOOF to help if possible.
The Weasel was shedding -Jarts and trailing smoke, but still flying
and clawing for altitude. Captain Pitchford had managed to get the
engine "Fire" light to go out by reducing power, and he was confi-
dent of reaching the water when he abruptly ran out of luck, and
hydraulic fluid. No hydraulic fluid meant no flight controls, and the
aircraft immediately nosed down and started gaining speed. It was
time to get out!
Captain Trier ejected first with Captain Pitchford not far behind.
They saw the F-IOOF explode below them as they descended into
North Vietnam— John Pitchford to become the first Wild Weasel
POW, Bob Trier, the first Wild Weasel MIA.
On 11 August 1967, the Weasels once again did a "full day's
work." Place of business, the Doumer Bridge. On this occasion, Lt
Col James E. Mclnerney, Jr., and his back seater. Captain Fred
Shannon, both earned the Air Force Cross for leading a Wild Weasel
flight that destroyed six SAM sites and damaged four others. Their
heroic suppression efforts allowed the first Doumer Bridge strike
force to complete its mission and escape without a loss. No one could
ask for more .
Aerial Reconnaissance
Modern day US reconnaissance aircrews act as the eyes and ears of
the commander and employ an impressive array of sophisticated
aerial cameras and sensors to acquire photographic and electronic
intelligence about the enemy and his environment. Reconnaissance
aircraft are usually employed singly to achieve maximum surprise, in
contrast to strike aircraft which are employed in larger numbers for
mutual protection and to put the necessary ordnance on the target.
US reconnaissance aircraft have traditionally been unarmed, partly
for political reasons and partly to encourage the aircrews to avoid
conflict and get the film back home. Unlike a strike mission, which is
successful if the target is destroyed, a photo reconnaissance mission is
successful only if the aircraft gets back home with the film and other
target information.
These unique differences in reconnaissance employed concepts
and tactics led quite naturally to the motto, "Alone, Unarmed, and
Unafraid." Although the "Alone" status was to fluctuate somewhat
in the course of events, and the "Unafraid" status was subject to sorae
debate, the reconnaissance forces remained "Unarmed" throughout
the Vietnam war.
25
Because they travel alone, or at most in pairs, reconnaissance
crews can be more flexible than the strike force in attacking a target.
Maneuvering prior to the target is restrained only by the enemy
defenses and the crew's imagination. The moment of truth arrives
when the aircraft has to be steady over the target at the proper
altitude to insure photo coverage. For many, the fulfillment of this
requirement proved to be the final moment of truth.
In our tale of bridge -busting, the recce crews got the photos for
strike pilots to see what the target — and its defenses— looked like and
then went in right behind them to document the damage. Men like
George Hall and Dan Doughty in RF-lOls, John Stavast/Geny
Venanzi and Terry Hicks/Joe Shanahan in RF-4Cs were the unsung
heroes as the "eyes of the Air Force." Unfortunately, some of them
didn't get back home with the film, but their buddies who did
brought many of the pictures you see in this book.
A lesser known recce function was the electronic countermeasures
(ECM) mission. The EB-66 was an older bird, loaded with elec-
tronic gear, that patrolled North Vietnam's skies and jam-
med/suppressed AAA and SAM radars. They tuned up and, on cue,
played their harmony part in the great orchestration of a bridge-
busting mission.
Combat Air Patrol (MIG CAP)
Control of the airspace over North Vietnam was a major con-
sideration in all air strikes in the country. The Combat Air Patrol, or
as it was commonly referred to throughout the war, the MIG CAP,
was that portion of the strike force whose sole job was to protect the
strike aircraft from attack by MIG fighters.
Air strikes by the US Navy in August 1964 (in retaliation for DRV
attacks on the DE SOTO Patrol) prompted the North Vietnamese
into an accelerated build-up of their MIG capability. By mid -June
1965, they had received some 70 MIG- 15s and MIG- 17s and in
December of that year were getting MIG-21s. With Russian aid,
their early warning and height finding radar capability also increas-
ed rapidly. This new capability gave them ground controlled in-
tercept (GCI) coverage over all of North Vietnam and much of the
Gulf of Tonkin.
The North Vietnamese demonstrated their fighter capability early
in the game when MIG- 17s scrambled in defense of the Thanh Hoa
Bridge on 4 April 1965. On this second US air strike against the
Dragon's Jaw, two bomb -laden F-105Ds were shot down. For
the early Thanh Hoa raids, protective air cover for the strike
force was being accomplished by F-lOODs, armed with
Sidewinder missiles and four 20mm cannons.
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In June 1965, two Navy F-4Bs downed two MIG-17s with Sparrow
missiles, the first confirmed MIG kills in SEA. The USAF then began
using the F-4C as its primary MIG CAP aircraft, and, on July 10,
1965, two USAF F-4Cs downed two MIG -17s with Sidewinder
missiles.
Air Refueling: The Tankers
The "gas station in the sky" was the accepted nickname for the
KC-135 Strato-tanker long before Vietnam, and it was ideal for the
task of refueling both bomber and fighter aircraft in SEA. The
military version of Boeing's 707, it is a high-speed, high-altitude bird
capable of offloading any or all of its 30,000 gallons-plus fuel
capacity.
Airborne refueling in direct support of combat operations was the
primary mission of the tanker force and included both pre-strike and
post -strike refuelings. It also included fuel for fighters flying
RESCAP (MIG cover and ground fire suppression for rescue opera-
tions) , photo reconnaissance and electronic intelligence (FLINT)
aircraft, and, on occasions. Navy aircraft.
The term "save" was used to reflect an air refueling with a receiver
which had insufficient fuel to return to his base. In early 1965, the
nickname Young Tiger was given to KG -135s refueling tactical
fighters and reconnaissance aircraft in SEA. Young Tiger came to be
a nickname revered by the consumer and borne proudly by the
tanker crews. The "Save Scrapbook" of the 4252nd Strategic Wing
contains the account of a battle-damaged fighter who was losing
more fuel than the tanker was offloading to him . The tanker towed
the fighter back to his base with its boom, unlatching him on final
approach.
The strike aircraft used in Southeast Asia between 1965 and 1972
were fast, maneuverable, and rugged, capable of doing the job. The
Thud, the Phantom, and the Navy birds, when allowed to work at
full capacity, made the transport of men and material a hazardous
operation for the North Vietnamese. But these planes and their
courageous pilots would have been far, far less effective, if able to
operate at all, had it not been for the support they received from the
"gas stations in the sky," the "Wild Weasels," and the recce pilots fly-
ing their solitary missions. Between April 1965 and December 1972,
Air Force and Navy strike aircraft, ably assisted by their suptport
forces, blasted away at the Thanh Hoa and the Paul Doumer
Bridges. It is this well -orchestrated effort that the Tale of Two
Bridges is all about.
28
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30
Chapter III. Early USAF Attacks
on the Thanh Hoa Bridge
The March 1965 decision to interdict the North Vietnamese rail
system south of the 20th parallel led immediately to the April 3rd
strike against the Thanh Hoa Railroad and Highway Bridge, known
to the Vietnamese as Ham Rong (the Dragon's Jaw) . The task of
planning and coordinating the mission fell to the men of the (5 7th
Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) , the "Fighting Cocks," command-
ed and led by Lieutenant Colonel Robinson Risner. Seven years
later, this same 67th TFS would take the initial F-4C Wild Weasels
into combat, but on 1 April 1965, the squadron was flying F-105D
"Thunderchiefs" out of Korat Air Base, Thailand, and preparing to
strike the Thanh Hoa Bridge.
The first punch at the Dragon's Jaw was scheduled to be thrown
the morning of 2 April, but a shortage of tankers and marginal
weather conditions in the target area caused the initial strike to be
delayed for 24 hours. Shortly after noontime of 3 April 1965, the air-
craft of RoUing Thunder Mission 9 -Alpha finally climbed into the
humid skies of Southeast Asia on their journey to the Thanh Hoa
Bridge. This force consisted of 79 aircraft ; forty-six F-105s; twenty-
one F-lOOs; two RF-lOls; and ten KC-135 tankers. The F-lOOs
came from bases in South Vietnam, while the rest of the aircraft were
from squadrons on temporary duty at various Thai bases. The ord-
nance loads and missions of these planes were as diverse as the fields
from which they flew.
Sixteen of the forty-six "Thuds" were loaded with a pair of
Bullpup missiles, and each of the remaining thirty carried eight 750-
pound general purpose bombs. The aircraft that carried the missiles,
and half of the bombers, were scheduled to strike the bridge; the re-
maining fifteen would provide flak suppression.
Seven of the F-10(te were assigned to flak suppression, two to
weather reconnaissance, four to provide MIG CAP, and eight were
tasked for rescue top cover (RESCAP) , if required. The RESCAP
and flak suppression "Super Sabres" each carried two pods of nine-
teen 2.75 inch rockets, (The "flak birds" had two 750-pound bombs
for good measure.) The MIG CAP F-lOOs were armed vnth
31
"Sidewinder" missiles, and the weather recce aircraft had only the 20
mm cannon ammunition which was common to all strike aircraft.
The RF-101 "Voodoo" reconnaissance pilots were scheduled to ob-
tain pre -strike and post -strike aerial photography of the bridge.
Lt Colonel Risner was designated overall mission coordinator for
the attack. His plan called for individual flights of four F-105s from
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Ingress routes for the Thanh Hoa bridge.
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Korat and Takhli which would be air refueled over the Mekong River
before tracking across Laos to an initial point (IP) three minutes
south of the bridge. Flights were scheduled to arrive over the IP only
minutes apart (exact spacing depended upon the type ordnance car-
ried) so precision timing was essential to prevent the aircraft from
bunching up. The flights had to hit the IP on time and proceed
directly to the attack, for it is a fighter pilot's "no-no" to hold up the
aircraft behind you, especially in the target area.
The attacks would be made by proceeding north from the IP, ac-
quiring the bridge visually, and then accomplishing a right hand
roll -in to cross the basically east -west bridge at a 20° angle on a
northeasterly heading. Those carrying "Bullpups" would launch
their weapons at approximately twelve thousand feet, while the 750-
pound bombs would be released between six and four thousand feet ,
with a minimum one thousand foot pull-out. This low altitude plan
reflected both excessive confidence in suppression forces and a low
regard for small arms and automatic weapons (AW) effectiveness at
the outset of the war. In defense of the tactic, however, remember
that this target proved to be more heavily defended than any previ-
ously struck, and the Thud pilots would have to press in close if they
hoped to hit a target only 56 feet wide with free-fall bombs. The
learning process for this generation of fighter pilots was just begin-
ning in April 1965.
After weapon release, the plan called for all aircraft to continue
east until over the Gulf of Tonkin where rejoin would take place and
a Navy destroyer would be available to recover anyone who had to
eject due to battle damage or other causes. After rejoin, all aircraft
would return to their launch bases, hopefully to the tune of "The
Ham Rong Bridge is falling down."
All the crews were thoroughly briefed on the strike plan. Strike
pilots studied photos of the bridge to clarify the aiming points v^hich
were the abutments at both ends of the bridge. The destruction of
either abutment would drop that particular end of the bridge into
the Song Ma River. Other photos indicated that enemy anti-aircraft
guns would be no heavier than 37mm.
Lt Colonel Risner's precise planning and coordination produced a
clockwork-type operation, and all participants moved smoothly into
place for the planned 1400 hours time-on-target (TOT) . The F-
100s from South Vietnam came up the enemy coast to accomplish
their various support missions, while the strike force proceeded to the
target area, cruising at an altitude of 17,000 feet. The sky was clear
and the F-lOO weather reconnaissance pilots reported visibility as
five to seven miles in haze at the target.
The flak suppression sorties led the attack. Bombs and rockets
were still exploding in the target area when the first flight of Bullpup
carriers approached the bridge from the south and prepared to roll-
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in. The sun glinting through the haze was making the target
somewhat difficult to acquire, but Lt Colonel Risner led the way
"down the chute" and 250-pound missiles were soon exploding on the
target. Since these missiles had to be released and guided one at a
time, each pilot shooting Bullpups had to go around for a second fir-
ing pass. This second pass could slow things down considerably
without the precision timing between flights.
The first two flights had already left the target when Captain Bill
Meyerholt, number three man in the third flight, rolled his Thun-
derchief into a dive and squeezed off a Bullpup . The missile trailed
bright orange fire as it streaked earthward toward the bridge. As
smoke from the previous attacks drifted away from the target, Cap-
tain Meyerholt was surprised to see no visible damage to the bridge as
he guided his missile to a hit on the superstructure and pulled up to
go around again. Like its predecessors, his missile had merely
charred the heavy steel and concrete structure. When a second attack
produced the same results, it became all too obvious that firing
Bullpups at the Dragon was about as effective as shooting B-B pellets
at a Sherman tank.
The remaining missile attacks only served to confirm this obser-
vation. When the first of the bomb-carrying Thuds arrived on the
scene, the target had barely been scratched. The bombing pilots
planned to remedy this situation as they rolled their machines in on
the target from 13,000 feet and then tried to keep their aircraft
slowed down to the 500-knot release airspeed (the F-105 is notorious
for its ability to go downhill rapidly) . Hence, the 4,000 foot
Capt Bill Meyerholt who watched his BULLPUP missiles "bounce off" the Thanh Hoa
Bridge. H : ^ .
36
F-105D armed with BULLPUP missiles taking on fuel prior to heading for the Thanh
Hoa bridge, 3 April 1965.
minimum release altitude came up quickly, with several pilots drop-
ping their string of eight bombs as low as 3,600 feet, only to see them
hit on the far bank because of a very strong southwest wind. The last
flight of the day, led by Captain Carlyle S. "Smitty" Harris, adjusted
their aiming points and scored several good hits on the roadway and
superstructure. Heavy smoke and haze, however, precluded any
bomb damage assessment by Smitty's flight as they pulled off the
target and headed for the Tonkin Gulf, but it was obvious that the
bridge still stood. When Smitty looked back at the charred structure,
he had no way of knowing that the smoke was really a warning from
the Dragon's Jaw.
Aircraft rejoin and; recovery went basically as planned, but two
aircraft did not make it through the battle. Anti-aircraft fire, con-
siderably more intense than anticipated, had claimed an F-lOO flak
suppressor and an RF-101. Lt Colonel Risner's Thud also took a hit
just as his second missile hit the bridge. Fighting a serious fuel leak
and a smoke -filled cockpit in addition to the enemy, he nevertheless
nursed his crippled aircraft to Da Nang, in South Vietnam.
On this first attack, ten dozen 7 50 -pound, general purpose bombs
and thirty-two missiles had been aimed at the bridge. Numerous hits
had charred every part of the structure, yet it gave no evidence of go-
ing down. Only the roadway on the south side was damaged enough
37
to prohibit vehicular traffic. The highway on the northern side and
the railroad in the center would require only minor repairs. The
Thanh Hoa Bridge had suffered far less damage than its attackers
had hoped for, and a restrike was ordered for the next day.
Aircrews and headquarters personnel, especially those involved
with weapon planning, were disappointed and disturbed that this
bridge had not fallen like those attacked previously. They did not yet
appreciate that the Ham Rong Bridge had been, architecturally,
grossly overbuilt. The center pillar of concrete and steel was enor-
mous, the abutments were anchored into hillsides with reinforced
concrete 30 to 40 feet thick, and most importantly, the strong single
truss supported only the middle twelve feet of the bridge containing
the railroad. The 22 -foot highway lanes cantilevered on each side
were expendable, and bombs impacting on them had little effect on
the girders or the truss. Heavy weapons would have to be dropped
within the narrow trussed area of the bridge to make it fall . Such a
combination of weapons and accuracy was not available to the Thud
pilots as they readied for the second go at the Dragon's Jaw.
The restrike was again coordinated and led by Lt Colonel Risner,
but changes were made in force size, ordnance loads and tactics.
This time, forty-eight F-105s would attack the bridge. Each would
drop eight 750-pound bombs and the ineffective missiles were left at
home for use against softer targets. The F-lOOs were still tasked to
provide MIG CAP, RESCAP, and weather reconnaissance in the
target area. However, no aircraft were scheduled for flak suppression
after the previous day's futile effort.
The routing was essentially the same as the day before, so at 1057
hours on 4 April 1965, "Robbie" Risner once again turned north at
the IP and began looking for the target. The low, "scuddy" clouds
(and haze) dictated that on this strike the target could best be ac-
quired if the bombing were done from east to west, still cutting
diagonally across the length of the bridge. This meant the Thuds
would be going away from the friendly expanses of the Tonkin Gulf
during their attacks, a fact that would become most significant to
Smitty Harris before the day was done.
Lt Colonel Risner once again was the first man over the bridge,
but on this mission he had ordered to stay high over the battle to
evaluate the effectiveness of each strike and redirect subsequent
strikes. He was watching intently for enemy defensive reactions and
bomb impact points when Smitty Harris, the first man down the
chute, began attack number two. The pilots behind him planned to
delay slightly so as to "go to school" on the initial bombs whose im-
pact point would give a good indication of the wind correction re-
quired for accurate bombing.
Captain Harris was in a steep dive angle and could see the muzzle
flashes from anti-aircraft weapons as he centered the target in his
38
sight and pushed the "pickle button" on top of the control stick at
about 4,000 feet. Smitty immediately felt his Thud lighten as three
tons of bombs departed for the Thanh Hoa Bridge. Moments later,
as he was puIHng out of the dive at 1 ,000 feet and turning east toward
the Gulf, a 37 mm shell slammed into the aft fuselage section of his
aircraft .
The stricken Thunderchief immediately decelerated and
wrenched violently to the side. The left wing fuel tank ripped away
from the aircraft and Smitty was fighting for his life. Reacting in-
stinctively, he managed to bring the disabled craft under control
while fighting for altitude and trying to restart the mortally wounded
engine. It was only ten miles to the water, but Captain Harris was
riding a losing horse. If he had been headed toward the Tonkin Gulf
when he came off the target, he might have made it. Instead, the
systems warning lights were coming on one after another, the aircraft
was shuddering and losing airspeed, and it was time to step outside.
The pilots directly behind the stricken aircraft could see the aft
fuselage burning and coming apart, and they called for Smitty to
"get out" as he disappeared into the low clouds and haze. Captain
Harris never heard these calls — his aircraft radio was out and after
ejection the only radio available to him was inside his survival kit. So
he had no opportunity to contact anyone on the emergency net
before he was captured by fifty to sixty armed peasants when he
landed in a rice paddy near the target. He recalled hearing what
were probably 750-pound bombs pounding at the Thanh Hoa
Bridge, but the muffled roar could have been the Dragon sentencing
him to over seven years in North Vietnamese POW campsi
Captain Harris was not the only pilot lost that day. Two other F-
1 05s were shot down before they ever reached the target area . These
aircraft were the last flight scheduled to strike the bridge, and they
had arrived early at the IP. They were orbiting and awaiting their
turn at the Dragon when four MIG-17s came out of the clouds with
cannon blazing. MIGs had been seen on previous missions, but this
was the first MIG attack of the war. . . and it was over almost as
rapidly as it began. The enemy aircraft had used a diving, high speed
pass, coming in behind the bomb -laden Thuds to nail the flight
leader and his wingman. There was no chance to get even, as they
continued straight ahead and out of the area at maximum speed.
Both F-105 pilots were lost. The MIGs had come to protect the
prestigious bridge and, in so doing, added a new dimension to what
was now a rapidly expanding war.
Lt Colonel Risner, despite the historic first MIG attack, refused to
be diverted from his primary mission. The Thud pilots continued to
press the attack, braving a hail of anti-aircraft fire to put their
bombs on the bridge — again with disappointing results.
Although over 300 bombs scroed hits on this second strike, the
39
bridge still spanned the Song Ma River. The striking force had in-
flicted the maximum destruction possible considering the weapons
available, and the bombs had been accurately dropped through a
hail of anti-aircraft fire that, for the first time, included 57mm guns.
The bridge had been severely damaged. Both the northern and
southern highways were heavily cratered and large chunks of con-
crete were missing. Several truss beams had been blown away and
bombs had blasted right through the railroad into the river. The
eastern span was sagging, but had not gone down. Extensive repairs
would be required to make the bridge passable for rail traffic and the
highways would never be restored to their former capability. The
hard fact was that 750-pound bombs just were not big enough to
deliver the coup de grace to such a formidable structure.
There was some consolation in the fact that the second raid did see
the final destruction of several other less prestigious but, never-
theless, choice targets in the Thanh Hoa area. Primary among these
was the local thermal -power plant that was seventy-five percent
destroyed by well-placed 750-pounders and the aircrews mopped up
by pounding a locomotive (with train) and 22 trucks into burning
rubble with 20mm cannon fire. On the credit side, the bridge was
sagging, a power plant was closed for the duration, plus a train and
some trucks had been pulverized.
Thanh Hoa was only one target and in the overall interdiction of
DRV supplies, results were in favor of the bombing campaign. The
enemy was being denied his normal supply routes and the entire
North Vietnamese transportation system was undergoing drastic
hange. Trucks now moved only short distances and almost ex-
clusively at night ; trails were used rather than the roads ; ferries sub-
stituted for missing bridges; pack animals and human supply
carriers were pressed into service; and anti-aircraft guns and am-
munition were being trasported along jungle trails. In effect, a com-
pletely new system, dependent on manpower, was evolving.
As the North Vietnamese reacted to the interdiction campaign, we
were also learning valuable lessons that would pay dividends later in
the war. Our early Thanh Hoa strikes and other USAF/USN high
risk attacks contributed directly to the development of aircrew sur-
vival vests containing flares and radios, bombing tactics to keep air-
craft out of the range of small arms and automatic weapons fire,
procedures and formations to counter the MIG threat, new and bet-
ter ordnance, and improved mission and weapon planning.
The trusty Thuds returned to the Dragon's Jaw on 7 May, just after
the enemy had succeeded in making the bridge operational for rail
traffic. This mission included F-4C Phantoms, armed with air-to-air
missiles to oppose the new MIG threat, and electronic intelligence
aircraft to confirm, if possible, the now suspected enemy use of
ground controlled intercept tactics and radar directed AAA .
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Twenty-eight F-105s bombed the bridge with 750 -pound bombs
(still the largest available) , and once again the eastern span was
charred, chipped, and twisted without going down. On this mission,
the aiming point was changed to a point midway between the center
and eastern end of the bridge rather than the abutments. As a result,
the eastern approach roads and the railroad were totally destroyed by
bombs that impacted just off the end of the bridge. The Dragon's
Jaw was again closed for repairs. One F-105 was lost to anti-aircraft
fire that now reached to 15,000 feet, but this time the pilot made it to
the Tonkin Gulf prior to ejection and was rescued with only minor
injuries.
Closing the Thanh Hoa bridge to traffic was just part of the overall
campaign against the enemy's logistic capability below the 20th
parallel . The destruction of bridges not only impeded the movement
of war supplies, but also trapped large amounts of railroad rolling
stock in the southern part of North Vietnam. This stranded equip-
ment immediately became targets for armed recce ' pilots, who
seldom saw a train now that the enemy supply operations were almost
exclusively at nighttime .
On one occasion, the closing of the Dragon's Jaw led directly to the
destruction of 144 railroad cars and three locomotives that could not
escape into their sanctuary above the 20th parallel. This significant
success once again underlined the value to the enemy of the bridge at
Thanh Hoa . It was the final bridge to safety in the bomb -free upper
latitudes, and despite the fact that its strategic importance had
seriously diminished with the effective interdictioti of the rail line to
Vinh, it remained a valuable target.
By mid-May 1965, a total of 27 North Vietnamese bridges had
been attacked and 26 had been destroyed. Only the Dragon's Jaw
remained standing and only the "Dragon" had taken its toll in
American aircraft. Bullput missiles and 750-pound bombs had been
quite sufficient for the French designed bridges, but were inadequate
for the job at the "unengineered" Thanh Hoa Bridge. The ordnance
was on target, but just wasn't designed for a bridge of this construc-
tion.
These well -delivered bombs temporarily closed the Thanh Hoa
bridge each time it was struck; however, round-the-clock repair ac-
tivity returned it to service each time. In light of previous strikes and
losses, future attacks would require some changes. Primary among
these changes was a reduction in the size of the attacking force. Flak
suppression, MIG CAP, and other supporting aircraft would no
longer be scheduled, and the strike aircraft would carry improved ord-
nance when it became available. The "Big Bullpup" with a 1,000-
pound warhead and 3, 000 -pound bombs were to be in the Southeast
' Armed recce is a "search and destroy" mission performed by fighter aircraft.
42
Asia inventory by July. These large weapons could then be tested
against the bridge.
The fourth Thanh Hoa mission, on 30 May 1965, was the first ap-
plication of these new policies. This strike consisted on only four F-
105s, which dropped thirty-two 750-pound bombs on the bridge.
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Although the bridge suffered only moderate damage, it was enough
to close it to road and rail traffic. As usual, though, the bridge would
soon be patched up by the North Vietnamese repair crews and
another strike would be launched. By that time, it would be the
Navy's turn since the Route Packaging System, initiated in No-
vember 1965, assigned Route Pack IV, with the Thanh Hoa bridge,
to the men and machines of Carrier Task Force 77.
44
Chapter IV. Three Long Years
From the beginning of hostilities in 1964, coordination of the air
interdiction effort against North Vietnam by the USAF and USN had
been a subject of some interest at all levels of command. Because of
differences in operational concepts, procedures and equipment, a
formal USAF/USN command and control system was not im-
mediately established which could allocate available air resources
against the enemy in efficient, coordinated joint air operations. In
the early periods of the war, the US Navy launched its air operations
from two aircraft carriers off the cost of North Vietnam in an area
called "Yankee Station," while the USAF flew from bases in South
Vietnam and Thialand. In mid-1966 the Navy added a third aircraft
carrier to Yankee Station operations.
As the numbers of daily sorties increased, the authorized target list
expanded, the enemy's defenses grew stiffer, and it became in-
creasingly clear that something would have to be done to provide
more control of the TAC-air operating over North Vietnam. CINC-
PAC and CINCPACFLT had delegated authority for day-to-day
planning and conduct of the armed recce portion of Rolling Thun-
der to the Commander 7th Air Force and the Commander, Task
Force 77. They, in turn, had established a Rolling Thunder Armed
Reconnaissance Coordinating Committee (RTARCC) , later
redesignated RTCC. This committee's charter was to resolve and
coordinate items of mutual interest to the Navy and Air Force, to in-
sure optimum effectiveness of the Rolling Thunder program through
elimination of overlapping areas of interest, and to reduce
duplication of effort against North Vietnamese targets.
Inasmuch as the previous system had been less than satisfactory to
both services, RTCC, in November 1965, divided North Vietnam in-
to six areas called Route Packages (RP) and each service was given
primary armed reconnaisance responsibility in several of these RP's.
The USAF and the USN were allotted three packages apiece. From
the inception of the Route Package System, the Thanh Hoa Bridge,
which lay in RP IV became the responsibility of the US Navy. As we
shall soon see, the Navy was to expend considerable air effort against
the bridge with much the same results as the earlier Air Force at-
tacks.
45
Navy Strikes the Thanh Hoa Bridge
The aircraft carriers operating on Yankee Station had fewer air-
craft available for interdiction efforts against North Vietnam than
the USAF. The number and type of aircraft carriers operating on
"the line" varied throughout the conflict, but a typical carrier had
about 70 attack and support aircraft on board. Primary attack air-
craft used by the Navy against the Thanh Hoa Bridge included A-4
Skyhawks, A-7 Corsair II's, A-6 Intruders, F-4B Phantoms and, on
occasion, A-3B Skywarriors and F-8 Crusaders. These planes
delivered vast amounts of ordnance on the bridge in an effort to deny
its use by North Vietnamese trains and trucks. Bombs varying in
size from 500 pounds to 2000 pounds, and missiles with warheads as
large as 1000 pounds of TNT were hurled against the Dragon's Jaw
time after time. The results were twisted girders and temporary clos-
ings of the bridge.
On 17 June 1965, the Navy began a three-year effort to destroy the
bridge. Attacking the target with small strike forces of two to four
aircraft, the Navy hit the bridge some 24 times with a total of 65 air-
craft between June 1965 and the end of May 1966. The ordnance
dropped during this period was approximately 128 tons.
This lack of success in not being able to drop the bridge completely
should not be construed as a lack of capability, initiative, or profes-
sionalism on the part of the aircrews involved; but rather it is an
acknowledgment of the intrinsic strength of the bridge itself. The ex-
perts now realized that weapons in the 2000 and 3000 pound class
would be required to drop the Thanh Hoa Bridge. Both concrete
highways had been destroyed by repeated bombings, thereby elimi-
nating approximately 40 feet of a 56 -foot wide target. Thus, the
placing of a bomb on a 16-foot wide, 500-foot long steel bridge from
a fighter aircraft traveling over 500 mph while being fired on by a
myriad of AAA weapons became a monumental task! Day and night
strikes against the bridge, using visual as well as radar bombing
techniques, had succeeded only in shaking the steel girders. The ap-
proaches to the bridge, however, were battered to the point where,
according to one Navy official, "The general area looks like a valley
on the moon."
The North Vietnamese, in addition to expending a great deal of
manpower and effort on repairing the Thanh Hoa, also built pon-
toon bridges in the vicinity to provide a by-pass while the bridge was
unusable. While this effort was a tribute to the tenacity and dedica-
tion of the North Vietnamese people to keep their lines of com-
munication (LOG) open, it also represented a desired ancillary ef-
fort from an interdiction campaign. The more manpower and time
required by the enemy to keep his LOCs open, the fewer people there
were available for farming, industrial work, and other vital tasks
necessary to keep the war machine in the homeland running.
46
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The proximity of the Thanh Hoa bridge to the Gulf, some eleven
miles inland, together with the normal weather patterns over the
northern part of North Vietnam, combined to provide very poor
weather over the target much of the year. Low cloud ceilings and fog
greatly hampered air operations against the bridge. Smoke from
burning fields and a continual haze were additional hazards in trying
to locate and destroy the bridge. This combination of heavy clouds
and poor visibility put the pilot in a very precarious position to com-
bat the radar-controlled SA-2s and AAA since the ability to elude a
SAM depended upon the pilot seeing it and taking evasive action at
the appropriate time. AAA is also evident by the puffs of smoke left
by exploding shells ; therefore , forces were not sent against the bridge
unless weather conditions were such that the pilot's ability to maneu-
ver and evade were unimpaired.
In some seasons of the year, poor weather permitted only 2-4
visual attacks per month. This, of course, worked to the enemy's ad-
vantage inasmuch as he was able to carry out of great deal of repair
work and thus keep his LOCs open for long periods of time.
Defense Continues to Improve
When the air activities started over North Vietnam in 1964, enemy
defenses were sparse to nonexistent. This, however, was soon to
change in the Thanh Hoa area. By 1966, AAA was being moved into
the area in increasing numbers and the North Vietnamese Air Force
was beginning to flex its muscles. In early January 1966, the first
sighting of a MIG-21 occurred 90 miles east of Thanh Hoa and a sec-
ond MIG was pursued by US fighter aircraft 25 miles southeast of
Thanh Hoa at a low altitude. This was the beginning of the North
Vietnamese Air Force's efforts to extend its operational ring and fre-
quency of fiights over the Gulf of Tonkin and away from the Hanoi
area. Although the US had lost two F-105s to MIGs in April 1965
over Thanh Hoa, very Ittle had been seen of MIGs that far south of
Hanoi.
It became obvious by early 1966 that the North Vietnamese were
being liberally supplied with vast amounts of AAA. Before the
December 1965 standdown, only one mission in twelve — 8 per
cent— had been engaged by North Vietnamese anti-aircraft fire.
However, by late February 1966, AAA defenses had increased to the
point that one mission in four was being engaged and this was to in-
crease dramatically before the war ended.
A part of this rapidly expanding AAA and MIG threat was a more
sophisticated radar-controlled environment which was capable of
providing the range, altitude, speed, and azimuth of US aircraft to
enemy gunners or pilots. To counter this new enemy capability, US
50
This SA-2 anti-aircraft missile (SAM) site (above) was photographed in the vicinity of
Thanh Hoa, North Vietnam. SA-2 site (below) in vicinity of Thanh Hoa Bridge.
51
forces designed and employed a new flak suppression weapon —
cluster bomb units (CBU) —which proved highly successful. Elec-
tronic countermeasures were refined to make it extremely difficult
for the North Vietnamese to use their radar systems without en-
countering jamming. On it went, counter for counter, until the war
was terminated some years later.
Interdiction of the Thanh Hoa-Vinh Rail Line
While efforts were being made to destroy the Thanh Hoa Bridge,
attacks were continually flown against rail line RR#4, which ran
south from Tahnh Hoa to the city of Vinh. Since the bridge had not
been destroyed, it was imperative that rail traffic not be allowed to
move south of Thanh Hoa. It was impossible to prevent all supplies
from getting through to the south, so interdiction became a matter of
making it as difficult, expensive, and time-consuming as possible for
the enemy.
RR#4 was struck repeatedly in early 1966, obliging the North
Vietnamese to rely on trucks for transportation. In May 1966, four
trucks were destroyed by air strikes on highway on highway 1 A, five
miles south of Thanh Hoa. Photographs of the results of this strike
showed 169 inactive units of rolling stock in the vicinity of Thanh
Hoa due to damaged rail lines and highways. Restrikes were im-
mediately launched from the carriers against the trapped cargo,
causing great losses of rolling stock and supplies to North Vietnam.
By mid-June 1966, RR#4 had been interdicted in thirteen places
south of the Thanh Hoa Bridge, and rail traffic was brought to a
standstill.
Although the enemy was catching hell along RR#4 during the first
six months of 1966, the fact remained that the Thanh Hoa Bridge
was still intact. The apparent invincibility of the bridge; its cost in
men, aircraft, and ordnance, its potential strategic importance; its
symbolic value to the North Vietnamese — all served as an incentive
for US aviators to find different techniques to destroy it.
Project "Carolina Moon"-(May 66)
One innovative effort took shape in September 1965. At that time
personnel at the Armament Development Laboratory at Eglin AFB,
Florida, came up with the concept of mass-focusing the energy of
certain high explosive weapons. The applicability of this concept to
new weapon designs was proved in many exhaustive experimental
tests in the Eglin complex. Lieutenant General Moore, Commander
of the 2nd Air Division in Saigon, was informed of the new mass-
focus weapon and its potential against bridges, particularly against
52
the Thanh Hoa Bridge. The new weapon, however, was rather large
and would have to be delivered by a cargo type aircraft. General
Moore felt that attrition would be high if cargo aircraft were used
directly against the Thanh Hoa Bridge. He responded by suggesting
that methods of upriver delivery be studied.
As the development of the weapon progressed, it became evident
that delivery by C-130 aircraft was feasible and the Tactical Air
Warfare Center (TAWC) was directed to form and train an ap-
propriate task force. The weapon, in its final configuration, would
weigh 5,000 pounds and resemble a large pancake about 8 feet in
diameter and 2-1/^ feet thick. The design was such that the weapon
was detonated initially around its periphery with the resultant force
of the explosion focused along the axis of the weapon in both direc-
tions. The weapon was to be floated down the Song Ma River where
it would pass under the Dragon's Jaw, and detonate when sensors in
the bomb detected the metal of the bridge structure.
It sounded like a bold plan — and it was. Specialists in many fields
were called upon to solve problems associated with extraction tech-
niques, chute deployment, drop accuracy, and river transit of
weapon affected by such things as depth and current of the river,
position of the tide, and wind draft on its exposed surfaces. This was
a formidable task, but acceptable solutions were found and the plan
proceeded.
Two C-130 crews and supporting personnel were sent to Eglin
AFB for intensive training and preparation for the upcoming mis-
sion. The first crew was led by Major Richard T. Remers ; the second
by Major Thomas F. Case. Quite simply, the plan was to drop five
weapons one to two miles up river from the bridge under the cover of
darkness. Entry and exit over the North Vietnamese terrain would be
at less than 500 feet to avoid radar detection. The route selected was
about 43 miles long, which meant the aircraft would be over enemy
territory for at least 17 minutes.
To assist in masking the approach of the C-130, a flight of two F-4
fighter aircraft was scheduled to make a diversionary attack, using
flares and bombs, on the highway 10 miles south of Thanh Hoa
shortly before the C-130 was to drop its ordnance. In addition, a
EB-66 was tasked to carry out jamming in the area during the attack
period. The plan was firm, the crews were selected, and training
began at an accelerated pace. Training sites in the Eglin area, which
had radar returns similar to those anticipated during the 17 -minute
flight over North Vietnam, were selected.
Their training completed, the two C-130 crews and aircraft
deployed to Danang AB on 15 May 1966. Along with the necessary
maintenance and munitions specialists, ten mass-focus weapons were
provided, allowing for a second mission should the first one fail to ac-
complish the desired results. The last of the contingent arrived at
53
Danang on 22 May 1966 and began their final preparation for this
unique assault on the Dragon's Jaw.
Last minute changes made on the route to the target included in-
telligence up-dates on automatic weapons and anti-aircraft artillery
positions, as well as a review of checklist and rescue procedures. In
this regard, an interesting discussion developed between the two
crews. Major Remers felt that the aircraft was tough enough to sur-
vive moderate anti-aircraft artillery hits, and gain enough altitude
should bail-out be necessary. Major Case agreed that the aircraft
could take hits, but the low-level flight would preclude a controlled
bail-out situation. With these conflicting philosophies, and the fact
that either parachutes or flak vests could be worn— but, not
both — Major Remers decided that his crew would wear parachutes
and stack their flak vests on the floor of the aircraft ; Major Case
decided that his crew would wear only flak vests and store the
parachutes!
The first strike was scheduled for the night of 30 May, but on 27
May, intelligence detected a five-fold increase in AW sites and five
new AAA sites. However, a re -evaluation of the plan showed it to be
secure and ^he mission was "on."
Major Remers and his crew took off from Danang at 25 minutes
past midnight, turned out over the water at 100 feet altitude and
headed north under radio silence. Within an hour, he had guided his
bird to the coast -in point in North Vietnam. Maintaining an altitude
of 100 feet above the water to avoid enemy radar detection, the big
four -engine Hercules crossed the coast of North Vietnam and headed
for the bomb release point. Two release points had been selected in
the river; one was two miles and the alternate, one mile from the
bridge; it was left to Major Remers and his two navigators. Captain
Norman G. Clanton and First Lieutenant William "Rocky" Ed-
mondson, to detect the actual drop point.
As they approached the first drop zone, Major Remers climbed the
aircraft to 400 feet and slowed to 150 MPH. Having encountered no
enemy fire, he elected to press on to the closer drop zone. Shortly af-
ter passing the first release point, heavy, intense AW and AAA fire
was encountered, but it was too late to turn back. Fortunately, the
ground fire, although intense, was inaccurate and missed the C-130
by several hundred feet. The five weapons were dropped successfully
in the area closest to the bridge. Immediately after the drop. Major
Remers banked his "Herky-bird" sharply to the right, dove back to
100 feet above the ground and made for the safety of the Gulf of
Tonkin. The operation has gone flawlessly! The diversionary attack
south of Thanh Hoa went as planned and, although it drew an un-
friendly reception, both F-4's returned to Thailand unscathed.
Mission effectiveness could not be assessed until the photo recon-
naissance birds made their run at dawn. Needless to say, the crew felt
54
Major Remers' crew immediately after mission : Kneeling : 1st Lt William R. Edmondson,
navigator; Capt Norman G. Clanton, navigator; SSgt Aubrey B. Turner, loadmaster;
A3C Johnny A. Benoit.loadmaster. Standing: MSgt John R. Shields, flight engineer; 1st
Lt Thomas M. Turner, co-pilot ; Maj Richard T. Remers, aircraft commander.
the mission was personally successful — they had survived.
Pent-up emotions of the crev^f gave way to excited activity by all in-
volved in the project as they waited for the recce report. Un-
fortunately, the pictures revealed no noticeable damage to the
Thanh Hoa Bridge nor were any of the bombs seen along the edge of
the river. Intelligence could find no trace of the bombs and a second
mission was laid on for the next night, 31 May. The plan for Major
Case's crew was basically the same with the exception of a minor time
change and slight modification to the route of flight.
A change in crew was made at the last miriute when Major Case
asked "Rocky" Edmondson, the navigator from the previous night's
mission, to go along qo this one because of his experience from the
night before. Ten mittuteiJ after its planned 1 :00 AM takeoff, the C-
130 departed Danang, turned out over water, and headed north.
The aircraft and crew were never seen or heard from again.
The flight of F-4s was making its diversionary attack at the
designated time when one of the F-4 crews saw anti-aircraft fire and
a large ground flash in the vicinity of the Thanh Hoa Bridge ap-
proximately two minutes prior to the scheduled C-130 drop time.
Photo reconnaissance the next njqrning revealed no wreckage and an
intensive search and rescue mission was flown over the Gulf of
Tonkin with no results. Moreover, one of the two F-4 aircraft was
shot down that evening and its crew was never reGovejpd. With the
55
unsuccessful conclusion of this second mission, the remaining C-130,
its crew, and support personnel redeployed to the United States and
the mass-focus weapon was not used again in Southeast Asia.
Some time later, a North Vietnamese PT boat crewman was taken
prisoner, and during his interrogation he revealed that in May 1966,
a US aircraft dropped five mines in the river near the Thanh Hoa
Bridge. Although four of the five mines exploded, there was little
damage to the bridge.
In June of 1966, Major Remers saw communist film footage from a
Japanese source on a major US evening news program which showed
the North Vietnamese parading what he recognized to be parts of a
C-130. Additionally, the North Vietnamese stated that none of the
Americans on board the aircraft had survived.
Strikes Continue Through 1966
The weather in RP IV was so poor during the early months of 1966
that the Navy flew only eleven bombing sorties against the Thanh
Hoa Bridge, just enough to keep the rail approaches to the bridge in
bad shape. As the weather began to clear in the summer months,
more and more effort was expended against the Dragon's Jaw and the
lines of communication north and south of the bridge. The pressure
and accuracy of the air strikes severely limited the supplies the North
Vietnamese could trasport on Highway lA and RR#4. This suc-
cessful interdiction of the LOG south of Thanh Hoa caused the
enemy to shift his southern LOG westward to Route 15 which put his
supply route closer to Air Force interdiction operations.
On 23 September, the Thanh Hoa Bridge was struck by 22 Navy
attack aircraft which dropped 57 tons of ordnance and rendered the
bridge unserviceable once again. Some 80 units of rolling stock and
1678 tons of POL, trapped in the Thanh Hoa area, were
systematically destroyed during a four day period. The North Viet-
namese supply effort had been dealt a blow.
Clearing weather allowed the US air effort to expand over the
North Vietnamese heartland and with it canne changes in the NVN
defense system. By July 1966 SAM firings had increased six-fold over
the month of June. The North Vietnamese changed their missile
tactics by firing two missiles at once, fuzing them for different
altitudes. In addition, missile launch procedures were varied; the
missile was sometimes fired with the guidance radar in "standby" un-
til the missile entered its final phase of flight, when the guidance
radar would be turned on and signals sent to the missile to intercept
the aircraft. This procedure deprived US pilots of precious seconds of
reaction time in evading the missiles.
Despite these and other tactical changes, AAA remained the
greatest threat to US aircraft. As a pilot took evasive maneuvers to
56
escape the deadly SA-2, he would turn hard and head for the
ground, thereby defeating the missile which could not turn as fast.
However, as the aircraft descended to lower altitudes, it entered the
lethal envelope of the heaviest AAA environment in all aerial war-
fare. So it was a combination of SAMs and AAA that the pilot had to
contend with, and anything less than complete attention to the
situation at hand often spelled disaster.
In October 1966, photo reconnaissance missions revealed little or
no activity in the repair of the bridges and rail facilities along RR#4
south of Thanh Ho a. No airstrikes were flown against Thanh Hoa
during this time. However, in December 1966, photo reconnaissance
revealed increased tempo in repair activity along the rail lines,
bridges, and rail yards. This called for renewed action against the
rail lines as well as the bridge itself. Thus the strikes went on, day af-
ter day, week after week, with notable success against the LOCs but
powerless to knock out the bridge.
The Walleye Glide Bomb
Several strikes were ilown against the "Dragon" during the first few
weeks of 1967, but with the same disappointing results. In January
1967, however, a US Navy aircraft carrier departed San Diego,
California, carrying a new generation of weapons into the Vietnam
conflict, the Walleye Glide Bomb, one of the new "smart bombs."
The Walleye is a free-fall glide bomb with a 1000-pound warhead
which has in the nose a TV camera designed to track and impact on
a high contrast aim point the camera relays what it sees to a scope in
the cockpit through which the pilot identifies the target. The pilot
sights the target on his scope, positions a set of crosshairs over the
pre -selected contrast point, identifies this point to the Walleye, and
releases the bomb within its glide and guidance parameters. The key
significance of this new weapon is its pinpoint accuracy. It also fur-
nishes a limited stand-off capability, which allows the pilot to release
the weapon farther away from the target than is possible with con-
ventional bombs.
In early March 1967, plans were made to attack the Thanh Hoa
Bridge as soon as possible with the new Walleye. Missions were flown
on 11 March, using the Walleye against military barracks and small
bridges to familiarize the pilots with actual weapon employment.
Results of these strikes were so successful that the Commander,
Carrier Division, Task Force 77, scheduled a Walleye mission against
the Dragon's Jaw on 12 March. Attack Squadron 212, designated for
this strike, had been provided with a scale model of the Thanh Hoa
Bridge to be used in conjunction with a movable light source
(simulating the sun) to locate the best points of contrast and the
time of day these conditions would occur. Army demolition experts
57
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also were on board the carrier to assist in identifying the most
vulnerable spots on the bridge structure and the sun's contrasting ef-
fect, the pilots and demolition experts agreed that 1412 hours (2 : 12
pm) on 12 March would provide maximum contrast for the chosen
aim point.
The sun shone brightly on 12 March as the pilots rode the
escalators from their ready rooms to the flight deck. Although there
was a considerable number of AW and AAA sites protecting the
Dragon, the strike force for this mission consisted of only three A -4
Skyhawks, with one Walleye each, and two F-8 Crusaders for MIG
protection. The mission was planned so that each aircraft would
make individual runs on the bridge from south to north in order to
give the pilot as much time as possible to locate
the aim point, identify it to the weapon, and release it. The flight
was launched and joined up over the carrier prior to heading for the
target. Enroute, the pilots completed their checks on the weapons
systems and declared the mission a "Go."
Over the target, each pilot dove at the bridge at 500 mph and
released his weapon as planned. Initially the AW and AAA was very
light, but when the third pilot initiated his run, the enemy fire was
extremely heavy. As the pilot searched for the aim point, he could
see, in his peripheral vision, hundreds of flashes on the ground which
he knew all too well to be the enemy guns firing at him . With the aim
point sighted, identified to the weapon, and "bombs away," all three
pilots headed their Skyhawks toward the Gulf of Tonkin.
Photography taken from the strike aircraft showed that all three
weapons impacted within five feet of each other on the designated
aim point; but, the bridge still stood. This mission was to be the final
glide bomb mission against the Dragon until some five years later.
Subsequent Walleye missions against other North Vietnamese
bridges were highly effective as each bridge attacked was put out of
commission. The Navy also dropped 68 more Walleye Glide Bombs
against barracks, power plants, and bridges scoring 65 hits in the
process.
Limited Stril(es Througli 1967
After the Walleye attack in March, the weather closed in again
and prevented further strikes until late April, when the low monsoon
clouds began to disappear. Once more the Navy took on the Dragon
in an attempt to destroy one of the last remaining enemy strong
points. Although the bridge had been damaged many times in the
past and the North Vietnamese had paid dearly in men and materiel
to keep it open, it had become a paramount symbol of North Viet-
namese determination. Defenses continued to be increased around
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Thanh Hoa and the SAM missiles, now more numerous, were
causing much concern. Furthermore, the North Vietnamese were
developing new tactics to coordinate the use of their MIGs, SAMs,
and AAA in a single area -^ new methods that were soon analyzed
and countered with improved equipment and new tactics by the
Americans. From late April 1967 until the end of September 1967,
the Navy flew 97 sorties and dropped approximately 215 tons of
bombs on the bridge.
The weather turned bad again in October and so severely ham-
pered air efforts against LOGs in RP IV that aircraft targeted
Composite (four pictures) showing destruction of Ninh Biqh railroad/highway bridge
by WALLEYE bomb. ' ' K
62
against the Thanh Hoa Bridge were usually sent to RP VI or to Laos
to expend their ordnance. This was the pattern of operations until
late January 1968; when the weather around Thanh Hoa cleared for
a few days.
A Big Strike Ends
the First Round (28 Jan 68)
Intelligence and reconnaissance showed signs of increased efforts
by the North Vietnamese to repair their south -bound LOCs during
the bad weather period. Reasonable immunity from US air strikes
during that time helped the enemy put a good deal of his LOCs in
working order again. This factor along with the US high command's
knowledge that negotiations might lead to another bombing halt
provided the impetus for a coordinated USAF/USN air strike against
the Thanh Hoa Bridge. Optimism ran high that this time the bridge
would be felled by the largest attack on the Dragon's Jaw since April
1965. At 0500 on January 28, US Navy A-4 Skyhawks hit the bridge
and over the next 3-1/4 hours, 44 Navy and Air Force fighters hurled
themselves at the bridge, dropping about 3 tons of bombs on the
bridge every 4-\^ minutes. Again it was a day of frustration for the
American pilots. Photo reconnaissance pictures showed only super-
ficial damage to the superstructure of the bridge, although girders
were twisted and bent. The southern approach to the bridge was
severely damaged. Rail tracks, twisted and torn, lay astride the rail
bed which was no longer recognizable because of large bomb craters.
The harsh truth was a bridge temporarily unusable, but one that
would be operational again in the future. Soon after this mission,
bad monsoon weather once again enveloped the bridge in low
louds, rain, and poor visibility which saved it from further bombing.
Bombing Halt Comes in Early 1968
The United States had been attempting for some time to bring the
Vietnamese conflict to an honorable and just conclusion. Its efforts
had been directed in many directions and involved many countries in
attempts to find a solution which would allow the South Vietnamese
to exist and govern themselves without interference from their
northern neighbor. In early 1968, it appeared that the climate and
conditions for political negotiation were favorable. Thus encourag-
ed. President Johnson halted all bombing north of the 19th parallel
on 31 March 1968. This order by the Commander-in-Chief was to
shield the Dragon's Jaw from further military attacks for many years
to come.
63
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By 31 March 1968, a number of changes had taken place in the
physical appearance of the Dragon's Jaw. The formerly massive
structure — a central railroad flanked by concrete highways — was
now a charred, dented, and twisted maze of steel girders. The central
rail bed had become a patchwork of flimsy boards upon which rested
twisted and bent tracks. Both approaches to the bridge were so
cratered that the movement of vehicular traffic was impossible. Dur-
ing the next four years, however, substantial repairs would make the
bridge again functional and a key target in the second round.
66
Chapter V. The Paul Doumer Bridge Goes Down
"They got a little place just south of the Ridge, Name of the place
is the Doumer Bridge. . ."So goes the "Doumer Bridge Blues" writ-
ten by Bill Middleton about the air war over North Vietnam. The
story which follows recounts the events of 1967-68 during which US
airmen wrote an exciting chapter in the history of airpower. It is the
story of the destruction of the Paul Doumer Bridge in the heart of
North Vietnam.
The Paul Doumer Bridge was almost as important symbolically
and more important militarily to the North Vietnamese than was the
Thanh Hoa Bridge. For US airmen, it was a major prize in the effort
to stem the tide of supplies moving into South Vietnam . Destroying it
would mean much: a morale boost for our own side, shock and
dismay to the enemy, and hope for those who were POWs in the
hated Hanoi Hilton.
There was an important difference between the Doumer and
Thanh Hoa bridges : the former had never been attacked because it
lay within an area near Hanoi which the US had chosen to leave un-
touched between 1965 and 1967. In the summer of 1967, however,
US leaders finally decided to attack targets within and near Hanoi.
The new target list, Rolling Thunder 57, contained six targets within
a ten -mile radius of downtown Hanoi and the Doumer Bridge had a
high priority on that list. Thus, the stage was set for a major effort
against the North Vietnamese transportation system, and the
Doumer Bridge became a prime target.
The word was flashed to the field and preparations were made to
carry out Rolling Thunder 57. The planners, in making their
analyses, noted the differences between the Thanh Hoa and Doumer
Bridges, and gave careful consideration to the lessons learned from
strikes on Thanh Hoa. One of the most important lessons was the
significance of choosing the correct weapon. Military planners decid-
ed that the F-105, carrying 3,000 pound bombs, would bear the
brunt of the effort against the bridge.
The 7th Air Force headquarters planners, known as the "Alpha"
team, in response to a directive from General Momyer, 7th Air Force
Commander, prepared the necessary directions for the field units
67
operating against the Paul Doumer Bridge. The 355th TFW at
TakhU, the 388th at Korat and the 8th at Ubon, all Thailand -based
tactical fighter wings, were selected as the strike forces against this
target. Directions were encrypted and dispatched to each of the
wings at 1000 hours on 11 August 1967. The go-ahead had come
through the system from Washington, the weather was good . . . the
time had come to go after the Paul Doumer Bridge.
Missions to be flown on a given day were ordinarily directed from
higher headquarters the previous day so that the munitions/ -
maintenance personnel would have adequate time to prepare the
proper bomb loads, fuel the aircraft, and load the electronic equip-
ment. Thus, when the new directions came in early on the 11th, the
aircraft had already been prepared for the targets selected on the
10th. Maintenance and weapons crews were ordered to reconfigure
the aircraft with 3,000-pound bombs in place of the 750-pounders
already aboard. Normally about one-hour -per-aircraft was needed
to change the fuel tanks and bomb loads — but not on this day. Tak-
ing calculated risks, the commander temporarily waived the rules
prohibiting the loading of fuel and munitions simultaneously, and
the normal one-hour aircraft task was compressed into 18 minutes.
The entire operation went flawlessly — morale was sky high since all
the personnel involved appreciated the importance of the new target.
The 355th TFW would lead the three wings against the Doumer
Bridge. The excitement of "going downtown" (the popular phrase
used by pilots for missions to Hanoi) permeated the wing. Colonel
(now Major General) John Giraudo, the Wing Commander, and
Colonel (now Major General) Bob White, Deputy Commander for
Operations — both highly experienced combat veterans from WWII
and Korea— quickly assembled the aircrews. It was evident that this
target would require all the expertise available. Colonel Giraudo had
just arrived in the theater, so he designated Colonel White as Force
Commander and mission leader. For the other 19 airplanes in the
Tahkli force, they selected the most experienced men available in the
wing to go on the raid.
The pilots hurriedly prepared maps in accordance with guidance
received from the Alpha team, and filled out line-up cards, complete
with call signs, aircraft tail numbers, code words for success, etc.
Then, the briefing process began. Systematically, crews synchronized
their watches with a "time hack" from the operations officer. Code
words used for various purposes were reaffirmed. The weather officer
provided a detailed account of conditions enroute, in the target area,
and what could be expected on the return to base. The route would
be clear all the way with only light winds in the target area— an
almost perfect setting for the attack. The intelligence officer provid-
ed target information, particularly the desired munitions impact
points. The crews were informed that the defense environment would
68
includes?, 57, 85 and 100mm guns. AW, SAMs, and MIGs— the en-
tire array of enemy capability.
Following the overall briefing, the men in each flight of four
Thuds discussed the specific tactics they would use under varying cir-
cumstances. Some of these topics were the rules of engagement,
anti-MIG tactics, SAM evasion, and downed air-crew procedures. In
many ways, this resembles the last -minute huddle before a big game.
The crewmembers quickly donned flying suits, "G-suits," helmets,
gloves and other paraphernalia and, in the personal equipment
room, survival vests were checked. Small two-way rescue radios, now
carried in the vests to preclude the problem Smitty Harris experi-
ence at Thanh Hoa, were checked and rechecked. Water bottles were
filled and stuffed into pockets, and a .38 caliber pistol loaded into a
shoulder holster. The crews grabbed their parachutes, jumped into
the flight line vans, and headed for their aircraft. The time was ap-
proximately 1300 hours.
On the flight line, the ritual of aircraft pre -flight inspection was
conducted. Personal equipment was placed in the cockpit (para-
chute, helmet, clipboard, maps, photos, and cards) . Munitions were
double checked, especially the bomb fuses which were set to detonate
the bombs the instant they came in contact with the bridge. The safe-
ty wire, extending from the bomb to the bomb rack to protect
against detonation while on the airplane, was secured and checked.
With a time-on-target of 1558, all preparations had been worked
backward so that start engines would be precisely at 1350 and take-
off at 1418. Watching the aircraft start, taxi, marshall, arm, take-
off, and join -up, was like watching an orchestration of men and
machines.
All activities were tuned to perfection and went precisely like
clockwork including the graceful, almost eerie movement, of a "25-
ton canary" (so aptly painted on the side of one F-105) as it glided
through these motions. Later, the mission would be jokingly referred
to as a "triple pumper," a term so often heard when crews relaxed
and the incessant movements of hands was evident in describing what
had happened on a tough mission in North Vietnam .
Water injection was used for take-off, with 11 -second spacing be-
tween aircraft. This gave maximum performance for the aircraft as
they labored in the hot 93 sun, becoming airborne in 28-29 seconds
after a ground roll of just over one mile. The lead aircraft ac-
celerated to 300 knots, flew approximately three miles on the runway
heading and then began a slow, lazy 180 turn to allow his flight
members to begin checking and double -checking all systems, for if
one aircraft was not functioning correctly in any way, a space (there
were airborne and ground spare aircraft) was ready to replace it.
This day, however, all was well with not one abort— ground or air.
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The spares returned to the flight line to wait for another day,
another mission.
Air refueling took place over Northern Laos at what was called
"Green Anchor." The fighters in each flight with the least amount of
fuel at initial join -up received fuel first, so that if anything was wrong
with an aircraft's refueling system, the pilot could divert to a friendly
base with sufficient fuel to recover safely. In this way minimum time
and effort were expended on the refueling.
At approximately four minutes prior to departure from the
tankers, each fighter began to "topoff" his tanks with those precious
last few gallons needed to be absolutely full. After topoff, each flight
departed the tankers in unison, joined the other flights, and headed
north. As usual, the tanker crews had performed their mission per-
fectly—no hitches, minimum radio calls, and precisely the correct
time and position at the conclusion of refueling.
The strike force that day consisted of a Wild Weasel flight, one
flak suppression flight, three bomb flights, and cover, consisting of
one F-4 (8th TFW) MIG CAP flight. Each flight contained four air-
craft.
After crossing into North Vietnam, all flights "greened-up", a
term meaning all switches were set so that appropriate munitions
were ready. The Wild Weasels were out in front carefully scanning,
listening, and looking for SAM's, MIG's, and radar directed AAA as
the strike force made its way in brilliant sunlight toward downtown
Hanoi. As the force crossed the Red River, approximately 95 miles
Northwest of Hanoi, and simultanelously increased speed from 500
knots to 0.9 mach (nearly 600 knot), altitude was about 10,000
feet. At four minutes to go, the force turned the corner at the nor-
thwest end of "Thud Ridge." >
The gauntlet of defenses would now be tested. Those beautiful but
deadly little puff clouds of flak from guns of various calibers would
soon begin to appear. At this point, variations in altitude would be
made to confuse the gunners and evade the flak.
As the force proceeded southeast along Thud Ridge, MIGs were
taking off from Phuc Yen airfield, only a few miles from the strike
force flight path, and were soon making arching, climbing turns in a
vain attempt at a head-on intercept. The force plunged through
their midst without loss or damage. To make a 180 turn and catch
the Thuds would now be impossible for the MIGs —they simply could
not catch up in time.
As the strike force came off the east end of Thud Ridge, the target
appeared clearly. It stood out like a black snake spanning the
' Thud Ridge was the name given to a prominent Hmestone karst outcropping
that ran northwest from Hanoi. It was a rugged range and provided a natural,
mountainous region over which one could fly relatively unhampered by ground
defenses.
71
72
brownish turbulent waters of the Red River ; it looked just like the in-
telligence briefers said it would.
Time was short as the last turn was made to the south and climb
was begun to 13,000 feet for the bomb run. The pilots called this
climb the "pop" for the roll -in. It was a maneuver wherein a flight
could evade flak, climb to the bombing altitude, and position all
four aircraft into echelon formation. Then, at precisely the correct
point over the ground calculated to produce a 45° dive angle for the
final run, aircraft 1 and 2, followed by 3 and 4, would commence
their roll -in and dive-bombing run.
During the bomb run, the aircraft were pointed at the ground,
and aimed at the target with engines oftimes operating in the af-
terburner range. All the while, each wingman was flying formation
just off the wing of his leader — a neat trick, but one which any good
fighter pilot learns to master.
The flak was very thick ; the 85mm guns were firing as rapidly as
they could and a number of SAM missiles were fired. It was the show
the pilots had been told to expect and it lived up to its billing.
The bomb run lasted less than seven seconds : seven seconds to fly
the aircraft to the exact spot in the air for bomb release— seven
seconds after hours of preparation and flight to the target— seven
seconds to the moment of truth — the longest seven seconds in the
world as flak hurtled past on all sides!
On the north side of the river, west of the bridge, was an 85mm
site with seven guns. The flak suppression flight completely
destroyed it —it simply went up in smoke! On the southeast side of the
bridge, another 85 -mm site survived and its guns poured their
deadly stream of red-glowing balls of steel but none struck, although
the fireballs could be seen going by. Perception, the ability to per-
ceive all this and yet concentrate on the target and fly formation, is
only possible after years of training and strict self discipline. Per-
ception is a trademark of the USAF fighter pilot and proved its worth
over and over again during the long Vietnam war. Stacking the
line-up with veterans paid off. The winds were from 350 degrees at
six knots, so only a minor correction was needed to keep the aircraft
lined up properly on the target. The first flight's leader, flying at 550
knots, released bombs at 8000 feet as planned, but his wingman
made one last correction, had the aircraft exactly where it was
needed, and released bombs at 7000 feet. Speed brakes went in, pull-
up initiated, and a hard left turn executed down river to the east.
The strike pilots were now overflying the "Hanoi Hilton" and their
former flying mates would know they had been there that day
because they were flying at supersonic speeds and the boom noise
would confirm their presence. As the lead flight maneuvered to the
east. Number Two, looking back at the bridge, saw a span drop into
the water. His heart was really racing now — they'd done it! "Giraffe"
73
would be the code word flashed back for all the world to
know -SUCCESS!
Two aircraft were damaged that day, Bear Four and Marlin
Three. Of course, the favorite propaganda artist, Hanoi Hannah,
who broadcast daily over short wave radio from North Vietnam,
would exaggerate their losses.
Bear Four took a direct hit in the afterburner section from an
85mm shell. His aircraft burst into flames— it was torching. The
pilot shut off the afterburner, the flames went out, and he called for
assistance from his flight mates. The remaining members of Bear
flight located their ailing comrade south of Hanoi and escorted him
to Udom, Thailand, where he landed safely. The landing gear
collapsed on touchdown, but the pilot walked away uninjured. The
flight surgeon with the ground rescue crew got a real shock when the
pilot of Bear Four emerged. . . John Piowaty had a red handlebar
moustache that definitely ended the flight surgeon's claim to the
longest handlebar moustache in Southeast Asia.
Marlin Three took a 57mm hit. Pieces of the shell penetrated the
aircraft's front and right windscreen, some hitting the instrument
panel. The aircraft also received a one -inch hole on the right side of
the nose. However, the pilot was not injured and recovered his air-
craft safely at Takhli.
The 8th and the 388th Fighter Wing forces, attacking several
minutes behind the 355th, dropped two highway spans into the Red
River.
As the aircrews returned to home base, went through maintenance
debrief, and headed for the debriefing, it became apparent that a
major success had been achieved that day.
Recalling the day's action, Lt Col Harry W. Schurr, 469 TFS,
described how the flights rolled in and how all hits appeared to be
right on the bridge, with the 3, 000 -pounders popping like big orange
balls as they struck. Capt Fred Shannon, 388th TFW Weasel, con-
tributed his description of how the Weasels knocked out two SAM
sites to insure the safety of the strike aircraft .
Congratulatory phone calls came into Colonel Giraudo's office
from the force leaders at Ubon and Korat. The strike photos below
(reproductions from 16mm color strike camera film) confirmed in
living color what the aircrews had reported. The bridge was cut and
span was down. Photos taken by a lone RF-4C moments after the last
strike aircraft was gone from the target confirmed the strike crew pic-
tures.
The following message is indicative of the reaction at higher
headquarters :
"From Commander, 7th Air Force Lt Gen Momyer, Personal
from Gen Momyer to Col Giraudo (355th) , Col Olds (8th) and
Col Burdett (SSStli) . Subject: Mission of 11 August 1967. The
74
superb execution of the strike yesterday on the Hanoi Railroad
and Highway Bridge was a display of the finest bombing and
teamwork witnessed to date in the SEA conflict. All participants
in this mission demonstrated capability and professionalism. As
you are aware, execution of this operation has the attention and
interest of the highest levels of government. My sincere
congratulations to you, the airmen officers of your entire
organization."
A recap of the first raid on 11 August 1967 reveals thirty -six strike
aircraft (those that actually dropped bombs) from three wings par-
ticipated, led by the 355th at Takhli. They dropped 94 tons of bombs
and destroyed one rail span and two highway spans on the northeast
side of the bridge. The superstructure was damaged and the highway
portion on the north side of the bridge, where it crossed the island in
the river, was cut. This stopped the movement of an average of 26
trains per day with an estimated capacity of 5,950 short tons. Two
aircraft were damaged, but no pilots were lost. The heart of the
North Vietnamese transportation system had been dealt a severe
blow.
By 30 August 1967 photography showed the bridge to be under
repair and estimated completion -time was three weeks. A rail ferry,
located about 3.5 nautical miles southeast of the bridge was being
used for limited service. By 3 October 1967, the bridge was restored
for both rehicular and rail traffic.
The monsoons brought bad weather to North Vietnam once again
and in so doing helped the Vietnamese by preventing US attacks on
the bridge. It was not until 25 October 1967 that a break in the
weather made it feasible to attack. At that time, 21 F-105s dropped
63 tons of 3,000 pound bombs. Again the bridge was rendered un-
serviceable by the destruction of 2 cantilever span just east of the
island, the eastern pier supporting the span, and the highway deck
on the span just west of span number 5 .
The bridge was repaired and serviceable by 20 November 1967.
Again, weather caused delays in bombing until 14 and 18 December
1967, when clear skies permitted 50 F-105s to drop ninety -plus 3,000
pound bombs. On 14 December, the rail and highway decking was
cut between the 6th and 7th spans from the east side and the decking
damaged on the 2nd and 3rd spans. On 18 December, the 2nd, 3rd,
and 4th spans and half of the 5th span were damaged. It was
estimated that it would take 2V^ to 3 months to repair the damage
enough to handle traffic. In fact, it was not until 14 April 1968,
when a 2800-foot rail bridge (pontoon type), 4.5 nautical miles
southeast of the Doumer Bridge, was completed, that rail traffic
again flowed across the Red River by other than ferry.
In all, 177 sorties (carrying 380 tons of ordnance) were flown
against the Doumer Bridge during 1967-68. 113 were F-105 strike
75
sorties, with F-4 and other aircraft providing flak suppression and
MIG CAP. Additional support came from F105F Wild Weasel.
An aircraft on ingress and egress to this target area could expect to
encounter fire from over 300 anti-aircraft gun positions and approxi-
mately 84 SAM sites, each writh 4 to 6 launchers. 109 SAMS were
fired at US aircraft and 24 MIG 17/21 aircraft were encountered.
Two US aircraft were lost to anti-aircraft fire and 15 were damaged.
On 2 January 1968, photography revealed the following condition
of the 19 span bridge: four spans still down, three damaged beyond
Sequence of three pictures showing the different stages in the destruction of the
Doumer Bridge (Aug 11, Oct 21, and Oct 25in 1S|67).
76
use, 12 were restored, and two permanent main piers and one tempo-
rary pier destroyed. It was estimated that 2\i to 3 months would be
again needed to repair the bridge.
From that time until the 31 March 1968 limited bombing cam-
paign, bad weather precluded hitting the bridge again. Further
bombing probably would not have been necessary, considering the
condition of the spans and the time needed to repair them. The
limited bombing precluded all activity above 20 North and per-
mitted rebuilding of the Doumer Bridge. In 1972, US aircrews would
again attack it as a prime target, only this time they would use
guided munitions to write yet another exciting chapter in the history
of the airpower.
Strike and post -strike photos of Doumer Bridge, 18 Dec 1967.
77
Chapter VI. Both Bridges Fall
The Bombing Halt (1968-1972)
One of the most significant dates in the Vietnam war was 31
March 1968. On that day, Lyndon B. Johnson announced that he
"would not seek, nor accept," the nomination for another term as
President. Following this, he ordered a halt to the air and naval bom-
bardment north of 20° North Latitude and called upon the North
to enter into peace talks to end the war. President Johnson's action
received widespread praise around the world as a major initiative for
peace. Although it denounced the continued bombing below 20
North, Hanoi was quick to accept the "peace talks" offer and
declared its readiness to arrange a meeting of representatives. Thus
began a four -year period that was to prove one of the most
frustrating and devisive in American history.
Shortly after the first bombing restriction, President Johnson fur-
ther restricted the bombing to south of 19 North, making the
Thanh Hoa bridge immune to attack. On 1 November 1968, the
President ordered a halt to all bombardmemt of North Vietnam.
During "bomb free" 1969, the transportation system throughout
North Vietnam operated at full capacity and the input to the Ho Chi
Minh trail network reached new highs. The bridges that had been
destroyed or damaged before 31 March 1968 were repaired and traf-
fic was again heavy.
Meanwhile, in the rest of Indochina, withdrawals of US troops
continued. More aggressive action by the Viet Cong and North Viet-
namese operating form sanctuaries in Cambodia, convinced
President Nixon that the safety of remaining American troops would
be jeopardized if the sanctuaries remained. Thus, during May and
June, the allies eliminated the Cambodian sanctuaries with a massive
ground offensive well supported by air power.
During the four years of the bombing halt, American fatalities in
the war had increased by over 25,000 and stood at 45,679. During
the same four years, however, President Nixon's "Vietnamization"
policy had reduced U.S. forces in South Vietnam from more than
540,000 to approximately 70,000 men. On 30 March 1972, nearly
78
four years to the day after President Johnson's initiative for peace,
the North Vietnamese launched their biggest invasion of the war, at-
tacking across the DMZ into Quang Tri province. U.S. tactical air
power in Thailand was employed to stall the offensive while units
that had gone home were redeployed to SEA. USAF squardrons of F-
4s, F-105s, EB-66s, KC-135s, and B-52s were deployed to Thailand,
South Vietnam, and Guam. Additional U.S. Navy aircraft carriers
were returned to the South China Sea. By the end of July, the largest
air armada of recent years had been assembled. Once again, the
systematic aerial bombardment of North Vietnam was underway the
transportation system and the bridges were key targets.
Doom for the Dragon
When the North Vietnamese invaded South Vietnam on 30 March
1972, it became painfully obvious that Hanoi had no desire to accept
any settlement other than one dictated by a smashing military vic-
tory. On 6 April 1972, American aircraft once again were sent north
of the DMZ to carry out a coordinated interdiction campaign against
the North Vietnamese logistic network. Two of the targets were the
Thanh Hoa and Paul Doumer bridges. Since the bombing halt in
1968 they had been repaired, and the rail lines crossing the bridges
were being fully utilized.
It was clear to the targeteers, mission planners, and strike pilots
that destroying the Thanh Hoa and Doumer bridges would not be a
simple task. They had taken their toll of US aircraft and pilots
during the early years of the war, and there was no reason to suspect
that the defenses around them had been softened. There was,
however, a glimmer of hope echoing along the halls and in the
briefing rooms of the fighter squadrons because some new weapons
were now available for such a mission.
A new family of "smart bombs" had been introduced in Southeast
Asia since the bombing halt in 1968. These weapons consisted of
Electro -Optical Guided Bombs (EOGBs) and Laser Guided Bombs
(LGBs) in the 2,000-pound and 3,000-pound class. The EOGB was
a contrast weapon, similar in concept to the Walleye first used in
1967 by the US Navy. The EOGB, however, was a 2,000 pound
bomb with a small TV camera attached to the nose which tran-
smitted a picture of what it was viewing to a scope in the attack air-
craft. The pilot would point the aircraft and weapon at the target
area thereby allowing the Weapon Systems Operator (WSO) in the
rear cockpit of the F-4 to find the target on the scope, refine the con-
trast aiming point and designate the target to the weapon. Once this
was accomplished, the pilot would release the bomb and quickly
depart the target area, leaving the EOGB to guide itself toward the
designated aim point. Target weather and cloud cover was a factor
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when delivering EOGB's, but if the weapon could see the target when
it was released from the aircraft it would usually impact the aim
point.
The LGB was somewhat different. A laser sensor was mated to the
nose of a 2,000 or a 3,000-pound bomb which enabled it to guide it-
self toward a target illuminated with low power laser energy. The
problem of illuminating the target with this laser energy was solved
by attaching a pod beneath the fighter aircraft. This pod contained
an optical viewing system and laser emitting capability, both
operated by the WSO in the backseat of the fighter. With this system,
the pilot could point his aircraft toward the target while his WSO op-
tically located the precise target aim point and illuminated it with his
laser equipment. The pilot would then release his bombs and depart
the target area leaving the LGB to guide itself to the target. An ad-
vantage of this system was that more than one aircraft at a time could
drop LGBs on the same target, with all weapons using the same
illumination point to guide on. Both the EOGB and the LGB
resulted in less aircrew exposure and greater accuracy than con-
ventional weapons. A disadvantage was that the target had to be con-
tinuously illuminated by the laser for the LGB to be effective. If
clouds obstructed the view of the illuminating pod the LGB would
become an unguided bomb and probably miss the target.
The new EOGBs and LGBs were given to the 8th Tactical Fighter
Wing (TFW) operating F-4 Phantoms from Ubon Royal Thai Air
Base, Thailand. By April 1972, the F-105 Thunderchief strike air-
craft had been replaced in Thailand by the newer, more modern
Phantoms. The 8th TFW was known as the "Wolfpack MIG
Killers"— a name acquired for their effectiveness in destroying more
MIG aircraft during Rolling Thunder than any other US tactical
TARGET
Laser Basket (Drawing).
83
fighter wing operating in North Vietnam. The wing, commanded at
this time by Colonel (now Brig. General) Carl S. Miller, was soon to
earn the title of "Bridge Busters"as a consequence of the wing's use of
the new weapons against the North Vietnamese supply system. Bet-
ween 6 April 1972 and 30 June 1972, the 8th TFW F-4 aircraft were
to destroy a total of 106 bridges, including the Paul Doumer and the
Thanh Hoa, with the new guided bombs.
In addition to the guided bombs, US air power hat^increased its
capabilities by improving its electronic counter measures (ECM)
through the use of "chaff" dropped from F-4 aircraft. "Chaff" is
millions of small thin strips of an aluminum -like -substance cut in
varying lengths, which are dropped by aircraft at high altitudes. The
chaff causes a great deal of interference on radar scopes, which
prevents the enemy form accurately identifying formations of air-
craft and thereby degrades the radar's capability. This makes the
operation of SAMs and radar -controlled AAA very difficult. The
chaff was scattered by a flight of F-4 aircraft, several minutes ahead
of the strike group, to provide a "chaff corridor" of specified length
and width through which the attacking aircraft would fly. The use of
chaff during Linebacker I operations was a significant factor in
keeping aircraft losses low. (Linebacker I was the code name for the
early 1972 air operations aimed at destroying North Vietnam's
logistics system . )
Operation Freedom Dawn
With the authorization to reinitiate the bombing of North Viet-
nam, several air operations plans were drawn up to satisfy the in-
terdiction requirements directed by the upper echelon planners. One
of these plans. Freedom Dawn, included, among other targets, the
Thanh Hoa Bridge. The plan called for a small tactical strike force
to destroy the Dragon's Jaw with the new family of guided bombs.
The operation was to be carried out by 12 F-4 Phantoms from the
8th TFW, eight of them loaded with 2, 000 -pound guided weapons.
A flight of 4 Phantoms was to lay a chaff corridor from the initial
point to the target so that the eight bomb -laden F-4s could operate
in a relatively sterilized radar environment. Bad weather in the
target area had been the cause of several last minute postponements
of the mission, but on 27 April 1972, reports indicated the weather
had cleared sufficiently over Thanh Hoa to permit the strike.
On that day, the 12 Phantoms took off from Ubon, and the three
flights of four aircraft each headed for an air refueling area where
SAC KC-135 tankers were orbiting, waiting to off-load extra fuel to
the fighters. This fuel might be necessary should enemy fighters ap-
pear or should the capping of a downed aircrew become a reality.
84
Having some extra JP-4 fuel might mean the difference between
making one last turn to destroy an enemy MIG or being able to orbit
a downed crewman and provide suppressive fire against ground for-
ces until SAR aircraft arrived.
With several thousand pounds of fuel obtained from the tankers,
the fighters headed for the bridge. The chaff delivery aircraft had
gone out in front to form the protective cooridor in advance of the
strike aircraft. However, as the strike aircraft approached the IP, a
glance in the direction of the target revealed heavy cloud cover which
could hamper the use of the guided bombs. The heavy cloud cover
and poor visibility precluded the use of LGB illuminators to
designate the target continuously. It was a day for the EOGB
weapons. The aircraft carrying the EOGBs then positioned them-
selves for the strike, and let loose with five EOGBs. The extremely
heavy anti -air-craft fire filled the skies with hundreds of white, gray
and black puffs of smoke from exploding AAA shells. A number of
SA-2 SAMs were fired at the aircraft, but SAM effectiveness was
reduced by the chaff— so much so that the Phantoms excaped
without a scratch. Post -mission photo reconnaissance showed the
damage to the bridge to be entensive enough to render it unusable to
vehicle traffic. The EOGBs had severely shaken the structure, but
stubborn to the end, the Dragon's Jaw would need one more punch.
The Dragon Goes Down
On the 10th of May, Operation Linebacker I was initiated, the
start of the increased interdiction effort in the north. Heavy air
strikes were flown against targets in the Hanoi -Haiphong area and
reduced to rubble many key objectives previously "off limits."
After three days of Linebacker activity, the Thanh Hoa Bridge
once again was highlighted on the daily mission orders. The mission
was to be similar to that flown on April 27th except the weather was
forecast to be better and two additional aircraft were scheduled,
making a total of 14 strike aircraft. Guided bombs were on the agen-
da again ; however, this time, nine 3,000-pound LGBs would be used
in conjuction with fifteen 2,000-pound LGBs and forty -eight 500-
pound conventional bombs.
On the morning of 13 May, the attacking force members an-
notated their maps with updated SAM plots and received final
briefings on enemy AAA defenses, air-refueling tracks, positions of
supporting ECM forces and the SAR procedures. The target weather
was briefed as good. The strike group took off on schedule and ren-
dozvoused with the KC-135 tankers for the pre-strike refueling.
The pilots then set an easterly course across southern North Viet-
nam to the Gulf of Tonkin, and from there north to the target area.
Approaching the target, everyone could see that the weather
85
forecaster had been correct. No trouble— some clouds were evident
and the flights positioned for the attack.
With the target in sight, the lead aircraft rolled in for the kill,
unleashing his LGBs at the bridge. Plane after plane followed, with
each pilot hoping that the anti-aircraft flashes on the ground did not
signal a shot destined for his aircraft . As they dropped more bombs
on the target , the last few pilots saw large clouds of dust spewing and
belches of fire as the bombs exploded on the bridge. After the final
aircraft had pulled away from the target, the strike pilots knew the
bridge was down. The pilots headed for home— mission ac-
complished.
No aircraft had been damaged, even though the AAA and SAM
fire had been intense. Post-strike photography by RF-4Cs confirmed
the strike pilots' assessment. The western span of the bridge had been
knocked completely off its 40 foot thick concrete abutment and the
bridge superstructure was so critically disfigured and twisted that rail
traffic would come to a standstill for at least several months.
The interdiction campaign against North Vietnam grew in in-
tensity during May 1972, and the enemy LOCs showed signs of crum-
bling under the continuous assault by American air power. Guided
bombs were used with increasing regularity and success.
By the end of May 1972, there were 13 important rail bridges
down along the two major rail lines running northeast and northwest
from Hanoi. There were another four rail bridges down between
Hanoi and Haiphong, and several more had been dropped on the
rail line running south from Hanoi.
Strikes Continue Against
tlie Tlianli Hoa Bridge
Although the bridge had been severely damaged on the 13 May
strike, the ambitious North Vietnamese began immediately to repair
the bridge so that rail traffic could again cross the Song Ma River. As
a result , it was necessary to schedule strikes periodically to hinder the
repair efforts. The Navy flew 11 more missions against the Thanh
Hoa Bridge and the US Air Force two more missions before the 23rd
of October 1972, the day President Nixon stopped all bombing of
North Vietnam. With this bombing halt, the saga of the Dragon's
Jaw come to a close. Although bombing would be seen over North
Vietnam again during Linebacker II in December 1972, the Thanh
Hoa bridge was not on the target list during the campaign, for it was
still in a state of disrepair.
86
USAF F-4s dropping the western span of Thanh Hoa Bridge «>n 13 May 1972.
87
Doumer's Demise
The precision guided bombs that caused the destruction of the
Thanh Hoa bridge also played a decisive role against the Paul
Doumer bridge. Although this bridge did not have the same repu-
tation as the Thanh Hoa, planners nevertheless knew that it
would take a major US effort to destroy the Doumer and other key
targets in the north. When the Linebacker I operation began on May
10, 1972, the 8 TFW was ordered to launch a large and carefully
coordinated attack against the Yen Bien railroad marshalling yards
and the Paul Doumer bridge. This was the first strike on the Doumer
since 1967. The force composition included an armada of aircraft
from other bases in Thailand to support the primary strike birds,
reminiscent of earlier Rolling Thunder missions. The 8 TFW was
tasked to supply the bombing punch with sixteen conventionally
loaded F-4s and eight F-4s to provide chaff support . The 388 TFW
at Korat would provide fifteen F-105G Wild Weasel aircraft for
SAM suppression and four EB-66s for ECM support. As usual, MIG
CAP would be supplied by Phantoms flying high in the target area.
On the morning of 10 May, with all mission planning complete,
aircrews were briefed and the aircraft were loaded with MK-84
2,000-pound guided bombs. Although Linebacker had started at the
onset of the southwest monsoon season, the weather appeared to be
suitable and the decision was made to go.
The first aircraft off were the two flights of chaff -support F-4s at
approximately 0800 hours. Approximately twenty minutes later, the
strike aircraft lifted off the Ubon runway. The sixteen F-4s were
launched in flights of four — "Jingle," "Napkin" and "Biloxi" flights
were armed with LGBs while "Goatee" flight carried the EOGBs.
After refueling and flying deep into enemy territory, the strike
flights located the chaff corridor on radar. The chaff birds had done
their job well, laying down a protective corridor that would shield the
strike aircraft during their final run to the target. The strike aircraft
flew within this protective cover until the Doumer bridge came into
view. Captain Mike Messett, Itader of a 2 -ship element on this mis-
sion, has vivid memories about the Doumer bridge. He was on the
original strike in August 1967, and recalls that day in particular
because he was hit by AAA shortly after rolling-in on the target. He
was a "back-seater" in those days, and the AAA exploded through
the front canopy and disabled the aircraft commander. Captain
Messett recovered the aircraft, released ordnance, and "got the hell
out of Dodge." Recovery was complex and entailed emergency in-
flight refueling and a rear seat landing back at Ubon. He was subse-
quently awarded the Silver Star for that trip to Mr . Doumer's bridge
and, as Captain Messett said, "I had a long unsettled grudge against
that bridge."
88
Captain Messett got his chance on May 10. As his flight reached
the desired altitude and roll -in point, the wingmen moved in to
within 4 shipwidths of each other. The element moved well forward
since the final turn for roll -in was away from them. All aircraft had
to maintain this integrity during the entire maneuver in order for the
bombs to enter the LGB "basket" that the flight lead would create.
Captain Messett was monitoring the progress of the preceding
elements as best he could to get a feel for possible variations in the
Capt Thomas "Mike" Messett is shown checking a 2,000 pound Laser Guided Bomb
loaded on his F-4E before a strike mission "up north." Capt Messett participated in
three strikes on the Doumer Bridge. ^;
89
pre -briefed plan. He saw several bombs impact on the superstruc-
ture, but many of the bombs hadn't hit yet. His flight leader released
his bombs at about 14,000 feet and that was his visual cue to release.
The flak in the area was heavy, but as Captain Messett said, "So
what." Although it was difficult to observe spans drop, he was con-
vinced the bridge took many hits.
All flights encountered heavy AAA ground fire and it was later
estimated that more than 160 SAMs were fired at the strike force that
day. Add the 41 MIGs that were launched and it is obvious that the
North Vietnam skies were a very unfriendly place to be on that day in
Mayl972. It seems hard to believe that not a single aircraft was lost
in the assault on the Doumer bridge. A great deal of credit for this
remarkable record went to the support crews whose job it was to pro-
tect the strike force— Wild Weasels, chaff aircraft, ECM birds and
theF-4MIGCAP.
The bombing results achieved were excellent. A total of 22 LGB
and seven EOGB 2, 000 -pounders were expended by the force. After
returning to Ubon from the three -hour mission, aircrews reported
that 12 bombs had scored direct hits, four were probables and 13
could not be observed due to smoke and enemy defenses. The recon-
naissance photos showed conclusively that the bridge had been
rendered unusable. Several spans were damaged and one span was
destroyed, effectively stopping rail traffic from the north to Hanoi.
When asked to report on the bridge damage, one flight leader stated
simply "one severely smoking bridge."
The mission was a success, and the Ubon Officers Club was packed
that afternoon as war stories were told and re -told. Captain Messett
An F-4dropping a MK-84 Laser Guidey,Bcimb.
90
said it was tremendous to see the Doumer again and it was absolutely
exhilarating to get his "sweet revenge." Little did Captain Messett
know that he would make one more trip to Mr. Doumer 's bridge.
To make sure that the bridge stayed down, a follow-up raid was
planned for the next day. Convinced now that the guided bombs had
deadly effectiveness, only four aircraft were fragged to reattack the
bridge. One of these aircraft would be carrying two of the impressive
Mil 8, 3, 000 -pound bombs. This was the bomb that dropped the
Doumer in 1967. These bombs, if delivered on target, would put the
finishing touch on the bridge.
On the afternoon of 11 May, a flight of four F-4s from the 8 TFW
carried out the second raid. Captain Messett and his roommate,
Captain Dave Smith, were both scheduled to lead flights up north
that day, but Captain Messett drew the Doumer Bridge, To their
complete amazement, they were to be the only strike forces in Route
Pack Six that afternoon. Captain Smith was scheduled to strike the
Bac Mai Command Post just inside the southern city limits of Hanoi.
Everything was normal and no problem encountered as both
flights proceeded inbound to their targets using the same route as the
day before. Then came the realization that the chaff had been
dropped too early due to a mix-up on target times, and the MIG
CAP and support flights had left early thinking the strike flight were
not coming. No MIGs harrassed either flight, but they did receive
signiflcant attention from the SAMs. Because they were such a small
force, Captain Messett was concerned that the SAM sites would have
an easy day working them over. As he passed his roommate who was
busy with his target, a few SAMs got very close to him and some ac-
tually went through the flight but failed to detonate.
It was at least another two minutes until he crossed Hanoi to set up
on the east side for roll-in. Oddly enough, the SAMs ceased and the
AAA was not in evidence. As Captain Messett said, "I think the
North Vietnamese couldn't believe what was going on." Target ac-
quistion was simple with no other aircraft to watch, and he observed
at least one span in the water with an adjacent one heavily damaged.
He elected to pick a span near the Hanoi side because of his position.
Release and tracking went excellently, and the GIB (Guy-in-
backseat) observed multiple impacts on the causeway. Although it's
impossible to see a span drop while on the bomb run, the observed
direct hits gave a favorable probability. Captain Messett was hoping
it was "rush hour."
The egress was quite smooth — almost eerie because no defenses of
any sort harassed the flight. Captain Messett was elated, knowing
that his flight of four had done as much damage as the entire strike
force the day before.
A total of eight LBGs was expended, including the two Mil 8s and
six MK84, 2,000-pounders and the results were phenomenal! Three
91
additional spans had been dropped into the river, and three other
spans significantly damaged. The Paul Doumer would not be a
target for some months to come.
Unfavorable weather during much of the next few months
precluded any further attacks against the Doumer bridge. However,
the significant damage inflicted on 10 to 11 May proved sufficient to
keep the bridge out of commission for a long time. This was confirm-
ed on 10 September, when the weather cleared enough for a flight of
four F-4s and the 8 TFW to strike the bridge "one more time." This
attack successfully dropped two more spans and the damage report
showed that the enemy had not yet been able to reuse the bridge.
By 13 May, both the Paul Doumer and Thanh Hoa bridge were
down — a tribute to all of the airmen who had bravely participated in
these missions throughout the long years of the Vietnam war. A
significant factor in this success story was phenomenal accuracy
achieved with guided bombs. With fewer strike aircraft required to
assure target destruction, more targets could be attacked and a
larger number of aircraft assigned to defending the strike force. The
higher bomb release altitudes helped keep the fighters our of the
deadly AAA range, thereby lowering loss rates significantly.
With the help of technology and training, airmen with determina-
tion, courage and professional skill finally were able to bring the
"Tale of Two Bridges" to a convincing close. Their story is but one of
many in the long Vietnam experience where airpower was applied
and the report came back. . . .
"Mission accomplished!"
92
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Post -strike photo showing the destroyed spans of the Doumer Bridge after the 10 Sep
1972 strike by F-4s from the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing.
96
MONOGRAPH 2
The Battle for the Skies
Over North Vietnam
1964-1972
Authors : Major Paul Burbage
Major Eli Gateff
Major James Hoffman
Major Blaine Lotz
Major Addison Rawlins
Major Barry Swarts
Major Ron Walker
Major Rudolph Zuberbuhler
Monograph Edited by
Lt Colonel Gordon Nelson
Major Norm Wood
97
Authors' Acknowledgements
The facilities at Maxwell AFB offer a rich variety of source
materials for the study of airpower in Southeast Asia. We are
grateful to Mr. Robert B. Lane and his staff of the Air University
Library, Lt Col Malcom S. Bounds of the Maxwell Corona Harvest
office, and Mr. Lloyd H. Cornett, Jr., and his staff at the Albert F.
Simpson Historical Research Center.
We are indebted to the staff of the A U Review who reviewed the
manuscripts and provided valuable editing assistance.
Additionally, we are indebted to the many Air University person-
nel who provided support and assistance throughout the project .
Finally, we are deeply indebted to the Office of Air Force History
(AF/CHO) and to the Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts and Objec-
tives (AF/XOD) , Headquarters, USAF for their assistance in the
final editing and publication. We are particularly grateful to Major
Charles N. Wood from AF/XOD for his help in the initial editing
process.
99
Table of Contents
Introduction 103
Chapter I. PRELUDE TO A SHOWDOWN 107
Factors Affecting Aerial Operations 108
Chapter II. EARLY USE OF AlRPOWER 112
The Opposition : North Vietnamese Fighter
Buildup 112
U.S. Air Superiority Capabilities 113
Quality of U.S. Aircrews 120
Early Lessons Learned 120
Chapter III. ROLLING THUNDER (MARCH 1965-
December 1965) 125
The Bombing Begins in Earnest 125
The First MIG Attacks 126
The First MIG Kills 127
SAMs and More MIGs 130
Chapter IV. AlR SUPERIORITY COMES OF Age 134
Status of Rival Capabilities 134
Rolling Thunder Resumes 135
MIGs and Operation Bolo 139
Moves and Countermoves 145
Chapter V. BOMBING OF THE North Resumes :
Operation Linebacker I 147
Policy and Other Changes 149
Air Superiority Enters a New Phase 151
Technology Versus Enemy Defenses 157
Oyster Flight on a Linebacker Mission ... 159
A Hunter-Killer Mission Against Combined
Air Defenses 165
Sowing Protective Corridors 167
Reflections on Linebacker I 173
Chapter VI. LINEBACKER II AND THE END OF
Hostilities 175
Peace Negotiations 175
The Big Push 175
Planning Considerations 176
Building a Strike Force 176
The First Three Days 177
The Tactics Change 184
The Post -Christmas Operations 185
The Final Thrust 187
101
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102
Introduction
This is the story of US air superiority over North Vietnam (NVN) .
It begins with the first US air strikes in 1964 and runs for eight long
years of gradually increasing applications of airpower —
"gradualism" it was called. It ends with the superbly planned and ex-
ecuted air activity known as Linebacker II in December 1972.
Linebacker II achieved in a few short days absolute US air
supremacy. When the Air Force completed this operation, B-52s,
F-4s, F-105s, F-llls, A-7s, rescue helicopters, and all the associated
support aircraft roamed the skies of North Vietnam at will.
No longer were MIGs and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) able to
threaten US aircrews or add to the number of prisoners of war held
by Hanoi. Only an anti-aircraft artillery threat was left to harass the
airmen.
Many courageous airmen gave their lives fighting through the
hostile skies of North Vietnam. Many more dedicated years of train-
ing, planning, and hard work to US efforts. There were jubilant vic-
tories and crushing setbacks. Political and diplomatic considerations
necessitated restraints in the application of air power— to some
airmen, it seemed that this prevented them from "winning" the war
in the traditional military sense.
Within this context the Air Force worked long and hard to main-
tain air superiority. Restrained from attacking some politically sen-
sitive targets, airmen fought through the same ground and air
defenses daily in order to "go North," to destroy and restrict the sup-
plies feeding the war in the South.
This monograph depicts the evolution of US aerial tactics over
North Vietnam. It describes how airmen, although [restricted] in the
application of air power, still managed to accomplish their tasks. It is
part of the story of the Air Force at war over North Vietnam .
This monograph was researched and written by a team of men
who trained for and/or fought in that war ; men who saw many vary-
ing aspects of that war. While assembled as students at the Air Com-
103
mand and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, the
following officers joined to reconstruct the events in this history.
Major Paul Burbage
Major Eli Gateff
Major James Hoffman
Major Blaine Lotz
Major Addison Rawlins
Major Barry Swarts
Major Ron Walker
Major Rudolph Zuberhuhler
They were assisted by their faculty leader and editor, Colonel Lloyd
Houchin, and a faculty reader, Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Nelson.
Major Burbage is the only monograph team member without ex-
perience in Southeast Asia (SEA) . An F-4 pilot with extensive
knowledge of air-to-air combat tactics. Major Burbage participated
in two F-4 squadron deployments to Korea in response to US com-
mitments there. He was an instructor in air superiority tactics for two
years.
Major Eli Gateff flew 29 missions over North Vietnam during five
temporary duty tours as a radar navigator in the B-52D. He flew a
total of 254, combat missions during the period form September 1969
to December 1972. He participated in both Linebacker I and
Linebacker II strike operations.
Major James Hoffman's operational experience includes 89 mis-
sions over North Vietnam during 1968 while he was assigned to the
433d Tactical Fighter Squadron, Ubon RTAFB, Thailand, as an
F-4 weapon systems officer.
Major Lotz served in Vietnam during 1967-1968 as an intelligence
watch officer assigned to the Headquarters, Seventh Air Force Warn-
ing Center, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, South Vietnam. His assignment
spanned the North Vietnamese Tet and May offensives of 1968.
Following his Vietnam tour, Major Lotz worked at Headquarters,
Pacific Air Force on an intelligence study of the air war in North
Vietnam. He was then assigned to the Air Staff Combat Application
Group, Headquarters USAF, where he continued to work in
Southeast Asian affairs.
Major "Ace" Rawlins flew 116 missions in SEA of which 100 were
over NVN in 1966-67. Assigned to the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing
(TFW) and flying the F-104C from Udom RTAFB, Thailand, he
participated in a variety of missions including interdiction, escort,
and combat air patrol (CAP), and in Operation Bolo, an effective
counter air operation that destroyed seven airborne MIGs in one day.
Major Swarts was an F-105 strike pilot stationed at Korat RTAFB
during 1968-1969. He flew 29 missions over NVN prior to the bomb-
ing halt of 1 November 1968. He spent the last months of his tour at
104
Seventh Air Force Headquarters where he monitored the combat test
and evaluation of new weapons entering the SEA theater.
Major Walker participated in attacks against North Vietnam dur-
ing two major campaigns. As a strike pilot in the F-105, he flew 48
missions over NVN before the bombing halt ended the Rolling
Thunder effort in 1968. Returning again to Takhli RTAFB in
September 1972, he logged an additional 27 NVN missions in the
F-111, many of which were in the Hanoi area in support of
Linebacker II.
Major Rudolph Zuberbuhler flew 300 combat missions of which
146 were over North Vietnam. These missions were flown during
1965, 1966, and 1972 from Ubon RTAFB, Thailand. He partici-
pated in Linebacker I as a flight commander in an F-4 squadron.
On 12 September 1972, his aircraft was shot down over North Viet-
nam and he became a prisoner of war. He was released on 29 March
1973.
Colonel Houchin's Vietnam experience spans seven years of the
war. Involved in the first jet fighter activities there in 1964, he was
back again in 1965. Flying F-lOOs, on both temporary duty tours, he
flew 56 missions over North Vietnam. During 1970-71, he was an ad-
visor to a Vietnamese Air Force wing commander.
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Nelson flew 135 missions over North
Vietnam in the B-57. Approximately 60 percent of these missions
were flown at night. Between 1965 and 1972 he was an instructor
pilot instructing fighter tactics. In 1973-74 he was chief of the
weapons and tactics branch at Udorn RTAFB.
These officers flew an aggregate total of 632 missions over North
Vietnam against MIGs, SAMs, and AAA. This is their story of the
evolution of American air superiority over the North. They were
there.
105
Chapter I. Prelude to a Showdown
Captain Steve Ritchie from Reidsville, North Carolina, was lead-
ing a flight of F-4 "Phantoms". His four aircraft were protecting a
strike force as it departed a target near Hanoi , and headed for Udorn
Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB) , Thailand. EC-121 radar sup-
port aircraft offshore warned the F-4 crews that MIGs were aloft.
The information, however, was too late to help the F-4s carrying
chaff dispensers. Enemy radar had vectored a MIG-21 pilot in be-
hind the chaff aircraft. • he rapidly moved in, fired an ATOLL heat
seeking missile and broke away to safety.
The ATOLL hit the left engine of one of the chaff escorts. With a
badly crippled F-4, the pilot headed out of the target area while
transmitting his position, heading, and altitude on the radio guard
channel. Meanwhile another pilot in a fighter flying cover against
MIGs for the benefit of strike forces (MIGCAP) had to depart too,
because his plane had an engine fire.
Captain Ritchie, knowing that North Vietnamese ground radar
controllers would direct their MIGs against crippled aircraft, de-
scended to a lower altitude, about 5,000 feet above ground. Learn-
ing from Navy radar and the orbiting Air Force EC-121 that two
MIGs were two miles north of the flight, Captain Ritchie turned
north to intercept the MIGs.
Within seconds he made visual contact with the lead aircraft —
close enough to see a silver MIG-21 with bright red star markings.
Recalling that a common NVN tactic was to send a single MIG out
front as a decoy. Captain Ritchie refused the baited trap, rolled his
aircraft and dove closer to the ground. Soon he saw the second MIG
pass overhead approximately 10,000 feet behind the first. The ploy
of the MIG pilots had failed ; now they were the hunted.
Captain Ritchie began a hard sUcing 6 V^ G turn to get into position
behind the second MIG fighter. He had the MIG in his gun sight and
the radar was locked on, providing range information. After several
seconds he squeezed the trigger twice, firing two Sparrow radar mis-
' An aircraft that dispenses narrow metallic strips used to reflect echoes for radar
confusion purposes.
107
siles. The first missile exploded in the center of the MIG fuselage;
the second missile went through the fireball.
Usually when MIG pilots worked in pairs, the remaining pilot fled
when his companion experienced trouble. However in this case, the
red-starred MIG leader stayed in the fight and tried to shoot down
the number four aircraft in Captain Ritchie's flight.
In response to the number four crew's request for assistance. Cap-
tain Ritchie descended to gain speed and made another hard turn
just in time to get into firing position as the MIG pilot was maneuver-
ing to destroy the number four aircraft. But the MIG pilot sensed his
danger and initiated a hard turn back into his attacker. There was
time for just the one missile to come off Ritchie's F-4. It shot straight
out, made a near 90 degree turn, and smashed dead center into the
fuselage of the MIG-21. The enemy aircraft disintegrated in a huge
fireball.
Factors Affecting Aerial Operations
The Fighter pilots have to rove in the area allotted to them in
any way they like, and when they spot an enemy they attack
and shoot him down; anything else is rubbish.
— Baron Von Richthofen
World War I
Captain Ritchie's victories over North Vietnam confirmed that
Von Richthofen's quotation was still valid, even though closure
speeds had increased ten-fold. Since the first air combat, in Von
Richthofen's day, pilots have known the importance of sighting the
enemy early. World War II airspeeds increased the problem, but not
until the Korean conflict and the birth of the jet age did "spotting the
enemy" become a foremost problem. By the start of the Vietnam
war, closure rates in excess of 1 ,000 knots were common.
Even though Captain Ritchie was successful, many of his fellow
airmen lost the tactical advantage because they still had to visually
identify the enemy prior to attacking. What was needed was a better
way of separating friend from foe. By the end of the Vietnam war,
technology had provided a better mousetrap. But, in the beginning
we were fighting at jet age speeds using horse and buggy tactics.
There are however, more subtle aspects to localized air superiority.
Many conditions lend themselves to survival in an air-to-air encoun-
ter. Pilots cite the ability to use surprise and judgment— namely, the
ability to size up situations quickly and accurately and to take advan-
tage of them. In North Vietnam, most US aircraft shot down by
MIGs were the result of enemy pilots achieving surprise over their US
counterparts. The element of surprise was critical. The fighter pilot
108
?^ s
KILL MI6S
The MIG Killers (11 Aug 1972) Front row: Capt Charles Debellevue (6 MIGs) and Capt
Richard S. Ritchie (5 MIGs) Back row: Lt Col Griff Bally (2ii^lGs) and Capt Jeff Fein-
stein (5 MIGs). '■" *\
109
who could not react automatically and correctly to an array of dan-
gers probably did not make the kill— or worse yet, got shot down
himself.
Some of these factors worked for Captain Ritchie and his flight of
F-4s; factors such as preparation, teamwork, and discipline. But the
enemy had some advantages also. The North Vietnamese had a high-
ly sophisticated ground controlled radar environment. The MIG-21
was about half the size of the F-4 and left very little smoke ; the F-4
left two large smoke trails that made it much easier to see. The MIG-
21 turned tighter, a very important attribute which counteracted the
better speed and acceleration of the F-4. The MIGs were specifically
designed for air superiority, while the US aircraft involved in North
Vietnam were not. During the Cold War period following World
War II, the US built fighters to perform multiple missions rather
than single missions such as air superiority and another for tactical
bombardment. The lighter and smaller MIGs were harder to see and
they were able to turn in a smaller radius. The F-4, on the other
hand, had greater acceleration and US aircraft, in general, had bet-
ter armament. US pilots had to be able to cope with these differ-
ences; to exploit their aircraft's special capabilities to best advan-
tage, and to avoid fighting when MIGs had the advantage.
Other factors affected the battle for air superiority. Anti-aircraft
artillery (AAA) and automatic weapons could limit use of airspace
closer to the ground. Surface-to-air missiles impinged upon USAF air
superiority by forcing some aircraft to a lower altitude in order to
avoid the SAMs. At the lower altitude, of course, aircraft were vul-
nerable to AAA and automatic weapons. Rules of engagement pro-
vided additional constraints. Decisions not to bomb airfields and key
strategic installations, not to fire upon North Vietnamese aircraft
unless attacked first, and not to attack unless visual contact was
achieved all affected the tactics used to achieve air superiority.
In an overall sense, air superiority is not an all or nothing proposi-
tion. There are varying degrees of it. The highest degree of air supe-
riority is called air supremacy. The US achieved air supremacy by the
end of World War II against Germany and Japan. During the Kore-
an War, the degree of US air superiority was indicated by the kill
ratio of US fighter aircraft to those of North Korea : 12:1. In South-
east Asia, on the other hand, at the end of Rolling Thunder, the kill
ratio was 2.5:1. In all cases, air superiority was reflected at one time
or another in varying degrees.
Essentially, air superiority is achieved by the force that can deny
the opposing force effective use of the air space while simultaneously
accomplishing its particular mission. Yet, air superiority may be
gained today and lost tomorrow. There were times that the US did
not have local air superiority over North Vietnam. Thus, air superi-
ority is required to decrease the ability of enemy aircraft and defenses
110
to interfere with the operation of friendly forces. It follows that the
first and highest priority task of tactical air forces in a theater of
operations is to achieve air superiority. The Air Force has many mis-
sions to perform ; but if air superiority is not established and main-
tained, then accomplishment of the others may not be possible.
Ill
Chapter II. Early Use of Airpower
By the end of May 1964, the JCS had made definitive proposals
to use airpower against North Vietnam. The intent of attacking tar-
gets in North Vietnam had been to stop military aggression against
South Vietnam. But, by August the focus of the war changed dra-
matically because NVN torpedo boats attacked US destroyers in the
Gulf of Tonkin. These attacks set the stage for intensified use of air-
power against North Vietnam .
The Opposition :
North Vietnamese Fighter Buildup
Prior to the Tonkin incident, the North Vietnamese had no air
defense fighter capability. They possessed only 30 trainer aircraft, 50
transports, and four light helicopters. On 7 August, two days after
the Tonkin incident, the USAF identified MIG fighters that ap-
peared at Phuc Yen Airfield near Hanoi. These were MIG-15s/17s
provided by Communist China.
The size of the North Vietnamese Air Force remained unchanged
until mid-June 1965 when additional MIG-15s and 17s from the
Soviet Union brought the total to 70 fighter aircraft. It was more
than a year after the Tonkin incident, in December 1965, before the
North Vietnamese would receive the first MIG-21s, an aircraft com-
parable to the USAF's best air-to-air fighter.
The acquisition of the MIG-15s and 17s helped the North Vietna-
mese improve their air force. The two Soviet -designed subsonic fight-
ers were both heavily armed. Each carried one 37mm and two 23mm
cannons, and could carry rockets or bombs under the wings. The
MIG- 15 would prove relatively unimportant in the North Vietnam
air war and claimed no known kills. However, this would not be the
case for the MIG-17. These fighter aircraft were the first employed
in North Vietnam as air defense forces.
In the early summer of 1964, the North Vietnamese had only two
modern airfields capable of sustaining jet operations: Gia Lam Air-
field at Hanoi and Cat Bi Airfield near Haiphong. Phuc Yen was un-
112
MIG-17 in dog fight with F-4, 1 May 1967.
der construction and nearing completion. By 7 August 1964 it re-
ceived MIG-15s and 17s. Two other airfields, Kien An at Haiphong
and Dong Hoi, just north of the Demilitarized Zone, had hard sur-
face runways and were capable of supporting limited jet operations.
Four additional airfields were built later, including Kep which was
north of Hanoi, about one-third of the way to China. During most of
the war, Phuc Yen and Kep remained the primary military airfields
where the majority of aircraft were deployed. Gia Lam, Cat Bi, and
Kien An were utilized as dispersal bases to provide for flexibility in
the employment of fighters to protect key areas .
Other aspects of the North Vietnamese air defense system were
very weak in 1964. The NVN forces possessed no surface-to-air mis-
siles and conventional antiaircraft weapons numbered only about
700. The radar complex consisted of about 20 early warning radars,
with very little definitive tracking capability. Overall, air defense was
limited to key pop^ati
picture of the North Vietnamese Air Force. By the end of 1964 they
possessed only 34 fighter aircraft. These were MIG-15s and MIG-l7s
based at Phuc Yen.
US Air Superiority Capabilities
The friendly Southeast Asia air defense role was assigned to the
Convair -designed F-102 all-weather interceptor. It was capable of
supersonic flight and was armed with six air-toi-air guided missiles
113
Military airfields in North Vietnam.
and twenty-four 2.75 inch diameter folding fin rockets. Though the
F-102 would remain on active alert at bases in South Vietnam until
1968, it did not play a significai^t role over North Vietnam.
The F-lOO Super Saber was given the role of fighter escort early in
the war. It first flew in 1953 and was produced4|i several versions in-
114
eluding the two seat "F" model. This aircraft was the first US fighter
capable of supersonic speeds in level flight. The F-lOO's basic arma-
ment consisted of four 20mm cannons mounted in the nose; it could
carry missiles and air-to-ground weapons under the wings. The "D"
and "F" models used in Vietnam were in-flight refuelable and could
carry external fuel tanks.
The most advanced US Air Force aircraft deployed into Southeast
Asia during 1964 was the F-105 Thunderchief, built by RepubUc
Aviation Corporation. Over 600 of these aircraft were built. Affec-
tionately known as the "Thud," this aircraft was a single seat, all-
weather fighter -bomber capable of speeds in excess of Mach 1 at sea
level and over Mach 2.1 above 36,000 feet. It was equipped with
sophisticated navigation equipment, and had radar capable of
ground mapping as well as air search and tracking. It had an air re-
fueling capability and could carry external fuel tanks. Internal arm-
ament included a 20mm, M-61 "Vulcan" multi-barrel cannon with
1 ,029 rounds of ammunition. The gun was capable of firing at rates
of 6,000 rounds per minute. It could carry air-to-ground weapons in
an internal bomb bay or under the wings and fuselage.
For the air-to-air mission, the "Thud" could carry the "Side-
winder" heat -seeking missiles under the wings. From 1964 through
the end of the Southeast Asia war, the F-105 saw constant combat
over the North. Compared to the MIG-17, it was faster, but it could
not turn as tightly. This was due to the relative size and weight of the
two aircraft. The F-105 was a large aircraft, approximately 69 feet
long, with a short wing span of only 35 feet. Its empty weight totaled
more than 28,000 pounds (F-105F) , with a maximum takeoff weight
of 54,000 pounds. In contrast, the MIG-17 had a wing span of 36
feet and weighed only 9,850 pounds empty; fully loaded it weighed
15,500 pounds. This resulted in a much reduced wing loading, or
weight per square foot of wing area, thus giving it a much tighter
turn capability.
By 1 December 1964, the F-lOOs and F-105s had been moved into
South Vietnam at Da Nang and Bien Hoa to augment the forces al-
ready there. Other US forces were based throughout Southeast Asia.
In Thailand, there were Ubon, Udom, Korat, TakhH, Nakhon
Phanom, and Don Muang Air Bases. In South Vietnam, there were
Da Nang, Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, Pleiku, and Nha Trang. As the
war progressed most of the flights over the North were flown from
only a few of these bases. The primary ones were Udom, Takhli,
Korat, Ubon, Da Nang, and Cam Ranh Bay after it became opera-
tional in mid -1965.
The air defense radar coverage was extended considerably in both
Thailand and South Vietnam, with new radars that would be the
principal sites throughout the war. Near Da Nang on "Monkey
Mountain" was the "Panama" radar. At Pleiku, the "Peacock" radar
115
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US Air Forces in Southeast Asia (& Primary Radars).
became operational. In Thailand, "Lion" was installed at Ubon
RTAFB, "Brigham" at Udom JB^TAFB, and "Invert" at Nakhon
Phanom RTAFB. Fighter aircraft also deployed into the two coun-
tries to fulfill the air defense role. This was the picture of the friendly
air defense forces. "^s ,.
119
By August 1964 there were F-lOOs at Da Nang and Takhli, F-102s
at Da Nang, Tan Son Nhut, and Don Muang, and the Royal Aus-
trahan Air Force had F-86Fs on alert at Ubon and Udorn.
Quality of US Aircrews
The US air forces that deployed to Southeast Asia in 1964 consist-
ed of highly qualified personnel. The US had better trained pilots
than NVN though most were not combat experienced. About 27%
of the US pilots were under 30 ; nearly half were over 36 ; therefore,
the average pilot was well -seasoned with approximately eight to ten
years of flying experience.
The Red Baron air combat study conducted by the Air Force in
1973 showed that prior to June 1966 over 50 percent of the fighter
pilots had more than 2,000 total flying hours; the average fighter
pilot had flown 510 hours in the type aircraft he flew in combat and
the ratio of MIG kills to Air Force losses was 3 to 1 in the Air Force's
favor. By June 1968, the average fighter pilot time in the combat air-
craft had dropped to 240 hours and the corresponding MIG kill rate
had dropped to .85 for each of our losses. The background and ex-
perience of these pilots is portrayed below :
Command Experience
Tactical Air Command
Pilot Training Graduates
Other Commands
MIG Kill Ratio
Yet, one surprising fact surfaced in the analysis of air-to-air
combat losses. Apparently total flying experience had no direct cor-
relation to a US pilot's chances of being shot down in an air-to-air en-
counter. On the other hand, the pilot with the most experience had
a greater probability of shooting down an enemy aircraft . In other
words, experience counted in the offensive role, but not in the defen-
sive role.
Early Lessons Learned
Generally, individual flight leaders determined their flight's com-
bat tactics. Each flight was assigned a mission with a time on target
(TOT) , or a time period in the case of MIGCAP flights. The routes
to and from the targets and the method of approaching the targets
120
Apr65-Jun67
Jun67-Mar68
64.5%
29.5%
12.5%
21.1%
24.0%
49.4%
3.0%
0.85%
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were not specified; therefore, success depended upon how well indi-
vidual flight leaders applied appropriate tactics.
One big factor that had to be considered throughout the war was
the weather. Weather caused visual target sighting and navigation
problems; but primarily it forced aircraft down into the range of
AAA defenses. If the weather was very poor, an aircraft might even
be within range of small arms fire the entire time the flight was over
enemy territory.
Most of the antiaircraft weapons were Soviet made and their capa-
bilities varied with size. The list below briefly describes each weapon.
Most Lethal
Weapon Range Maximum Altitude
Quad 12.7mm 1000' 5,000'
Twin 14.5mm 1300' 6,500'
37mm 1400' 10,000'
57mm 1500-5000' 18,000'
85mm 5000-10,000' 25,000'
100mm 3000-20,000' 30,000'
Weapons of 57mm or larger could be radar controlled. These weap-
ons are credited with shooting down 80 percent of the aircraft lost in
1965.
The lessons of the early operations were clear. Antiaircraft fire,
not MIGs, was the main threat to US aircraft. To minimize losses,
aircraft would have to avoid the AAA effective range envelope when
possible or achieve surprise and complete attacks before AAA be-
came active.
Avoiding effective AAA required pilots to approach the target at
higher altitudes which resulted in earlier detection and, of course,
loss of surprise. Moreover, as the targets became more heavily de-
fended, defenses prevented most strafing attacks and aircraft were
forced to remain above the most intense AAA while making only one
bomb pass. Thus, bombing was less accurate, particularly when
changing winds were a factor.
These first strikes into high threat areas started the development of
new tactics and weapons to counter the air defense system. The per-
spective on defense of the aircraft was continually changing. It was
driven by the threat. Higher altitudes escaped the AAA optimum
ranges, but placed the aircraft in the envelope for SAM activation.
Later in the war, when the MIGs were more numerous, the air-to-air
threat compounded the defensive tactics. Flying too low meant AAA
reaction; flying at medium altitudes meant SAM reaction— the MIG
became a problem at all altitudes. This evolution continued through-
out the war.
122
57mm NVN AAA firing at RF-101, Feb i9§6,
123
Hostilities in the South were reaching a point that called for fur-
ther action against the North. On 13 February, the President decided
to begin the sustained air war against North Vietnam : Operation
Rolling Thunder.
RF-101 flies over 57mm AAA weapons position in NVN, 25 Jan 1966.
124
Chapter III. Rolling Thunder
March 1965-December 1965
The Bombing Begins in Earnest
On 12 February 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended an
eight -week program of action against North Vietnam. They for-
warded this program to the President through the Secretary of
Defense. On 13, February, President Johnson authorized the
operation. The code name given to this plan was Operation Rolling
Thunder.
Rolling Thunder was to be a measured and limited air action, ex-
ecuted jointly with the government of South Vietnam, against selec-
ted military targets in North Vietnam, south of the 19th Parallel.
The program called for strikes by both US and South Vietnamese
aircraft against the following military targets: barrack areas, radar
sites, airfields, ammunition depots, bridges, and storage areas.
The first raid was conducted on 2 March when a strike force of 44
F-105S, 40 F-lOOs, 7 RF-lOls, and 20 B-57s, with KC-135 tankers for
refueling support, struck an ammunition depot at Xom Bang.
Nineteen A-lHs of the South Vietnamese Air Force struck the
Quang Khe Naval Base .
During this attack the strike forces again met what was to remain
the greatest threat to air superiority throughout the entire war — an-
tiaircraft artillery fire. The US lost four aircraft during this raid,
three while attacking antiaircraft positions. Immediately, flak sup-
pression tactics were reexamined and flak suppression was scheduled
only when considered absolutely essential for protection of the
primary strike force.
Another important lesson learned during this first raid was that
combat losses could be reduced if pilots made only one pass on the
target and then departed the area. Multiple attacks, or remaining
to search for targets of opportunity invited trouble. Additionally, a
smaller number of aircraft was to be used on a random recycle and
restrike basis against the same target complex. This would also allow
greater flexibility in tactics, more surprise, and far less exposure time
per aircraft.
125
In mid-March, after a fact-finding mission by General Harold
Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, the President relaxed some of the
bombing restrictions previously imposed. Heretofore, the President
and the Secretary of Defense had day-to-day approval on all targets,
even prescribing the strike dates and times. Now, although the
President and Secretary continued to select targets, it was no longer
on a day-by-day basis. Targets were now selected in weekly packages
with the precise timing of the individual attacks left to the on-scene
commander. Further changes to the ground rules permitted random
armed reconnaissance of highways and railways, and flak sup-
pression and CAP aircraft which had not expended their ordnance
were permitted to attack targets enroute home from the target area.
The First MIG Attacks
On 4 April, the USAF attacked what was to prove one of the most
stubborn targets of all — the Thanh Hoa railroad and highway
bridge, 70 miles south of Hanoi. While striking this target, the pilots
encountered a second threat to air superiority — the MIG.
The USAF employed a strike force of F-105s, supported by F-lOOs
in a MIGCAP role, to destroy the bridge. Although the force hit the
bridge with numerous bombs, not a span fell. During a restrike on
the bridge the USAF lost its first aircraft to MIGs. The incident oc-
curred as follows.
Zinc Flight, four F-105s from Korat, was scheduled to be the
fourth element in the strike force. Due to refueling problems and a
haze restriction to visibility, the attacking planes were not on
schedule and began "bunching up" over the target. The strike,
however, was under the control of a mission commander orbiting the
area, and he instructed Zinc Flight to orbit over the checkpoint. Zinc
Flight had been in the orbit area 10 miles south of the target, for
three or four minutes and had almost completed an orbit, when the
number three pilot spotted two aircraft making a diving high speed
pass toward the flight. When the aircraft closed to about 3000-4000
feet, he identified them as MIGs, attacking Zinc Lead and Zinc Two.
He radioed, "Zinc Lead, break— you have MIGs behind you. Zinc
Lead, break. Zinc Lead, we're being attacked." Zinc Four also saw
the attacking MIGs and gave a similar warning.
Neither Zinc Lead or Two reacted to the warnings, and the MIGs
continued their attack. At this time Zinc Three spotted two more
MIGs behind the first two. They were set up to attack Zinc Three and
Four. Zinc Three called for the formation to break, and along with
Zinc Four broke left into the attacking MIGs.
Meanwhile, the leading MIGs passed in front and above Zinc
Three and Four. They were light grey MIG-17s with Chinese Com-
munist red-star-and-bar markings on the bottom of the wings. The
126
MIG-17ancl F-105 in dogfight over NVN, 28 Aug 1967.
MIG leader fired his guns when he was about 1500 feet behind Zinc
Lead. Zinc Three observed pieces of metal coming from the aft sec-
tion of Zinc Lead's aircraft. The second MIG flying in almost a
fighting wing position (200 feet out, 200-300 feet behind) fired on
Zinc Two almost simultaneously. Zinc Three observed flames on the
aft section of Zinc Two's aircraft. The two MIGs ceased fire at an
estimated range of 700-800 feet, rolled wings level and continued
straight ahead at high speed. The remaining MIGs did not attack
Zinc Three and Four, but followed the first two. A MIGCAP of F-
100s was unable to respond to the MIGs because the MIGCAP was
protecting aircraft bombing the bridge, and haze prevented
adequate visual waiting of the sudden attack.
These first two 'losses revealed some interesting MIG tactics.
Because of restricted visibility the MIG pilots were obviously using
vectors from ground controlled intercept (GCI) radar to establish
their six o'clock positioning. Their second tactic was the hit and run
technique that was employed successfully throughout the war.
The Fjii^st MIG Kills
During the second week of July 1965, the USAF achieved its first
MIG kills. Although MIG activity had been Hght co|npared to what
127
was to come, strike pilots began to detect an enemy pattern in the
MIG warnings which were broadcast by the EC-121D, Big Eye, sup-
port aircraft. These aircraft, flying at low altitudes over the Gulf of
Tonkin and equipped with search radar and radio relay transmitters,
determined the range and altitude of hostile aircraft and issued
warning to friendly aircraft .
The MIG warning at this time was given via a color code. Yellow
signified that MIGs were airborne, and Red meant that MIGs were
about ten minutes from a possible engagement. As a rule, the warn-
ings would be cyclical ; first, yellow, then red, and back to yellow as
the MIGs feinted a return to home base. However, shortly thereafter,
the warning would return to red as the last US flight departed the
area after the strike. The MIGs would follow the flight out of the
area, but rarely attacked.
The timing of the second red warning was such that the friendly
escort aircraft had only minimum fuel remining. It was suspected
that the MIG pilots could determine from their radar when the
escorts would be returning to base, and when, because of their low
fuel state, they would be able to make only one fast intercept. As a
result of these suspicions, strike pilots recommended that USAF
fighters plan tactics based on the fact that the MIGs retreated when
the attack force came into the area and, if they would do combat at
all, they would attack only the last flights when the escorts would be
low on fuel .
As a result of this recommendation, on 10 July 1965 an escort
flight of four F-4Cs from the 45th Tactical Fighter Squadron
Side view of an EC-121D aircraft of the Air Defense Command in flight near McClellan
AFB,CA,1967. ^ *,
128
delayed their usual takeoff time until 20 minutes before the strike
force departure. The escort flight then followed the last F-105 strike
flight and arrived approximately 15 minutes after the other F-4
escort flights. This tactic was designed to give the 45th TFS F-4
escort flight the appearance of being the last F-105 flight over target.
The flight maintained radio silence and flew the altitude and speed
of the F-105 flights. The flight was spread in a formation with lead
and number two on the left and three and four on the right. Flight
members maintained approximately 2000 feet between the two air-
craft in each element and 5000 feet between the elements. This for-
mation was selected because it provided more coverage to the rear of
the flight. The second two aircraft (second element) provided cover
by weaving behind the lead element. Lead and number three used
their radars extensively, while two and four had responsibility for
visual search.
After establishing an orbit near the target area, the F-4s waited.
When almost at BINGO fuel (amount needed to return to base
with reserve) the lead pilot decided to make one more pass to the
north from which the threat was expected. After completing the turn
at the southern end of the orbit, he picked up a radar contact 33 miles
away; shortly thereafter, his number three also got contact. The ele-
ment composed of lead and number two decided to make the visual
identification of the MIGs by accelerating ahead of three and four.
This tactic was designed to place them seven to ten miles ahead of ihe
second element of F-4s. This would enable the leading F-4s to break
away after visual identification and permit the second trailing F-4s
to fire their Sparrow missiles if the contacts proved to be hostile.
To conserve fuel, the lead element chose not to use afterburners,
and the trailing element flew an 'S" pattern behind the leaders. As a
lesult of these maneuvers, when the MIGs were sighted the elements
were separated by only two to three miles instead of the desired seven
to ten miles. Because they were too close together, the second ele-
ment could not fire a radar guided missile.
As they passed, each turned and the MIG-17s ended up attacking
the second element. Both pilots in the second element lit their after-
burners. Meanwhile, the MIG pilots dropped their tanks and turned
very tightly behind three and four, firing as they maneuvered for
position. Both F-4 crews could see the nose of the MIG light up from
the muzzle flashes. Although the MIGs initially out -turned the F-4s,
the F-4s were able to accelerate during the turn and gain additional
separation.
Captains Tom Roberts and Ron Anderson, pilots of number four,
initially flew a fighting wing position on number three, crewed by
Captains Ken Holcombe and Art Clarke, but because Roberts felt
that Holcombe did not have sufficient lookout protection, he broke
right during the turn in an attempt to help. The MIGs split and slid
129
by in an overshoot. Once the overshoot occurred, Captain Holcombe
decided to gain separation by executing a roll to the right and put-
ting the aircraft into a 30 degree dive. The MIG pilot tried to follow,
ending up behind and three -fourths of a mile away. Holcombe ac-
celerated, gained more separation, and turned left into the MIG, at-
tacking it almost head-on. Due to an inoperable radar, he was
unable to launch a Sparrow missile and the Mig passed head-on, fir-
ing as it went by. After the MIG passed, Ken made a slight turn to
keep the enemy in sight, and then made a sixty degree dive to 10,000
feet. Since he was still in afterburner, he was able to reach 1.3 mach.
He then initiated a high-G barrel roll, with the MIG having turned
behind him at approximately one mile. As he completed three -
fourths of the roll, he noticed the MIG firing again from the seven
o'clock position. As he completed the high-G roll the MIG again
overshot. This time the MIG again started to turn, but then leveled
and descended towards a cloud.
Ken and Art were now about 13,000 feet at mach 0.95 with the
MIG almost straight ahead. Ken fired a Sidewinder heat -seeking
missile at about 1 to 1 V4 mile range. He did not see the missile. He
then fired a second missile, which detonated just aft of the MIG-
17, destroying it. Short of fuel, he headed for recovery at Udorn.
In the meantime, Tom and Ron in the number four aircraft after
breaking right, started an afterburner assisted dive from 20,000 feet.
Tom accelerated to about mach 1.4 at 12,000 feet and started a 4G
pull-up. During this maneuver the following MIG lost some distance
but continued to follow. In the pull-up, Tom lost sight of the MIG,
so he continued his climb to 33,000 feet and came back over the
top, inverted in a "sort of Immelmann" to rejoin the flight. On
rolling out at the top, he observed the MIG at about 28,000 feet in a
90 degree bank, doing a vertical recovery. He completed his
maneuver and had the MIG about 4,000 to 5,000 feet in front of
him. He fired a Sidewinder. The missile went by the MIG's tailpipe
and detonated near the left wing tip. Captain Roberts fired a second
missile but this one failed to track. Finally, his third Sidewinder
destroyed the MIG .
Credited for the first USAF MIG kills in the air war over North
Vietnam were Captain Kenneth E. Holcombe (AC) , Captain Arthur
C. Clarke (P) , Captain Thomas S. Roberts (AC), and Captain
Ronald C. Anderson (P) . Total elapsed time for both engagements
was less than four minutes.
SAMs and More MIGs
The USAF did not have long to enjoy its success in the air-to-air
encounter. Shortly thereafter an EB-66 (a tvnn engine electronic
counter-measures aircraft) intercepted radar signals used to guide
130
MIG Killers— Lt Gen Joseph H. Moore, Commander of the 2nd Air Division, awards Sil-
ver Star medals to F-4C aircraft commanders who downed two Communist MIG type
jets over North Vietnam, on 12 Jul 1965. Accepting the awards are USAF pilots Capt
Kenneth D. Holcombe of Detroit, Ml, and Capt Thomas S. Roberts of LaGrange, GA.
surface-to-air missiles (SAM) . This meant that the North Vietna-
mese were ready to use the third threat to US air superiority — the
SAM. This SAM site was plotted west of Hanoi where none had been
identified before. Five other suspected sites had previously been visu-
ally identified but their operational status was unknown.
Pilots preparing for strikes against NVN were briefed on the new
threat. On 24 July, flights of F-4Cs from Ubon were flying MIGCAP
when an EB-66 intercepted more SAM radar signals and flashed a
warning to all friendly aircraft. Tfiis site was also estimated to be
west of Hanoi. Shor^ af|er the warning had been given, an F-4C
pilot observed a missile climbing at an estimated speed of Mach 1 ,
with a climb angle of greater than 50 degrees. Within seconds, he
saw it hit one of the other F-4s. The aircraft disintegrated in a brown
colored fireball. Two other missiles detonated behind the flight.
The remaining F-4s took evasive action and successfully
recovered, but all had suffered damage from the original burst.
From this encounter, it was learned that immediate, violent, evasive
action was a useful tactic against the SAM. It was also learned that
tight formations should be avoided in areas where SAMs were a
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As a result of this new threat, a new mission emerged, known as
Iron Hand. The primary job of Iron Hand aircraft was to seek out
and destroy missile sites. The first fighter aircraft to be modified with
special missile radar detection equipment was the F-IOOF, called
Wild Weasel I. This Wild Weasel aircraft would pick up the radar
frequencies associated with the SAM sites, hortte onto the signal, and
attack the missile launchers. The Iron Hand mission required spe-
cialized aircraft, ordnance loads, and tactics.
In August more suspected SAM sites surfaced on the target list. Ef-
forts to locate and destroy these sites constituted a major portion of
the air operation during August and September, but all known sites
were unoccupied. MIG activity during these months was slow, with
only a few sightings reported.
During November there was an increase in MIG and SAM activity.
US aircrews sighted MIGs on ten different occasions. On 5 Novem-
ber, the USAF lost an F-105 to a SAM and on 7 November two
flights of F-4s destroyed two occupied SAM sites. Fifteen days later
two flights of Iron Hand F-105s, using terrain masking in order to
reach the target undetected, destroyed two more sites. The F-105
was the second aircraft to be converted to the Iron Hand role.
Results of Rolling Thunder for 1965 showed that USAF pilots had
logged about 10,570 tactical strike sorties over North Vietnam, drop-
ping more than 80,000 tons of bombs. While conducting these sorties
the USAF destroyed hundreds of vehicles, buildings, bridges, and
ferries. Included in the results of the air superiority mission were the
destruction of numerous AAA sites, SAM launchers, and radar sites.
Factors effective in countering the MIGs included those found im-
portant in air-to-air combat in the First World War: formation in-
tegrity, good eyesight, aggressiveness, and training. Different types
of formations were flown depending on the type of visual and radar
coverage desired. Radar played a significant part since USAF air-
craft were over enemy territory where enemy radar could vector
NVN fighters onto them; therefore, the EC-121 was used to identify
NVN fighters when they were airborne, and warn US aircraft of the
enemy threat .
Tactics employed against the SAM included violent maneuvers, in
both azimuth and elevation in order to evade the tracking missile.
The USAF also began using specialized Wild Weasel aircraft and
Iron Hand flights to attack missile emplacements.
The overall tactics employed against enemy air defenses were
necessarily dynamic in nature. Whenever existing tactics resulted in
relatively high attrition, changes were promptly made. These shifts
in tactics brought changes in penetration altitudes, evasive maneu-
vers, delivery techniques, weaponeering, and equipment.
133
Chapter IV. Air Superiority
Comes of Age
Status of Rival Capabilities
As seen in the preceding pages the initial phases of RoUing
Thunder operations saw the buildup of US forces and the develop-
ment of tactics to cope with the threat to US air superiority. During a
one-month ceasefire in December 1965, many things occurred that
required drastic changes in the US approach to air superiority. The
cessation in the US air campaign over North Vietnam (24
December 1965 through 31 January 1966) while intended to show US
willingness to negotiate, gave North Vietnam an unmolested op-
portunity to increase and perfect its defenses. When aerial opera-
tions resumed on 1 February 1966, US aircraft found a fully in-
tegrated AAA, MIG, and SAM defense system tied together by an ef-
fective command control network.
The numbers of SAM sites and MIGs had increased significatly
over those previously encountered. Supersonic MIG-21s, with
significantly better capabilities than a the MIG-15s and 17s, joined
the NVN fighter force. Additionally, the AAA order of battle had
mushroomed and spread into new areas.
After 1965, the USAF relied primarily on the following aircraft for
Rolling Thunder operations. The F-105D was the primary strike,
air-to-ground delivery vehicle; the F-105F (Wild Weasel) proved
effective against the SAM installations. The F-4C was the MIGCAP,
or air-to-air cover for the strike force ; the D and E versions were
follow-ons to the F-4C and embodied improved weapons delivery
systems. The KG -135 A provided in-flight refueling for the fighters;
and the EB-66, EG-121, and G-130 aircraft provided the needed
electronic surveillance and countermeasures support for the strike
forces. In addition to the normal air-to-ground ordnance such as
iron bombs and cluster bombs, USAF aircraft were equipped with
Falcon, Sparrow, and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. The F-105 and
F-4E aircraft each had an internal 20mm cannon and the F-4D
used the externally-mounted 20mm cannon pod. The combination
of missiles and cannon gave the pilot both long and short range
weapons for use in air-to-air engagements.
134
Rolling Thunder Resumes
The resumed bombing program was intended to stop infiltration
and provide a basis for negotiations. To pursue the bombing task,
the USAF had to maintain air superiority in areas where the air-to-
ground mission would occur. However, the specific rules of engage-
ment did not permit strict application of sound military doctrine.
Lucrative targets were excluded due to bombing restrictions around
Haiphong, Hanoi, and along the Communist Chinese border. The
tasks, combined with the limiting rules of engagement, presented the
Air Force with a formidable challenge: destroy, stop, or slow the
supplies going south, but do so without attacking all elements of the
enemy air defense system.
During the first half of 1966, US forces only engaged MIGs on the
average of once a month. The SAM threat became more definite,
but it was not as bad as it could have been due to the following three
factors : poor missile quality, inadequately trained missile crews, and
the evasive tactics and effective electronic countermeasures (ECM)
used by the USAF aircrews. Regularly, the USAF aircrews avoided
oncoming SAMs by jettisoning ordnance immediately and using a
high "G" turning maneuver to make the missile overshoot. These
evasive tactics decreased the SAM probability of kill but caused the
US aircraft to abort target attacks.
To avoid SAMs, aircrews entered the target areas at low altitudes
where the missiles were less effective and used the natural terrain
features of North Vietnam to mask the ingressing force as long as
possible. The final leg of the in -bound route would terminate with a
pop -up maneuver designed to gain maximum altitude, enable the
pilot to see the target, and make a dive bomb pass on it. Shortcom-
ings to this approach were readily apparent. The low altitude route
put the fighters within range of small arms and automatic weapons.
The altitude gained during the pop -up maneuver put the fighter
back in the lethal SAM envelope and allowed the pilot only a short
time to acquire the target and release his weapons. Colonel M. S.
"Sabre" Sams, 388th Tactical Fighter Wing Commander, said that
"... numerous targets have not been hit because the strike force
could not go into the target at the desired altitude and [aircrews]
were forced to use 'pop-up' tactics which allow only a few seconds to
acquire the target and [this] decreases bombing accuracy."
Even though the aircraft loss rate to SAMs was not high, the
avoidance tactics combined with the enemy threat, reduced US
target strike effectiveness. Therefore, new tactics or improved
technology was needed to decrease the SAM threat to strike aircraft.
The specially equipped two -seat F-105F Wild Weasel and the
Shrike missile provided the answer. The F-105F, replacing the
F-IOOF, was a faster, longer aircraft. When the F-105F crew
135
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detected SAM guidnace radar emissions, it would launch a Shrike
beam -riding missile which guided to the radar and destroyed it. The
Shrike was first used in the lesser defended portions of NVN where
optimum tactics were developed. Later it was used in the heavily
defended areas of the North.
With the introduction of the Shrike, the SAMs were much less ef-
fective because the time the radar operators could safely transmit
was reduced considerably. For instance, to assure a high degree of
accuracy, the SAM operator had to go through a comparatively
lengthy sequence. First, he had to acquire the aircraft on radar, and
then he had to track the aircraft from SAM launch until impact.
But, if the target acquisition phase was shortened by the Shrike
threat, then the SAM simply would launch at the target aircraft. In
addition, if the tracking phase were also shortened, then the SAM
would be fired in a far less accurate ballistic mode. For these reasons,
the introduction of the Shirke had a very positive impact on reducing
the SAM capability.
On 3 July 1966, a four -ship Iron Hand (SAM suppression) flight
attacked three SA-2 sites in heavily defended NVN, using Shrike
missiles, 2.75 inch rockets, and 20mm cannon. They attacked the
first site with two shrikes, and the radar signal ceased 52 seconds
after launch; destruction of this site could not be verified, however.
An F-105D launched another Shrike at the second site that remained
operational and probably was not hit.
The F-105F Weasel pilot then attacked the third site with a
Shrike, apparently missed, and the flight had to descend to a lower
altitude to avoid two SAMs that were launched at them. One missile
guided on the flight but missed the aircraft by 2000 feet. The second
missile closed on the Weasel, and the pilot dove to 200 feet with the
missile closing. When the missile closed to an unmaneuverable point,
the Weasel pilot pulled up, and the missile detonated 500 feet below
him. The pilot then rolled his F-105F in on the site and strafed it,
causing a secondary explosion . His wingman observed that the radar
stayed on the air, so he fired a full pod of eighteen 2.75 inch rockets,
that hit the radar van. Emissions ceased. Two days later on 5 July,
another Iron Hand flight attacked four SAM sites. Evaluation reveal-
ed that two sites were damaged, one heavily damaged, and the
fourth was destroyed.
The Wild Weasel aircraft offered the best solution at the time
against the SAMs. However, the North Vietnamese soon learned how
to counter the Shrike threat. SAM radars coordinated with long
range EW/GCI radars to keep themselves informed of US aircraft
positions. This meant that the SAM radars did not have to perform
the tracking function. They stayed in a warm-up condition, called
"dummy load." From these, the SAM operators switched to an active
137
radiating position, launched the missile, and then returned to dum-
my load — all in a short period of time .
By such tactics, the enemy negated some of the SAM protection
that the Shrike previously provided. New technology was needed to
regain the upper hand. The answer was sought in electronics and the
possibilities it offered. The result of the effort was the electronic
countermeasures (ECM) pod. The pod had the ability to jam the
enemy radar in such a way that the enemy could not determine exact
aircraft range and bearing information.
Colonel William S. Chairsell, 388th Tactical Fighter Wing Com-
mander (August 1966 to August 1967) , credited the introduction of
the ECM pod as the major factor allowing improved tactics, better
bombing accuracy, and a reduction in aircraft loss rate. The pod
allowed "Thuds" to roll in on targets from medium altitudes —
12,000 to 15,000 feet— giving more positive target identification and
improved weapons delivery accuracy.
Prior to the pod's integration into the F-105 weapon system, the
388th Wing conducted an operational test of its capability. During
1-8 October 1966, F-105 pilots flew numerous sorties in pod-
equipped aircraft to ascertain the feasibility of new tactics for use
against gunlaying and SAM radars. More than 100 successful sorties
were flown with very promising results. The fighters were able to go
relatively unmolested into the target area at altitudes between 10,000
and 17,000 feet. Many aircraft actually flew multiple orbit patterns
in the target area, yet received no hostile fire.
On 7 October, two pod-equipped flights were bombing their
assigned targets when they detected 10 AAA guidance radar signals
and 12 SAM radar signals, with at least two SAM radars in the im-
mediate target area. One flight orbited the heavy signal area at
13,000 feet prior to dropping ordnance. No missiles were fired at this
flight. Far below 37mm flak was seen, but it did not appear to be
directed at them.
The next day, four more F-105 flights tested the pod, but, in one
flight, two aircraft did not have pods. They received 37mm, 57mm,
and 85mm fire ; and one SAM passed nearby. The other two F-105s
in the flight had ECM pods. Crews sighted sporadic barrage flak, but
no missiles. In contrast, another pod -equipped flight flew into the
target area, maintained altitudes between 13,000 and 17,000 feet,
and drew no flak or missiles.
The evolution of SAM evasion tactics had indeed come a long way.
Heretofore, low altitude ingress to avoid SAMs created unacceptable
losses from AAA and small arms. The follow -on tactic had been a
change in altitude, from "on the deck" to 4,500-6,000 feet, and also
meant protecting the strike force with Wild Weasels. This modifica-
tion had taken the attacking aircraft out of the AAA/small arms
envelope but placed them within effective SAM range. Now, with the
138
introduction of the ECM pod, US fighters again were able to operate
with some freedom within the North Vietnamese SAM environment.
Colonel Chairsell went on to say, "... seldom has a technological ad-
vance of this nature so degraded the enemy's defense posture. It has
literally transformed the hostile air defense environment we once
faced, to one in which we can now operate with a latitude of per-
missibility." For the moment, effective tactics against the radars of
SAMs and AAA guns had been perfected. However, the MIGs still
remained a problem .
MIGs and Operation Bolo
In April and May of 1966, the MIG force had actively and ag-
gressively engaged USAF forces. Their tactics indicated that support
aircraft were prime targets. To combat the threat, support aircraft
received F-4C MIGCAP protection.
The MIG threat would have been nullified somewhat if enemy air-
fields could have been attacked. However, such permission never
came as a typical execution order indicated: "Not, repeat, not
authorized to attack North Vietnamese air bases from which attack-
ing aircraft may be operating." Since the MIGs could not be at-
tacked on the ground, the USAF was forced to engage them in the
air, usually on the MIG's terms.
An answer to the MIG problem came in Operation Bolo. Re-
stricted from attacking the enemy aircraft on the ground. Air Force
planners designed an operation to lure MIGs into an air battle on US
terms. Colonel Robin Olds, Commander of the 8th Tactical Fighter
Wing, led his unit in the execution of Operation Bolo. A major prob-
lem that had to be coped with was the unpredictable reaction of
North Vietnamese air defense forces. In the past, MIG reactions to
USAF airstrikes had been cyclic, perhaps geared to either the ex-
perience level of the available MIG pilots or influenced by seasonal
weather and the offensive strike pattern. Aware of this predictability
problem , the overall objective of Operation Bolo was formulated :
destroy the airborne force of the North Vietnamese. The specific ob-
jective : deceive and lure the MIG air defense force into a reaction
posture and, once airborne, seek them out, engage, pursue, and
destroy them .
The attacking F-4 force would have to appear on enemy radar as a
normal F-105 strike force. A typical pre -Bolo strike force consisted of
F-105s in the strike role, four flights of four F-4s each for MIGCAP
and also a backup air-to-ground role, plus one or two Iron Hand
flights comprised of two F-105Ds and two F-105F Wild Weasels.
The normal overland route went north over Laos, then over the
mountains to the Red River Valley and into the target area. The
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water route went north over the Gulf of Tonkin, turned west and
proceeded along the ridge line 20 miles north of Haiphong.
In Operation Bolo, F-4Cs equipped for air-to-air combat would
replace the F-105s. F-4Es with an internally mounted gun were not
yet available. The F-105s had been using the ECM pod, so the F-4Cs
had to be similarly equipped.
The Christmas bombing halt in December 1966 provided the nor-
mal North Vietnamese buildup during the truce. On 2 January 1967,
Operation Bolo, commanded by Colonel Olds, was launched. Here is
Olds' description of that eventful day :
... I was serving as mission commander of a force of F-4C ,
F-104, and F-105 aircraft performing a planned fighter sweep
in the Hanoi area. Fourteen flights of F-4s, six flights of F-105
Iron Hand, and four flights of F-104s participated in the sweep,
supported in the normal fashion by B-66 ECM, RC-121 Big
Eye, and K-135 tankers. The B-66s were provided escort by ad-
ditional F-4C aircraft.
As mission commander, I flew lead position in Olds flight,
first in the stream of F-4Cs planned to converge on Phuc Yen
airfield. TOT (time on target) was 1400G (Greenwich) , and
was made good. No definite radar contacts were made as we in-
gressed on a heading of 145 degrees. Weather at the time was
solid undercast, tops estimated 7000 feet, ceiling unknown. I led
Olds' flight past Phuc Yen for approximately 14 to 18 nm (nau-
tical miles) , then turned so as to cross Phuc Yen again on a
reciprocal heading. As the turn was completed Olds 3 picked up
a radar contact low at 12 o'clock, high closure rate. He gained a
lock -on and instructed to attack. Steering dot information put
the flight into a 10 to 15 degree dive. Just as we neared the top of
the undercast, radar broke lock. The target was under or in the
overcast and had passed beneath us on an opposite heading.
I led the flight on past the airfield once again, called the in-
gressing F-4 flights Ford and Rambler that missiles free was no
longer in effect and turned my flight back southeast. Just as we
again crossed Phuc Yen, Ford flight arrived on time. Everything
then happened at once. Ford called a MIG-21 closing on Olds
flight at their 7 o'clock. Olds 2 saw the MIG simultaneously. Ad-
ditional MIGs were popping up through the clouds. Olds lead
initiated a left turn of sufficient intensity to throw off the attack-
ing MIG's aim, but without breaking Olds flight integrity. A
defensive split by elements was automatically taken.
After 90 degrees of turn in this modified break, I sighted an
aircraft at my 11 o'clock in a left turn, slightly low, about a mile
and a quarter away. I closed on this target for positive iden-
tification, not having seen a MIG before and by now uncertain
of the exact location of all members of Ford flight. The target
was positively identified as a MIG-21, silver in color, too distant
for markings to be seen. I instructed the pilot (back-seater) to
go bore sight, put the pipper on the target, and called for lock-
142
on and full system operation. I was setting us up for an AIM -7
attack. Closure was enough to necessitate haste in establishing
the proper attack parameter. We achieved the steering dot (in-
terlocks "in") and pressed -released, pressed and held the trig-
ger. Two AIM -7s launched and appeared to track. At that mo-
ment we lost radar lock-on, having passed beyond minimum
range, and the missiles had no chance to guide. I quickly se-
lected HEAT, put the pipper on the MIG as he was disappearing
into the overcast, received an indistinct missile growl and fired
one AIM -9, knowing the missile had little chance to guide.
During the first encounter. Olds 2 was busily engaged in pur-
suing the original MIG-21 that had closed behind my flight. In
addition, as I closed on the MIG that evaded in the cloud deck, I
had another in sight at my 10 o'clock, in a left turn, and just
above the clouds. I then turned my attention to the second MIG.
I pulled sharp left , turned inside him , pulled my nose up about
30 above the horizon, rechecked my missile switches and ready
panel, switched fuel to internal wing transfer, barrel rolled to
the right, held my position upside down above and behind the
MIG until the proper angular deflection and range parameters
were satisfied, completed the rolling maneuver, and fell in
behind and below the MIG-21 at his seven o'clock position at
about .95 mach. Range was 4500 feet, angle off 15. The MIG-
21 obligingly pulled up well above the horizon and exactly
down sun. I put the pipper on his tailpipe, received a prefect
growl, squeezed the trigger once, hesitated, then once again.
The first Sidewinder leapt in front and within a split second,
turned left in a definite and beautiful collision course correc-
tion. I did not take my eyes off the first Sidewinder and conse-
quently did not see precisely what the second missile did. It ap-
peared to my peripheral vision to have guided also. The first
missile went slightly down, then arced gracefully up, heading for
impact. Suddenly the MIG-21 erupted in a brilliant flash or
orange flame. A complete wing separated and flew back in the
airstream, together with a mass of smaller debris. The MIG
swapped ends immediately, and tumbled forward for a few in-
stants. It then fell, twisting, corkscrewing, tumbling, lazily
toward the top of the clouds. No pilot ejection occurred above
the overcast. The MIG continued to fall and disappeared into
the clouds. The plan form view of the aircraft was clearly visible
during many separate instants. It was minus one wing and the
other presented the wedge shape, sharply swept leading edge,
straight trailing edge, characteristic of the MIG-21 .
I continued my left turn, looked for other MIGs, checked my
fuel gage, and gave the order to egress, knowing that Olds 4, not
having obtained fuel from his centerline tank, was then at
bingo.
We left the battle area as Ford flight broke off its engagement
and as Rambler flight became engaged.
143
Col Robin Olds and Capt John B. Stone return from a MIG kill over North Vietnam,
1967. % ; .
144
F-4 aircrews destroyed seven MIGs during Operation Bolo. No
USAF Losses occurred. The new tactic, utilizing surprise by simu-
lating the F-105s with F-4s, was effective but could not be considered
long lasting. The MIG pilots, even though wary after the 2 January
raid, continued to be a threat. Eventually, the MIGs became such a
threat to operations that the restriction against attacking North Viet-
nam airfields was lifted briefly in 1967.
Moves and Countermoves
Iron Hand flights, electronic countermeasures, and counter-MIG
operations were employed in various combinations as air superiority
tactics evolved during the Rolling Thunder era. Tactics continued to
change, albeit on a smaller scale, to suit particular situations. The
remainder of this chapter illustrates the see-saw battle for tactical ad-
vantage.
At the beginning of 1967, the AAA/ AW threat in North Vietnam
consisted of 5000 to 7000 weapons, ranging from the 12.7mm to
100mm guns. In addition, US intelligence had identified approx-
imately 170 SAM sites in North Vietnam. The US reacted to this in-
creased threat by adopting special formation procedures using the
jamming capabilities of the ECM pods. Pilots flew a specific flight
formation position, both laterally and vertically, to gain maximum
pod radiation coverage. If flight members maintained proper
distances, the ECM pods denied the ground radars range, bearing,
and altitude information. This effective tactic caused the North
Vietnamese to begin inaccurate barrage firing with SAMs and AAA.
In May 1967, after the MIG airfields were declared valid targets,
USAF fighters destroyed 26 MIGs on the ground. Strikes were timed
to catch the MIGs between sorties. Another MIG deterrent came in
the form of the EC-121M Rivet Top aircraft that arrived in late
August 1967. This EC-121 could detect a MIG taking off and report
its position to to US aircraft in the area. Colonel Howard C.Johnson,
the 388th Tactical Fighter Wing Deputy for Operations, said that,
"Rivet Top has provided outstanding real time MIG information to
our strike force." Once again a slight tactical edge had been gained.
In an October three-day effort against the MIG, 20 were damaged
or destroyed at Phuc Yen and Cat Bi airfields. But in November, the
US was faced with an renewed SAM threat. The North Vietnamese
installed optical tracking devices on the Sam guidance system , severly
degrading the effectiveness of the ECM pod. US ECM and anti-
radiation missiles were upgraded, but the Rolling Thunder opera-
tion closed with a distinct possibility that the enemy had regained the
upper hand in the use of the SAMs.
From mid-December 1967 to 1 April 1968, the US made no major
changes in the rules of engagement or targeting. Then in early April,
145
bombing restrictions were imposed, limiting USAF operations to
only the southern portion of North Vietnam. These lower route
package areas were easier to attack than the heavily defended Hanoi
and Haiphong areas. Since few SAM sites were present in the south,
the Iron Hand Flights found very few radar targets, and although the
Iron Hand F-105s now carried a new missile, the Standard Arm,
which was a vast improvement over the Shrike, they rarely had occa-
sion to fire it.
The MIGs that operated in this area of North Vietnam did not
have the GCI and SAM support that they enjoyed further North,
thus, they were relegated to hit-and-run tactics. The focus of air
superiority tactics improvement shifted to the research and develop-
ment of improved weapons and the training associated with these
weapons when President Johnson directed the bombing halt on 3 1
October 1968.
Air-to-Air Losses During Rolling Thunder
NVN 116
US 55
146
Chapter V. Bombing of the North Resumes :
Operation Linebacker I
In the spring of 1972, increased NVN activity in the DMZ caused
President Nixon to issue admonitions to NVN that the US would not
allow an offensive to go unanswered. He stressed the use of military
force against military targets in North Vietnam. In remarks on 30
April, he said that the North Vietnamese were taking great risks if
they continued their offensive in the South. He was confident that he
could limit strikes to military targets. He was equally confident that
if the NVN did not withdraw to the North, strikes into North Viet-
nam would be necessary to protect the diminishing numbers of
American servicemen in Vietnam .
Throughout the early spring of 1972, USAF fighter units deployed
to several bases in Southeast Asia in response to mounting tension in
the DMZ. With little surprise on the first of May, ground fighting in-
tensified around Quang Tri City in the northernmost provence of
South Vietnam. General Vo Nguyen Giap's numerically superior
force, supported by armor and heavy artillery, took the city from
8,000 troops of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 3d
Infantry.
This flagrant violation of South Vietnamese territory, and the US
promise of support, set the stage for renewed combat. On 4 May, the
South Vietnamese and US negotiators jointly agreed to cancel in-
definitely the then ongoing Paris peace talks.
On 8 May, the President ordered the mining of North Vietnamese
ports. This was to support the interdiction of land routes to NVN
and the resumption of naval and air strikes. The intensive air strikes
into North Vietnam were to be known as Operation Linebacker.
8 May was also the day the Major Robert A. Lodge and Captain
Roger C. Locher got their second MIG kill. Major Lodge was leading
Oyster flight, four F-4s whose mission was to provide MIGCAP sup-
port for a major joint Navy /Air Force strike in the Hanoi area.
Oyster One and Oyster Three had new improved radar sets that
allowed them to detect MIGs at extended ranges. In addition, the
improved Navy radar picket ship. Red Crown, was operating in the
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Gulf of Tonkin, Around nine o'clock in the morning Major Lodge
led his flight into North Vietnam. With the air of Red Cronm's
MIG advisories, Major Lodge and Captain Locher were developing
the air picture in their minds in anticipation of the events that would
follow.
There were two flights of MIGs northwest of Hanoi. One of these
flights had already engaged Galore, another MIGCAP flight of four
F-4s. Galore Three, with Major Barton P. Crews in the front seat
and Captain Keith W. Jones, Jr. in the back seat, would also get a kill
this day.
Major Lodge turned Oyster flight north; his intent was to assist
Galore. They immediately identified the battle on their radar and
pressed the attack. Shortly thereafter. Red Croum. advised Oyster
flight that they were being attacked by MIGs from their right. Major
Lodge brought the flight around in a hard right turn to an easterly
heading. Captain Locher immediately acquired the MIGs at 12
o'clock, 40 miles away. Oyster Three also identified the radar con-
tacts, and Red Crown cleared Major Lodge in Oyster One to fire. '
Before Oyster could close to missile range, the MIGs, apparently
also under ground control, turned away. Major Lodge ended up in
trail with the MIGs, but just outside missile range. They continued to
close but by this time the air picture had become confused. To be
sure that he did not fire on friendly aircraft. Major Lodge decided to
visually identify the MIGs before firing. He closed to about a mile,
visually confirmed that his target was a MIG, and shot him down.
As they returned to base. Lodge and Locher reflected on the joy of
painting their second red star on the side of the Phantom that had
served them well— little did they realize that the price for the next
kill would be the loss of their own aircraft .
Policy and Other Changes
The purpose of Linebacker was to reduce the North Vietnamese
capability to. wage war against South Vietnam to the greatest extent
possible. In order to do this, the objective was divided into three
basic tasks: (1) destroy the war-related resources already in NVN.
(2) reduce or restrict NVN assistance from external sources; and,
(3) interdict lines of communication to impede the movement of
men and supplies into Laos and South Vietnam. The essential
political difference between the Linebacker campaign and earlier
Rolling Thunder operations was the President's decision to isolate
NVN from external resupply.
'Throughout the war there were so many US aircraft over North Vietnam that US
pilots could not fire a missile without either visual identification or clearence from a
controlling agency such as Red Crown.
149
But Linebacker was different in several other ways. First, Presi-
dent Nixon gave the Seventh Air Force Commander considerably
more latitude and flexibility in directing the aerial operation than
previously permitted. Laser -guided bombs (LGB) , with their in-
creased accuracy allowed strikes on previously restricted targets. In
addition, the rules of engagement were relaxed, providing more
freedom of operation.
Now, the Seventh Air Force Commander usually set his own
priorities, selected the targets, and determined the strike. This allow-
ed him to consider such important factors as military priorities,
weather, enemy defenses, and operational status of the target. The
theater air commander also had the authority to restrike or divert
strikes based on his assessment of post -strike reconnaissance. This
fundamental change in management returned a portion of the pro-
cess of prosecuting the war to the professional military commander
in the field. Armed with greater authority, a larger target list, and
the knowledge that the President wanted results. General John W.
Vogt, Jr. Seventh Air Force Commander, set about accomplishing
the objective of Linebacker. All targets of the Linebacker campaign
fell into categories associated with the three tasks described on page
Linebacker strikes by Air Force aircraft against these targets
were planned and executed decisively and concurrently with the US
Navy. Each service assumed responsibility for targets within a
specified area and established a completion date for destruction.
They then executed the campaign. Once begun, the operation was
not one of gradual escalation similar to Rolling Thunder, but was
immediate and punishing. The cumulative impact was crushing.
Strikes on war -related resources destroyed vehicle repair facilities,
POL storage areas, war -making industries, port facilities, SAM sites,
airfields, truck parks, military storage areas, military camps, head-
quarters, and assembly areas. In order to "reduce or restrict NVN
assistance form external sources," all main harbors of NVN were
mined and the northeast and northwest rail lines were interdicted.
Loss of harbors forced Soviet and Chinese ships into the time-
consuming task of off-loading into shallow draft boats or barges out-
side the 12 -mile limit. This "lightering" process extended the
unloading time for a five or six thousand ton vessel to more than a
month. Thus, the mining made resupply from ships relatively in-
significant. On land, the northeast and northwest rail lines were the
primary land routes from China. Continuing strikes also insured that
these resupply channels were reduced to a trickle.
Tactical airpower accomplished the last task, "interdicting the
lines of communication to impede the movement of men and
materials into Laos and South Vietnam," by systematically striking
bridges, key choke points, port facilities, truck parks, staging areas,
POL facilities, supply caches, and trucks moving from Hanoi south.
150
The effect of the Linebacker campaign on these supply routes was
dramatic ; the enemy's supply was reduced to an estimated 20 per-
cent of his initial capabilities.
Technological advances in weaponry contributed a large part to
the success of Linebacker. Guided bombs, with their excellent ac-
curacy, greatly increased target destruction capabilities. This
significantly reduced the number of sorties required to destroy a
given target, and therefore allowed the US to attack more targets.
The most effective of the guided weapons was the laser guided bomb .
The LGB was a conventional bomb fitted with a guidance package
which steered the bomb to impact directly on a target. The target
was pinpointed by an aircraft fitted with a laser designator. So accu-
rate was this bombing system that in two days, 10 and 12 May 1972,
the Air Force and Navy dropped six bridges, including the famous
Hanoi Railroad and Highway Bridge, known as the Paul Doumer
Bridge. And on 13 May, F-4 laser bombers completely destroyed the
Thanh Hoa Bridge, billed as "the bridge which would never go
down." These bridges had withstood hundreds of sorties and thou-
sands of bombs since 1964. A few aircraft carrying LGBs had re-
duced them to rubble.
In addition, the LGB provided the opportunity to strike several
important bridges along the northeast and northwest railroads that
previously had been restricted from bombing because of their prox-
imity to the People's Republic of China (PRC) . The eariier restric-
tion had been imposed because of possible political repercussions
should the PRC receive damage from the relatively inaccurate con-
ventional bombs. The explicit accuracy of the LGB eliminated that
risk, and thus allowed destruction of these targets.
Air Superiority Enters a New Pliase
By 11 May, the tempo of the conflict obviously had increased.
Since the President initiated the campaign, some 1800 sorties had
been flown, and the air-to-air combat box score was seven US air-
craft down vs eleven MIGs.
During the combat lull prior to Linebacker, the North Vietnamese
rebuilt their defenses while the US applied technology and perfected
tactics which increased its offensive capability to protect strike forces.
During the six months of Linebacker I (May-October 1972), the
technology and tactics were introduced to counter the defensive
moves of the enemy.
With Linebacker came the mission specialization of aircrews, even
within the same squadron. In the past, the fighter pilot had been a
"jack-of -all -trades;" a bombing mission today, counter -air opera-
tions tomorrow, and a night attack another time. But because of the
moves and counter -moves on each side and the increasing degree of
151
sophistication involved in each area of expertise, specialization
became increasingly important to mission accomplishment. For ex-
ample, North Vietnamese defenses forced the US to concentrate
specific fighter forces on SAM and AAA suppression . LGBs required
special delivery tactics and laser designator knowledge. And most im-
portant, survival and effectiveness in the air-to-air combat role re-
quired a high degree of proficiency that could only be achieved by
specialized training and experience.
Under this concept, the 432d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at
Udorn, Thailand, performed the task of providing the primary
MIGCAP and escort aircraft for Operation Linebacker. Within that
vfing, the 555th Tactical Fighter Squadron, known as the "Triple
Nickel," operated as the primary counter-air squadron. This enabled
the crews to fly together over extended periods, develop flight tactics,
and solidify themselves as fighting units.
Successful air-to-air combat requires that all flying skills: leader-
ship, knowledge of enemy tactics, flight discipline and integrity,
mutual support, teamwork and individual capabilities be peaked.
Even though many improvements in tactics and equipment greatly
aided success in Linebacker, the air-to-air combat score nevertheless
indicated a deficiency in pilot air-to-air combat proficiency. For
while the US still maintained the advantage in the kill ratio, it had
dropped considerably from the 12 to 1 kill ratio in Korea. The Air
Force immediately increased its aerial combat training. Even though
the results were not available in time to affect the outcomes of
Linebacker I operations, the overall impact is that there is now a
continuing program to prepare pilots for future air-to-air combat.
The strike package was perhaps the significant key to the success of
Operation Linebacker. It normally consisted of 32 F-4s, carrying a
mix of LGBs and conventional bombs, and was supported by another
20 -to -40 aircraft to protect the package from the enemy defenses.
While the accuracy of the LGB allowed a considerably reduced
number of bombers to destroy a given target, the vulnerability of the
LGB aircraft to SAMs and MIGs during weapon delivery required
an increase in the number of protective support aircraft. The ob-
jectives were to inflict as much enemy damage as possible, and then
bring everybody home. A tremendous amount of effort went into
achieving these objectives.
The support package of a typical Linebacker strike consisted of
one or two flights of F-4s configured for air-to-air escort against the
immediate MIG threat, a flight of four F-4s or F-105 Wild Weasels
proceding the flight in search of SAMs, a hunter -killer team of two
F-105s and two F-4s in the SAM and flak suppression role, and two
flights of four F-4s in the MIGCAP role. In addition, a chaff delivery
flight and its escorts preceded this complex formation. The chaff
flight consisted of four-to-eight A -7s or F-4s, and was escorted by a
152
flight of F-4s and possibly a Wild Weasel and a MIGCAP flight.
"Alone, unarmed, and unafraid," a single or a pair of RF-4C recon-
naissance aircraft followed the strike to record target damage.
This combination of strike and support packages made up the
primary Linebacker strike force. In addition, an array of ships and
aircraft remained on the periphery to further support the operation .
EB-66s conducted standoff ECM jamming; the RC-121, callsign
DISCO, maintained radar coverage and acted as airborne command
and control, as did Red Crown, a US Navy control ship stationed in
the Gulf of Tonkin.
KG -135, Strategic Air Command tankers, refueled the strike force
in -bound to the target and were available for egress refueling if re-
quired. Also standing by in case they were needed were the A-7D
"Sandys" and the CH-53 "Jolly Green Giants" rescue force. The sup-
port/strike ratio ran as high as five -to -one on missions where the US
anticipated strong opposition.
Linebacker missions staging out of Thailand typically ingressed
NVN near Hon Gay for the Gulf of Tonkin, or through "Gorilla's
Head" on the Laotian border. Usual force composition sent against
any one target numbered more than 50 aircraft .
The first aircraft into the target area were the Wild Weasel and
hunter -killer teams. These specially equipped aircraft detected,
located, and destroyed SAMs and associated radars likely to threaten
the chaff flight or the strike force. They also provided warnings to
the strike crews of SAM launches.
When the Weasels were mated with F-4s carrying cluster bombs
and iron bombs, they formed the hunter -killer team. Additionally,
the F-4 carried air intercept missiles, and its second role was to pro-
tect the Wild Weasel element from MIG attack.
The chaff bombers were next in, following the hunter -killer by two
or three minutes. Chaff bombing was a new Linebacker tactic. Their
job was to spread chaff through which the vulnerable strike force
bombers could fly. The chaff masked strike aircraft from enemy
radars and helped prevent SAM shoot-downs. These F-4s, or A-7s,
with a full load of chaff bombs, were not maneuverable and needed
30 to 50 miles of uninterrupted airspace to do their job. To protect
themselves from SAMs, all chaff aircraft used ECM equipment to
jam the SAM radar. This gear was carried in pods under the air-
craft and required the pilots to fly a precise "pod formation" to
prevent enemy radar from pinpointing any one flight member.
However, flying in "pod" was not a good defense against MIGs and
thus required fighter escort to counter that threat. At least one
fourship escort flight of F-4s trailed the chaffers by a couple of
miles on each flank. Their job was to stay with the chaffers and
protect them from MIG attack from the rear.
Escort flight crews had to resist being decoyed away by tantalizing
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radar targets. They had to predict whether the MIGs seen on their
radars were decoys, or whether they were a serious threat to the
force. Unseen MIGs might be waiting to attack the chaff flight as
soon as the escort began pursuit of the decoy. The escort flight re-
mained with the strike force for MIG protection, while the MIGCAP
was cast in an aggressive, offensive role. It attempted to search out
the MIGs and engage them before they could reach the strike flight.
Patrolling the ingress track, the MIGCAP flights would try to an-
ticipate the direction from which the MIGs would most likely attack
155
Generalized map of the air-to-air combat arena.
the force. The flight leader could then set up an orbit pattern to
most effectively protect the strike flights. The strike force followed
the chaff package by about 15 minutes in order to give the chaff
time to disperse. The force entered the area virtually surrounded
by protection: by chaff, by escorts, by Weasels, and by the roving
MIGCAP.
At the beginning of Linebacker, May 1972,- US intelligence
estimates placed the North Vietnamese air order of battle at 250
MIGs one-third of which were the newer MIG-21. The enemy also
had nearly 300 strategically placed SAM sites imbedded in the
ground and better than 1500 AAA weapons defending the most im-
portant targets. This massive threat to US aircrews was tightly in-
156
tegrated through the use of some of the best Soviet communications
and radar equipment and enjoyed the distinct advantage of
operating over its own homeland. Ahhough AAA still provided the
greatest threat at low altitudes, the biggest challenge was to protect
the force form SAMs and MIGs. Technology again helped accom-
plish the job.
Technology Versus Enemy Defenses
Electronic identification of enemy aircraft allowed MIG hunters to
take full advantage of the head-on capabilities of the US radar -
guided, air-to-air missile. Previously, the rules of engagement re-
quired US pilots to identify MIGs visually before firing at them.
Now, new aircraft equipment allowed positive electronic identifica-
tion, eliminating the likelihood of extended maneuvering with agile
MIGs.
The electronic capability to stand-off and shoot was enhanced by
the improved dog-flight Sparrow and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles
incorporating quicker reaction, greater range, and more maneuv-
erability. Another technological advance was the adaptation of the
F-4E, Phanton II, with a SAM hunting capability comparable to the
F-105 Wild Weasel. The F-4 was more maneuverable, and if engag-
ed by MIGs, had a better chance of success.
Defensive technological advances against the SAM included im-
proved ECM pods and the use of chaff. The new ECM pods provided
jamming over a wider selection of frequencies than previously possi -
ble. This, the electronic "music" that these pods emitted, was able
to counter a variety of radar and electronic signals. Chaff was also
very effective when used to counter GCI and SAM radars. How-
ever, in 1972, it was really a reapplication of technology, having
been used for similar purposes in World War II.
As previously discussed, chaff was employed to protect the strike
force. Increasingly, however, pilots used it to protect their individual
aircraft. They tucked chaff bundles into the speed brake compart-
ments of their fighters. When a SAM was fired at the flight, a pilot
would open his speed brakes and deploy his chaff bundles into the
slip stream, causing the missile to guide on the chaff rather than on
the missile -dodging aircraft.
Technology also affected the evolution of tactics against the MIGs.
Control and warning capabilities were advanced by integrating an
airborne radar aircraft and the US Navy's radar ship, with a com-
puter site in Thailand. These systems formed an effective network
of MIG watch warnings to counter the enemy fighter threat.
Every perceived threat was weighed for possible counter-measures.
These and all other efforts of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps
157
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tactical air effort were fully coordinated among Admiral John S.
McCain, Jr., Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command; General
Frederick C. Weyand, US Army Commander, Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (MACV) ; and General John W. Vogt, Jr,
USAF Deputy Commander of MACV. These communications im-
proved aircraft employment throughout the theater.
Oyster Flight on a Linebacker Mission
On 10 May 1972, Major Robert Lodge again led Oyster flight into
battle. This would be his last flight. The strike package consisted of
32 F-4s in the attack role, plus the normal support aircraft. Twelve
of the strike planes were armed with the new laser guided bombs,
four carried electro -optical guided bombs (EOGBs) and sixteen
were loaded with conventional 500 pound bombs. The targets in-
cluded the Paul Doumer Bridge and the Yen Vien Railroad Yard.
Since they were near "downtown" Hanoi, pilots expected a vigorous
MIG reaction.
The operation was complex and required precise timing and coor-
dination. The strike and support aircraft came from several bases,
consolidating as units during aerial refueling, and then heading
north as complete packages.
Oyster refueled routinely and headed North. Major Lodge, and his
backseater. Weapon Systems Officer (WSO), Captain Roger C.
Locher were leading a highly experienced eight man team. They had
worked together frequently and each knew his assignment. Bob
Lodge and Roger Locher had been together for over eight months.
Both had previous Southeast Asia combat tours, and had two recent
MIG kills to their credit.
Major Lodge's wingman. Oyster Two, was 25 -year old First Lieu-
tenant John D. Markle, a veteran of 78 combat missions ; twenty were
over North Vietnam. His WSO was Captain Stephen D. Eaves. Cap-
tain Richard S. "Steve" Ritchie, with Captain Charles B. "Chuck"
Debellevue as the WSO, flew number 3 aircraft, leading the second
element.
Later Steve Ritchie would become the first USAF Ace of the Viet-
nam conflict with five kills, and Chuck Debellevue would become the
first ever USAF navigator Ace. Debellevue became, in fact, the lead-
ing USAF Ace of the war being credited with six kills. Ritchie's wing-
man. Oyster 4, was Lieutenant Tommy Feezel, another young man
who had rapidly gained experience and proved himself. His WSO
was Captain Lawrence Pettit.
As Oyster flight approached NVN, the leader of Baiter flight, the
other MIGCAP flight for the mission, told Major Lodge that two of
his flight members had aborted and the flight would be late arriving
159
Captains Steve Ritchie and "Chuck" Debellevue stand beside their F-4 with five red
stars signifying their Ace status, Oct 1972.
at its patrol area. Baiter flight was delaying to pick up a spare air-
craft. Major Lodge, aware of the probable MIG opposition, decided
to cover both patrol areas, thus providing maximum protection for
the strike force .
Oyster flight, heading east -northeast, crossed into NVN at the
Gorilla's Head and proceeded towards its patrol area near Hanoi 80
miles away. The object was to stay between the MIGs, just getting
airborne, and the strike flight. The visibility was good and only a few
puffy clouds hung over Thud Ridge and the hills to the west. The
strike flight should easily find ^e target, but clear weather also
meant the MIGs would be up in force.
En route to the pgtrol area, Oyster flight members jettisoned their
centerline fuel tanks as they went dry, descended to 3,000 feet above
ground level, and accelerated to 500 kts. High airspeed was most im-
portant in this environment and they never let it get low. They need-
ed that airspeed to evade a SAM or a missile, or outmaneuver lighter
and better-turning MIGs. Speed also reduced the probability of an
AAA hit . They were going into the target area low and fast .
Red Crown, on station in the Gulf of Tonkin, provided MIGCAP
radar information. Therefore) as Major Lodge and his flight left the
foothills, they switched to the MIGCAP frequency and established
radio contact with Red Croxvn. About 40 mildS^qvt £f Hanoi, Oyster
160
flight turned northwest and was on station. Everyone was quieter
now. Oyster flight, in the heart of enemy territory at low altitude,
was carrying the fight directly to the enemy. Each man had specific
responsibilities, knew his duties well, and the flight functioned as a
team. The formation was widely spread in order that the two wing-
men. Oyster 2 and 4, could provide better visual coverage against
MIGs that might try to attack from six o'clock. Cockpit switches were
already set up hot, but another check made certain, and then all eyes
shifted outside to check for MIGs.
Suddenly, Red Crown advised the flight of MIG activity in the
Hanoi area. But, as yet, nothing appeared on the F-4s' radar scopes.
The flight continued northwest. As Oyster flight approached 30
miles south of Yen Bai airfield. Baiter flight members checked in on
the radio . Baiter flight was about 40 miles short of its orbit point and
headed in-bound. The strike force was about 20 miles left of Baiter,
in -bound at 15,000 feet. Oyster flight was now well ahead of all other
friendly aircraft in the area. This position, and the capability to elec-
tronically identify hostile aircraft, meant that Oyster flight could fire
their radar missiles in a head-on attack without having to visually
identify the MIGs. This was very important. It gave the initial advan-
tage to the F-4s because the MIGs did not have a missile designed for
a head-on attack.
Shortly after Baiter's position report, Captain Locher in the back-
seat of Oyster One got several radar contacts, indicating intensive
MIG activity. As Captain Locher recalls : "The MIGs made one turn
back to the north, then when they were about 45 miles from us, they
all at once started heading south [at full throttle] ."
Since Oyster flight was low, around 2000 feet AGL, Major Lodge
elected to snap up. The MIGs were between 13,000-16,000 feet alti-
tude and heading southeast. Radar revealed four MIGs: paii;s about
a mile in trail. Captain Locher locked onto the front target. Major
Lodge told the element to take the third MIG on the scope. Oyster
flight had just crossed the Red River at a point 15 miles south of Yen
Bai and the setup was excellent for a front quartering shot, left to
right. Major Lodge and Captain Locher decided to shoot one missile
at a time because on the mission two days before, they had fired two
missiles at one MIG and both had hit.
Oyster flight lit the engine afterburners and started a climb to cen-
ter the "aim-dot" and obtain an optimum radar firing solution. At
eight miles, with a closure rate over 1000 knots between the F-4s and
the MIGs, Major Lodge fired his first missile. It started to guide to-
ward the lead MIG, but it exploded in front of Major Lodge when it
armed. He immediately fired his second missile. The range was down
to about six miles and the missile began to guide. After approximate-
ly five seconds there was a huge red /orange explosion; Bob Lodge
and Roger Locher had their third MIG kill.
161
Oyster 2, crewed by Lieutenant John Markle and Captain Stephen
Eaves, in fighting wing formation position on the right side of
Oyster Lead, had an early radar lock-on and confirmed the bandits.
As they started the snap up and Oyster Lead's missile fired, Markle
checked with Eaves to insure they still had a good radar lock-on. Ev-
erything was fine and, since they were approaching the heart of the
firing envelope, John Markle ripple-fired two missiles.
The missiles roared out 1 5 degrees right and impacted behind the
canopy of the MIG-21. The first missile cut the enemy aircraft in
half. Immediately, the air filled with enemy missiles, fired unguided
and head-on from the remaining MIGs. Obviously, this was a diver-
sionary tactic by the trailing MIGs, because the heat seeking missile
was not a head-on weapon.
The missiles streaked over Oyster flight, followed very closely by
the third MIG-21, which, to Roger Locher, seemed to come out of
nowhere and almost hit him. Instinctively, Bob Lodge pulled hard to
the right and found himself at six o'clock to the third MIG, but at a
range of 200 feet, he was much too close for his missiles to be effec-
tive.
If Major Lodge's F-4D had had a gun, he would have used it, but
he was close, even for that. He had to get some separation to give the
missile time to guide and arm. The MIG began climbing in a fairly
gentle two-to-three "G" right hand turn. Major Lodge followed him,
planning Co stay slightly to the outside of the turn, in order to gain
separation as they pulled through near the top of the maneuver.
At the time Markle and Eaves had fired at the first MIG, Captains
Ritchie and Debellevue in the number three position were wide to the
left, and in good position to converge on the trailing MIG element.
What they saw was a sky rapidly filling with activity. In Captain
Ritchie's words, "Things really got confusing once the engagement
started. There were missiles in the air all over the place, fireballs,
smoke trails, debris, and airplanes everywhere. Lead and 2 got their
kills head-on, then we converted to the six o'clock on the two remain-
ing MIGs." He started the conversion, using radar information, with
a moderate 4-to-5 "G" climbing right turn, and completed it visual-
ly. Lieutenant Tommy Feezel was on his wing in good position, but
could function only as a set of eyes because his radar had failed, mak-
ing his radar guided missiles useless.
As Ritchie and Debellevue completed their conversion, they saw
both MIGs. Ritchie elected to take the one on the left that was flushed
about 10,000 feet from the other MIG-21 and appeared to be trying
to join up. The whole flight was turning right and down now. All was
as it should be, the flight was 30 seconds old, Oyster flight had
claimed two kills and was still behind the MIGs, well in control of the
situation.
Steve Ritchie placed his sight on the MIG in front of him, switched
162
First Lt John D. Markle, aircraft commander and MIG killer, 555 TFS, Sep 1972.
the fire control system to auto-aquisition, and got a good radar lock-
on. He waited a few seconds to insure that the release conditions of
the missile had been met and ripple fired two radar missiles. He was
in good position on the MIG, about 1000 feet below and 6000 feet be-
hind him on the inside of his turn at 18,000 feet altitude. As Steve
squeezed the trigger, the MIG began to tighten his turn. The first
missile came off and guided to the target, but went under the MIG
and did not detonate. The second missile hit the MIG square in the
center of the fuselage causing it to explode in another spectacular
fireball. The MIG pilot ejected.
Captain Ritchie looked to the right in his four o'clock position and
saw Lodge and Lochjgj: about 7000 feet out immediately behind their
MIG and trying to dkop back into firing range. Lieutenant Markle
was right with him in good formation position. Suddenly, as if out of
nowhere, four MIG-19s attacked Lodge and Locher.
"Oyster Lead you have MIGs at your ten o'clock." Markle and
Eaves had seen the MIGs as they overshot and then pulled hard back
into Oyster Lead's six o'clock position. Oyster 2 called the MIGs at
ten o'clock and again at nine o'clock. Major Lodge must have
thought that he could still get th^MIG-21 or had not heard the radio
calls because he continued to track the MIG in front. The MIG-19s
quickly stabilized at about 2000 feet on Lead and opened fire with
their cannon. % ,
163
Almost simultaneously, Major Lodge fired his third AIM-7. But he
was still too close and the missile was ineffective. Oyster 2 made a last
desperate call, "Hey Lead, break right, break right, they are firing at
you." The MIG-19s were flying so close it was as if they were flying
formation on Lead. They just kept shooting.
Oyster 2 saw Lead get hit and explode. Captain Locher the WSO
ejected. Markle and Eaves disengaged, went full afterburner and
sliced down and out of the flight. Picking up a heading of 310 de-
grees on the deck and checking their six o'clock for other MIGs, Oys-
ter 2 departed the area .
Oyster 3 and 4 also turned for home. They lit their afterburners
and headed for the deck, indicating 650 knots airspeed. Lieutenant
Feezel spread wide on Ritchie for better mutual support and began
looking for other aircraft in the area . As they crossed the ridge line
just west of the Red River at about 50 feet altitude, Lieutenant Feezel
saw a MIG-21 about 500 feet above him and 100 feet back. Obvious-
ly the MIG had not seen him. All Feezel needed to do was to go idle
power and use his speed brakes to flush the MIG out front of him.
Unfortunately, his radar was inoperative and, since the F-4D had
no gun, he could not fire on the MIG.
Quickly he radioed Steve Ritchie about the MIG. Captain Ritchie
looked out to his right, "... and there was 4 in my four o'clock,
5000 feet out with a shining silver MIG-21 just sitting right on top of
him. I think GCI was vectoring him out after us and he just could not
see us. Suddenly I looked forward just as one of those tremendous
rain forest trees seemed to fill my windscreen ; I put the stick in my
lap and then in one corner and just missed it."
The MIG pilot pulled off to the left and rolled over to look down,
but apparently still didn't see either 3 or 4. As he was probably get-
ting low on fuel and rapidly farther from his base, he turned back to
the right and departed. Lieutenant Feezel joined up on Ritchie as
they climbed out towards the tanker, where they were joined by Lieu-
tenant Markle. They would go the last few miles as a three ship for-
mation.
Oyster 1 would not come home that night. Major Bob Lodge, an
outstanding officer and a courageous leader, was killed in the line of
duty. Captain Locher bailed out of the crippled Phantom just prior
to its explosion and evaded capture in the NVN jungle for 23 days
before a combat rescue team reached him.
In addition to the loss of Major Lodge and his F-4, Harlow 4, of
the strike force escort flight, was lost. Another MIG-19, using hit
and run tactics, shot down the second F-4. But Oyster flight de-
stroyed three MIG-21s, and in conjunction with the other support
aircraft accomplished its mission of protecting the strike force. The
strike force reached the target and inflicted severe damage to the
enemy. The F-4s carrying the conventional bombs, successfully iso-
164
Capt Roger C. Locher after rescue from the jungle north of Hanoi. 7AF Commander,
General Vogt is in the background, 10 May 1972.
lated the Yen Vien Railroad Yard by cratering both entrances to the
marshalHng area. The aircraft carrying guided -bombs dropped four
spans on the Paul Doumer Bridge, knocked out one abutment, and
severed an adjacent rail line. The box score for the first Linebacker
strike was three MIGs destroyed versus two F-4s lost ; and the strike
force had been highly successful .
USAF daytime losses during Linebacker 1 amounted to 44 aircraft
— 12 to SAMs, 5 to AAA, and 27 to MIGs— dramatically pointing
out the effectiveness of the NVN air defense system which forced the
US to use more than half of the total force in the role of defense sup-
pression. The Americans were able to do this on a daily basis, there-
by maintaining air si^CTipjity continually over NVN .
A Hunter-Killer Mission Against Combined Air Defenses
The following paragraphs describe how F-4 and F-105 pilots coor-
dinated their anti-SAM tactics. This mission also illustrates a bold
new North Vietnamese move— coordinating SAM firings with MIGs
in a concerted attack.
On 2 September 1972, Eagle flight finished refueling with the
strike force and began a gentle descent to gain air^ef d and get down
165
to an advantageous fighting altitude. Eagle was one of two hunter -
killer flights assigned to protect a Linebacker strike against Phuc
Yen Airfield. Eagle 1 and 2, F-105Gs carrying anti -radiation missiles
(ARMs) , accelerated to the northwest of the ingress route. Eagle 3
and 4, F-4Es armed with cluster bombs, Sparrow air-to-air missiles,
and a 20mm cannon, eased off to the southeast of track. Eagle in-
gressed two minutes ahead of the strike force at 15,000 feet, cruising
at 425 knots, about 50 miles west of Hanoi. All flight members con-
stantly cross-cliecked their formation positions, and monitored tell-
tale gauges and audio signals for signs of SAM activity. The flight
members were line -abreast with Eagle 2 and 4 on the outside of the
formation about 2,000 feet from each element lead. Eagle 3 main-
tained about 5000 feet separation on Eagle Lead.
As the flight crossed the Black River about 45 miles from Hanoi,
Eagie Lead's radar warning instruments picked up the first strong
SAjM activity signals from the target area. Eagle 1 and 2 turned and
launched ARMs at the active SAM site; Eagle 3 spotted a SAM
launch at ten o'clock low. Banking back into the SAM, Eagle flight
dispensed speed brake chaff and evaded the SAM that detonated
200-300 feet behind Eagle 3. No one had received an electronic in-
dication of that SAM launch. Major Jon L Lucas and First Lieu-
tenant Douglas C. Malloy, the Eagle 3 crew, counted four other
SAMs, all launched without radar warning indications. Lucas and
Malloy visually located the site. Eagle Lead cleared the F-4E ele-
ment. Eagle 3 and 4, to attack while he and Eagle 2 moved off to
hold near Thud Ridge about 25 miles north of the target. Eagle 3
and 4 rolled in on target from the south. Major Lucas was narrowly
missed by a SAM while, simultaneously, 57 and 85mm AAA opened
up on him and his wingman.
Unscathed, Eagle 3 and 4 pulled off the target and streaked north
to rejoin Eagle Lead and 2. At this point the radio began crackling
with MIG warnings to the strike force. Major Lucas recounts: "I
heard the call 'White bandits attacking, Phuc Yen.' Following this, I
heard (Eagle) 2 call that he just had a missile go by, and "break
right!" Racing to support the F-105s, Major Lucas and his wingman
had numerous radar warning and AAA indications. They constantly
watched, and jinked violently to avoid flak.
Within minutes. Eagle 3 and 4 covered the air miles separating the
two elements and saw Eagle 1 and 2 about six miles ahead. The
geometry of their high speed turn to reform the flight brought them
well inside the attack angle being set up by the much smaller, and
not yet visible, MIG-19 that was chasing Eagle 1 and 2. Apparently,
the MIG pilot was concentrating on repositioning on the F-105s in
order to shoot his second missile, because when Eagle Three saw the
MIG, he found himself slightly ahead and low in the MIG's eleven
o'clock position. Eagle 3 and 4 pulled into a 6G turn toward the
166
bandit in order to roll out at his six o'clock, as he streaked overhead
apparently intent on his own attack on Eagle 1 and 2.
Major Jon Lucas scurried frantically in preparation for his missile
attack on the MIG-19. Manipulating power and maneuvering the
aircraft, he simultaneously carried on a conversation with his
backseater to insure radar lock -on. Checking his missile status panel
and master-arm switch, he verified a good radar lock and maneuv-
ered his aircraft to stay in range. As the nose drifted down to the
MIG's six o'clock position, Lucas squeezed the trigger.
At this point Eagle 4 called a SAM launch at two o'clock. Eagle 3
responded by breaking down into the SAM, forcing it to pass
overhead. When he rolled back to locate the MIG-19, all he saw was
a pastel -orange parachute.
Reconstructing the flight, it was apparent that as the MIG pressed
his attack. Eagle One and Two tried to outrun the MIG. The pilot of
Eagle Two recalled that he thought the MIG was going to maneuver
to reattack Eagle Lead, but then he saw the MIG suddenly break to
the left and disengage. The next thing he observed was the MIG spin-
ning and smoking until it hit the ground. Lucas had shot him out of
the sky.
As the battle developed across the countryside, with the two F-105s
being chased by the MIG-19 who was himself being trailed by the
F-4s, the North Vietnamese launched a SAM and barely missed the
F-4s. North Vietnamese weapon system integration seemed suffi-
ciently reliable to fire a SAM even with MIGs within range. It was
almost a successfully coordinated defensive effort .
Later , the Red Baron study cited this mission as a classic example
of mutual support. Coordination between flight members had
negated the effect of the SA-2 and MIG attacks and contributed to
the destruction of the MIG-19.
Eagle flight, and especially Major Jon I. Lucas and First Lieu-
tenant Douglas C. Malloy, had performed magnificantly to thwart
multiple threats.
Sowing Protective Corridors
As Oyster and Eagle flights demonstrated, the MIGCAP hunted
the MIGs offensively and the hunter -killer aggressively attacked
threatening SAM batteries. The chaff bombers performed an equally
interesting and dangerous task. The aircraft assigned this mission
were extremely vulnerable to MIG attack. Their external load
decreased maneuverability and increased fuel consumption, and
they had to fly straight and level to dispense their chaff. The chaffers
were especially desirable targets because the North Vietnamese knew
that SAMs were useless against strike aircraft flying in the chaff.
167
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MIG-17 bursts into flames after be-
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Also, chaff and escort aircraft airspeeds were slower and their
posture much more defensive and reactive than that of the MIGCAP
aircraft .
The chaff escort mission was equally hazardous and can be ex-
plained best by describing a typical Linebacker assignment. Finch, a
flight of four F-4Es, was protecting Date flight, one of the two chaff
flights operating on 12 September 1972. The primary target was the
La Danh storage caves 35 miles north of Hanoiv Finch ingressed near
170
the town of Hon Gay, on the east coast near Haiphong. The chaffers
were about three miles ahead in Hne -abreast formation. Finch 1 and
2 were on the left flank, 3 and 4 on the right. Immediately, Red
Crown, the Navy control destroyer, began issuing MIG advisories. As
the force continued west-bound, MIGs scrambled and headed North
to cross ahead of the strike force.
Finch 1, Lt Colonel Lyle L. Beckers, with WSO, First Lieutenant
Thomas M. Griffin, interpreted the MIG warning properly and an-
ticipated an attack on the chaff force form the right side. Finch 4
spotted the bandits at four o'clock high, in a right turn, at high
speed .
Two MIG-21 bandits drove straight toward the chaffers in a
pincher-type geometry attack. They disregarded the escorts, or failed
to see them. Finch 3 and 4 engaged the MIG closest to them, with 1
and 2 slipping, apparently unobserved, into the other MIGs six
o'clock position. Colonel Beckers' Sparrow missiles failed to launch
as the MIG closed on the left hand chaff flight. At this point. Finch
flight had called the chaffers into a break to the right, and both
escort elements were hard on the heels of the NVN interpceptors.
Lyle Beckers stabbed his throttles into afterburner and reset
switches to fire a Sidewinder heat -seeking missile. Just then the MIG
launched a missile at the breaking chaffers. The missile narrowly
missed Date 4 and impacted Date 3 in the aft section.
Date 3, crewed by Captain Rudolph W. Zuberbuhler and his
WSO, Captain Fredrick C. McMurry, nursed their crippled fighter
toward the Tonkin Gulf, hoping to get "feet wet" before ejecting.
However, the bird became uncontrollable as they neared Phantom
Ridge, north of Haiphong, and both ejected. They were subsequent-
ly taken prisoner, and were released on 29 March 1973.
Further complicating and confusing the air battle, a third MIG-21
flashed in, over -shooting Finch 1 and 2. Finch 2 had time to roll out
of his turn and fire a Sidewinder at the fleeing MIG but was forced to
roll back to stay with Lead prior to seeing the effects of his missile .
Consistent with typical hit and run tactics, as soon as the first MIG
fired his missile, he dove toward the ground in a split -S maneuver,
Beckers, with his wingman, followed the MIG down through this
maneuver, and fired a Sidewinder which failed to guide. As the flight
bottomed out and pulled up in a steep climb, Beckers fired a second
Sidewinder which impacted the MIG's left wing without appearing to
detonate. But the MIG's wing began to stream smoke and flames;
Finch 1 decided to close in for a gun kill and moved in to about 1,000
feet. As he opened fire, Beckers noticed his tracers passing behind
the MIG and eased the pipper ahead of the MIG until he could see
hits all over the fuselage. Trailing smoke, the MIG fell off on a wing
and impacted the ground.
Finch 3, flown by Major Gary Retterbush and backseater First
171
fe
Mfebeirtg hit by 20mm cannon fire, 5 Jun 1967.
Lieutenant Daniel L. Autrey, also had difficulty with their radar
missiles. After the initial attack, the MIG that Retterbush was pursu-
ing disengaged without firing. Retterbush and Autrey turned into
the MIG's six o'clock position and ripple -fired two missiles. The first
failed to guide, and the Seconal did not detonate. Gary then switched
to his heat -seeking missiles and fired a Sidewinder that narrowly
missed but caused the MIG to execute a Split "S." The MIG pilot eas-
ed his turn as he pulled out, allowing Gary to fire t^o more AIM -9s.
172
Both were near misses but failed to detonate. One went just under
the MIG, the other over the canopy. Gary then switched to guns,
began firing, and immediately hit the MIG's fuselage and left wing.
Retterbush pressed the gun attack and saw bullets impacting the
canopy area. In a few seconds, the MIG lost control, apparently stall-
ed, and pitched downward in a wingover attitude. It disappeared
from sight.
Fighter pilots in controlled training conditions seldom agree on
the exact outcome of air combat engagements. Statistics are
somewhat firmer if the combatants shoot real missiles and bullets.
However, circumstances and characteristics of air battles still defy
duplication after the smoke has cleared and pulses return to normal .
In this battle, uncertainty exists as to whether two or three MIGs
were downed by Finch flight. Moreover, no one can be sure how
many MIGs attacked Date chaff flight. Only a correlation with
North Vietnamese statistics could determine how effective the Air
Force was that day.
Reflections on Linebacker I
Much has been said and written on the fact that the military
fought in Vietnam with one hand tied behind its back. It must not be
forgotten, however, that the USAF is an arm of the national govern-
ment which employs force as an instrument of national policy. That
force, then, is governed in its degree of application by the policy of
the US government in accordance with national objectives. Under
these conditions, the rules of engagement became a "battlefield
manifestation of national policy."
These were the rules under which airmen and other members of
the armed forces fought; rules that limited and restricted the ap-
plication of force. They served the political aspect of the war, yet
reduced the military effectiveness of the force. The advent of
Linebacker saw a reduction in political restraints, which, in turn,
eased the rules of engagement and allowed strike forces to carry the
war more effectively to the enemy. Airfields, hydro -electric plants,
key bridges inside the Chinese buffer zone, and key military targets in
and around Hanoi were removed from US political protection as the
effort intensifed.
Operation Linebacker was considered a success by virtually all
viewers. The primary elements contributing to this success were :
1 . The President's decisive action when the invasion began.
2 . The immediate response of airpower .
3. The President's decision to allow the military to make
target decisions, once general guidelines and rules were
established.
173
4. The giant step forward in technology exemplified by the
guided bombs and their pinpoint accuracy.
Within the mechanics of Linebacker itself, the outstanding con-
tribution was in the defense suppression effort. By neutralizing and
destroying the enemy early warning radar, AAA, SAM and MIG
threat, the aircraft loss rate was kept at an acceptable level and the
Linebacker strike force was able to operate effectively in any area of
NVN . Thus, air superiority was achieved and sustained.
As the war progressed, the USAF tactics continually changed to
meet new threats and to take advantage of increased capabilities
provided by advances in technology. Significant in the evolution of
air superiority tactics in Linebacker was: (1) the introduction of
electronic capabilities that allowed missile shots without visual iden-
tification ; (2) the activation of improved US warning and control of
aircraft over NVN; (3) specialization of units and personnel, which
made specific people and organizations experts in a given mission,
thus greatly improving the counter-air capability; and (4)
recognition of the need for an implementation of enhanced aerial
combat training.
As the military objectives of Linebacker I were achieved, the
political objectives for Linebacker were likewise deemed successful.
As a consequence, bombing operations north of 20 degrees North
were halted by the United States in October 1972 as a demonstration
of US good faith. Negotiations toward a ceasefire, at the Paris peace
talks, had led to apparent agreement in November, but hopes of
reaching a final agreement were dashed by the intransigence of
NVN. The stage was set for the final curtain, Operation Linebacker
IL
Air-to-Air Losses to Date 30 November 1972
NVN
185
US 90
174
Chapter VI. Linebacker II and
The End of Hostilities
Peace Negotiations
On 26 October 1972, the North Vietnamese announced they and
the US had reached agreement on a nine -point peace plan. Dr.
Kissinger agreed with the plan to withdraw all US forces from SVN
in return for the release of US POWs within 60 days, but denied he
had agreed to a NVN announced 31 October deadline for signing the
accord. Nevertheless, he told the nation, ". . .we believe peace is at
hand," and added that only a single three to four day negotiating
session remained to work out final unresolved details.
Bombing of all except the southern part of NVN was immediately
suspended. Significant difficulties remained, however, since South
Vietnam's President Thieu publicly denounced the plan as a "surren-
der of the South Vietnamese people to the Communists."
Despite intense US public pressure to get prisoners of war home by
Christmas, a final agreement could not be reached. One day after
President Nixon was briefed by Dr. Kissinger on the latest stalemate,
he gave the order, "Execute Linebacker II."
The Big Push
Operation Linebacker II called for the swift, massive application
of airpower at the heart of NVN. This meant hitting Hanoi,
Haiphong, and other key objectives vital to the North Vietnamese
economy and national prestige. Political restraints were reduced.
Targets that had been off limits in the past were added to the ap-
proved target list. Major military airfields, for example, had long
been sanctuaries, yet they affected air superiority and were lucrative
targets. The level of destructive power was substantially increased.
Employment of the B-52 over Hanoi, for the first time, demon-
strated the President's resolve to bring the war to an end as .soon as
possible. The B-52, with its 30-ton bombload, was many times larger
175
in firepower than the fighter-bombers that had hit targets around
the city in the past.
The immediate goals of this renewed bombing effort were two-
fold: one, to halt the massive communist resupply effort that gave
Hanoi the capability to stage large-scale offensive operations in SVN,
and two, to convince the North Vietnamese that a very early return
to the negotiating table would be in their best interest.
Planning Considerations
The gravity of the situation was obvious. In the face of an already
hostile public opinion, the President had elected to risk the loss of
more aircraft and the capture of more American airmen. Every ef-
fort had to be made to keep losses to a minimum. However, during
the restricted bombing, Hanoi had been undisturbed, once again, in
its efforts to fortify and resupply antiaircraft artillery and missile
sites. The sites constituted a formidable defense and were expected to
take their toll of aircraft, particularly the B-52.
Despite the B-52's sophisticated electronic countermeasures
capability, planners were concerned about the heavy concentration
of surface-to-air missiles the bombers would face. Through a long
process that compared experience with known offensive and de-
fensive capabilities, experts estimated the US would lose three per-
cent of the total force of fighters and bombers in the 12-day effort.
This would be a costly price to pay, but not unacceptably high if it
met the twofold goals of the new offensive .
Building a Strike Force
A successful penetration of defenses such as those found around
Hanoi required the coordinated efforts of many specialists and a
variety of aircraft. Most combat aircraft had the potential to com-
plete a strike mission without assistance, but the loss rates of those
trying to provide their own self -protection were unacceptably high.
As Linebacker I and other previous operations against the North had
illustrated, a force of specialized aircraft grouped for mutual protec-
tion stood a much better chance of both mission accomplishment
and survival .
At the center of the strike force was the B-52. Because of their size
and restricted maneuverability they were a lucrative target for both
MIG interceptors and SAMs, and thus required a great deal of
protection. Past efforts to neutralize the North Vietnamese defenses
had to be magnified in order to assure accurate bomb delivery and to
get the big birds safely home.
As stated earlier, chaff was an important strike force protection.
By dispensing clouds of radar reflective tin foil ahead of the strike
176
force, the fighters were able to obscure the bombers from searching
SAM and GCI radar beams. But, the mission was dangerous for the
dispensing aircraft. Chaff blossoming behind the releasing aircraft
marked its position and made it a target for the SAM . The drag of
the chaff dispensers combined with the flight profile robbed the
chaff aircraft of their normal maneuverability. As a result, a number
of aircraft were lost in this key role.
Bomber escort and combat air patrol missions were popular with
the fighter pilots. The two missions differed in that escort flights ac-
companied the bombers, while the CAP flights roamed likely MIG
activity areas. The objective was the same— stop MIG interceptors
before they could reach the bomber force.
Tactics for countering air-to-air attacks changed dramatically
before the Linebacker II campaign. The long range lock-on
capability of the F-4 radar enhanced the ability of the escort and
CAP flights to protect the strike force.
The F-105 Wild Weasel further protected the B-52s. Their
reputation for destroying missile sites with anti-radiation missiles and
general purpose bombs was well established. Overall, their anti-SAM
tactics were quite effective in forcing the operators to resort to less ac-
curate methods and tactics. EB-66s also gave mutual electronic
countermeasures support to the powerful internal systems carried on
eachB-52.
Following its deployment to Thailand in September 1972, the F-
111 was used to supplement the strike force capabiHty. Using its
terrain following radar, it was able to fly at low altitude, slip un-
detected into North Vietnam, and strike targets at night and in bad
weather. Previously these conditions protected enemy targets against
such accurate attacks. F-llls used their exceptional capabilities to
deliver twelve 500 -pound bombs on selected SAM sites and airfields
just minutes before the main strike force arrived. Defenses were
there by denied the preparation time they normally had while wait-
ing for the bombers to arrive .
Finally, the task force included the many KC-135 tankers required
to get the force to the target and back, and specialized rescue aircraft
used to recover aircrews downed in enemy territory.
Overall, these new, more powerful strike forces were not unlike
those used in Linebacker I. A change to night time strikes, em-
ployment of the F-lll, and high altitude B-52 bombing were the
most significant differences.
The First Three Days
Colonel Bill Brown, Vice Commander of U-Tapao's 307th Strate-
gic Wing, had long awaited this moment. As an F-105 pilot on a
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EB-66 supported the B-52 with electronic countermeasure operations.
previous Vietnam tour, he had been able to hinder the enemy's war
effort effectively, but never had he delivered such an awesome
amount of firepower directly to the NVN heartland. On 18 Decem-
ber, the thunder of his exploding bombs announced the arrival of the
first B-52 in the heavily defended Hanoi area.
In addition to targets in the immediate Hanoi area, the bombers
also hit Kep and Hoa Lac Airfields located to the northeast and west
respectively. B-52 tactics called for a southeast heading on the bomb
run, with a steep turn of nearly 180 degrees immediately after bomb
release .
Strong tail winds boosted the B-52's groundspeed to a comfortable
600 knots during th^^on^b runs, but caused most of the chaff to drift
out of position. Thus, many of the bombers were not afforded this
very valuable protection. Also, the advantage of a 100 -knot tail wind
to the target was quickly removed when it became a 100 -knot head
wind as the B-52s departed the target, thus extending their SAM-
threat time .
The first cells of B-52s met stiff opposition as they made their
bomb runs. Although heavy AAA reached the bombers' altitude it
was unable to bring any of th^m down. Despite numerous firings
throughout the 12 -day effort, only orie aircraft received AAA dam-
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MIGs also were quite active during the strikes and caused many
aircrews great concern. Airman First Class Albert Moore, an 18-
year-old B-52 tailgunner, had been calling out SAMs from his posi-
tion in the Stratofortress. Suddenly, a strange blip on his radar screen
announced a more immediate danger —MIG! As he watched a MIG-
21 swing in behind and slightly left of the bomber, he called out a
warning to the rest of the crew. There was little they could do since
they were concentrating on the bomb release only seconds away. The
MIG closed rapidly and dropped to a firing position behind the B-
52. Airman Moore locked onto him with his radar and clamped
down on the gun triggers. The B-52 shuddered as the four 50-caliber
machine guns fired, and missed! Moore relaxed his grip a moment,
then fired again, and missed! Airman Moore fired a third time as
the MIG approached to within 1200 yards. After what seemed an
eternity, the MIG's radar image suddenly ballooned and disap-
peared from his scope.
Technical Sergeant Larry Chute, a gunner on another B-52, saw
the MIG on fire and falling away. He watched several pieces of the
aircraft explode into a fireball and disappear in the undercast.
Albert Moore could not believe his eyes. The MIG was really gone.
He had fired 800 rounds of ammunition and downed an enemy air-
craft. His efforts earned him the Silver Star.
MIG-21 "Fishbed" over North Vietnam.
182
Airman Moore's encounter was subsequently recorded as one of
two confirmed MIG kills by B-52 tailgunners. Although they posed a
serious threat, MIGs were thwarted in their efforts to shoot down a
B-52. The tailgunners, MIGCAP fighters, and bomber escort flights
managed to hold them off despite repeated intercept attempts.
The most effective of Hanoi's defenses against the B-52 strike force
was by far the surface-to-air missile. The SAMs were numerous, mo-
bile, and accurate if not completely jammed.
By the time B-52 commander Lt Colonel Don Rissi of CoUinsville,
Illinois, led Charcoal, Ivory, and Ebony cells to the final turn point
for their bombing runs on the Yen Vien railroad yard, nearly 50
SAMs had been fired at the strike force. One B-52 had been hit, but
it returned to U-Tapao. Of the 17 SAMs fired at the last three cells in
wave one, two hit Charcoal Lead. Rissi's "G" model B-52 was two
minutes from bomb release when it received heavy crew compart-
ment damage and began burning. The aircraft went out of control
about 30 seconds later and the crew ejected. Charcoal 1 was the first
B-52G lost to hostile fire, and only the second stratofortress downed
by enemy action in over seven years of ARC LIGHT bombing opera-
tions. Only three of the six crewmen of Charcoal 1 were returned
when the prisoners of war were repatriated. Colonel Rissi was not
among them . Members of the crew confirmed that his injuries from
the SAM had proved fatal.
Five hours later. Wave II met similar opposition from the SAMs.
Another B-52G fell victim to SAMs in the target area shortly after re-
leasing its bombs. Fortunately, the crew was able to bail out over
friendly territory before the bomber exploded.
Wave III drew the heaviest opposition of the three attacks on the
first day. Over 50 SAMs were fired at the B-52s in addition to heavy
AAA fire and attempted intercepts by MIG-21s.
Nearly all the B-52 sorties were successful on the first day of Line-
backer II operations despite the launching of over 200 SAMs at the
force. However, three aircraft were lost and two others damaged by
the missiles.
Planning on day two was similar; B-52s arrived in three waves,
three-to-five hours apart, each wave of aircraft completing its bomb-
ing in about 30 minutes. F-llls again bombed airfields just prior to
the bombers' arrival. Tactics were changed to keep the strike force in
the chaff. Ingress and egress tracks remained generally the same.
Two bombers were damaged by SAMs but none were lost despite
more than 180 launchings.
Day three, 20 December, was generally a repeat of the force's tac-
tics and timing used on the previous two days. One change called for
the use of an additional ECM. Unfortunately, the similarity ended
here as three B-52s were lost during the first of three strike waves.
Two of the three losses in Wave I were "G" model B-52s, with
183
older, unmodified ECM equipment on board. Wave II, with no
bomber cells of unmodified "G" models, bombed its targets and
suffered no SAM hits. However, three more bombers, two of them
unmodified "G" models, from Wave III were destroyed. In three
days, the toll of unmodified "G" losses stood at five. By contrast the
modified "Gs" suffered only one damaged. Other B-52 models suf-
fered the remaining losses.
Of the six B-52s lost on the third day, three were struck by SAMs
before bomb release and three in the post -target turn. Debriefings
indicated the North Vietnamese were allowing the first cells of each
wave to pass while they plotted the approach routes and post -release
turning points. They then salvoed SAMs into the subsequent cells'
bomb release and post -target turn areas where the probability of hit-
ting a B-52 was the greatest.
During the first three days of Linebacker II, drone photography
indicated outstanding bombing results. However, there was little cel-
ebration as the SAMs were still very potent enemy weapons. Enemy
counter-air tactics also were changing. For instance, MIGs would fly
abreast the B-52s, measure their altitude and call the information to
the SAM sites. Accurate salvoes of SAMs immediately after the MIGs
departed indicated the information had been put to use.
Brigadier General Glenn R. Sullivan, Commander of the 17th Air
Division, directed Colonel Brown, Vice Commander of the 307th
Strategic Wing at U-Tapao, to chair a special tactics panel to review
the situation and make recommendations. The panel recommended
changes that included varying ingress and egress headings, crossing
tracks between the initial point (IP) and the target, and introducing
random altitudes and sudden altitude changes before the bomb re-
lease point and the post -target turn. It also recommended varying
the time between bomb release and the post-target turn. Eighth Air
Force authorized these changes beginning the fifth day of the opera-
tion.
The Tactics Change
Although the B-52s still flew a southeasterly bomb run heading on
day four, several changes were made : waves were compressed to put
all bombs on target in 15 minutes instead of 30; post -target turns
were modified to allow an overwater exit from NVN; altitude sepa-
rations were increased ; and even more ECM equipment was used to
jam the SAM radar.
Of the two aircraft lost to SAMs on day four, one apparently vio-
lated his cell integrity thus exposing itself to SAM radars. The second
B-52 had simply run into an extremely heavy concentration of mis-
siles.
184
On day five, 22 December, the tactics panel's rather sweeping pro-
posals became effective. Using the new tactics the B-52 strike force
devastated Haiphong's railroad yard and petroleum products storage
area. No B-52 received damage.
As bomber tactics improved, MIGCAP tactics also became more
effective. On 22 December, Lt Colonel Jim Brunson of Eddyville,
Kentucky, was leading Buick flight, a four -ship flight of F-4Es out of
Udom RTAFB, to their assigned combat air patrol area, when they
received a "bandit" call indicating MIGs were airborne near Hanoi.
Red Crozvn, the primary intercept controller, acquired Buick flight
as they entered NVN and immediately began giving Colonel Brunson
vectors toward the MIGs.
Two MIG-21s were climbing through 29,000 feet altitude just west
of Hanoi when Red Croxvn identified other friendly aircraft directly
between Buick flight and the MIGs. When the bandits turned south,
it became readily apparent they were also under radar control and
strike force aircraft were their intended victims. Set up for a head-on
intercept, Brunson locked -on with his radar and requested clearance
to fire. Since friendly aircraft were still a factor, Red Crown insisted
on a visual identification before granting clearance. Buick flight
members jettisoned their external fuel tanks and accelerated.
Spotting the MIGs about 10,000 feet above him. Colonel Brunson
led Buick flight in a steep climb while his WSO, Major Ralph
Pickett, maintained a positive radar lock-on. With clearance to fire
now granted, the steering dot centered, and a MIG-21 under his gun-
sight pipper, Brunson fired four radar guided missiles in rapid suc-
cession. The flight watched the missiles close for the kill. Guiding
flawlessly, the first missile knocked the entire tail section off the lead
MIG and sent it into an uncontrollable spin. Still in good formation,
the flight turned to engage the second MIG, but it had accelerated
and departed. With all aircraft low on fuel. Colonel Brunson led
Buick flight back to base and one of the biggest celebrations of his
career.
The Post-Christmas Operations
The Christmas day recess in Linebacker II operations apparently
was used by the North Vietnamese to resupply the SAM sites. After a
low of four missiles fired on 23 December and 14 fired on the 24th,
68 SAMs met the bombers on 26 December, the eighth day of
massive strikes. Two aircraft were lost, one in the Hanoi area and one
while attempting to land with battle damage at U-Tapao. Both were
part of a strike force with restricted ECM protection.
The value of the new tactics was further demonstrated in the
bombing of the Thai Nguyen railroad yard. Eighteen B-52s dropped
185
their bombs and recovered unscathed even without the usual chaff
protection. The chaff in this case had been laid over the heavily
targeted Hanoi area .
Targeting for the Stratofortresses changed to include some of the
troublesome SAM sites. In addition, nightly low -level raids by F- 111
fighter-bombers now were divided between the airfields and SAM
sites. Not unexpectedly, bombing the Sam sites gave the B-52s
maximum exposure to the missiles. Moreover, at this very close
range, radar burnthrough of ECM devices, allowing SAM operators
to see through the jamming, was not altogether unlikely. One in-
cident of a B-52 mission against a SAM site is as follows.
Captain John Mize of Shreveport, Louisiana, was on his fourth
Linebacker II mission when 15 SAMs were fired at him as he released
his bombs on a particularly active site. One SAM impacted the left
wing of his B-52D as he executed a steep turn away from the target
area. The tremendous concussion knocked out all four port engines
and associated equipment. Shrapnel set one engine afire, and as red
cockpit warning lights flashed, the airplane began to fall. Several
thousand feet of altitude were lost before Captain Mize managed to
get the big bird leveled off.
Nearly every system on jthe bomber was inoperative. There was no
radar, ECM, or computers. Only one alternator, a radio, and the
cockpit lights remained in operation. All instruments were out ex-
cept the altimeter and airspeed indicator. Most of the six -man crew
had received shrapnel injuries.
The B-52 was almost helpless because it no longer had the mutual
protection of the other aircraft in the cell, and it had lost its self-
protection equipment. The crew saw two more SAMs but they
missed. Fortunately, no MIGs spotted the crippled aircraft.
After about ten minutes, the flaming engine burned itself out and
the crew set about trying to nurse the aircraft back to friendly
territory. Since the B-52 could not maintain altitude with only the
four right wing engines operational. Captain Mize gradually des-
cended to maintain flying airspeed. The navigators calculated that if
the left wing held together, they could get to the Thailand border
with only a small compromise of the 10,000 feet minimum recom-
mended bailout altitude.
As they drew closer to the safety of Nakhon Phanom RTAFB,
Thailand, the situation rapidly deteriorated. The bomb bay doors
fell open, one landing gear started cycling up and down, and other
electrical systems went astray. In spite of the crew's gallant efforts, it
soon became obvious they would not be able to coax the rapidly
descending bomber to a safe landing. Fortunately, when the bailout
order was given, the B-52 was only eight miles from Nakhon
Phanom. Each man ejected individually on Captain Mize's order. All
ejection seats, except the navigator's which was damaged, functioned
186
normally. When his failed, the navigator exited through the hole
formed when the radar -navigator ejected. After assuring himself that
everyone was safely out of the dying Superfortress, Captain Mize ejec-
ted. For his heroic efforts, he was awarded the Air Force Cross, the
other crew members received the Distinquished Flying Cross. All
crewmembers also received the Purple Heart.
The Final Thrust
Weather in the target area during Linebacker II compounded the
problem of attacking enemy defenses. Throughout December, the
dominant northeast monsoon brought almost daily low clouds to the
NVN delta region. Broken to overcast conditions existed below 5000
feet altitude for most of the 12-day Linebacker II campaign.
Weather clear enough to permit visual bombing existed less than 12
hours total during the entire period. This thwarted most efforts to
use the deadly accurate laser guided bombs and emphasized the need
for an all-weather tactical bombing capability.
By 28 December, however, the bombing and revised B-52 tactics
had proven so effective that bombers were no longer lost or even
damaged. Compression tactics allowed more than 100 bombers to
release their bombs and depart within a 15 -minute period. Varying
altitudes and headings avoided the previously established flight pat-
terns. Success was such that finding enough lucrative targets began
to be a problem. MIG sorties dwindled and, as more SAM sites were
struck, missile firings became sporadic and ineffective. Wave after
wave of bombers pounded targets with relative impunity. The bom-
bing could have proceeded indefinitley with little likelihood of fur-
ther losses.
The following is arecount of the last USAF MIG kill in Southeast
Asia; it occurred on 8 January 1973.
Crafty, a flight of two F-4s from the 4th Tactical Fighter
Squadron, was assigned a night MIGCAP mission in support of B-52
strikes. They ingressed North Vietnam through the "Gorrilla's Head"
and established their CAP about 70 miles southwest of Hanoi. The
pilot of Crafty One was Captain Paul D. Howman. His backseater was
First Lieutenant Lawrence W. Kullman. The following is Captain
Howman 's description of the kill.
About five minutes after arriving on station, we were advised by
Red Crown that a MIG was airborne out of Phuc Yen and was
heading southwest toward the inbound strike force. They vec-
tored us northwest and told us he had leveled at 13,000 feet.
Passing through [a heading of] north, we picked him up on
radar at about 60 miles. We were able to follow him most of the
way in as the range decreased. At about 30 miles, I called 02 and
we jettisoned our centerline tanks.
187
Crafty One and Two descended to 12,000 feet at 400 knots, still
taking vectors. Red Crozm turned them to a northeasterly heading.
At 16 miles Red Crown cleared Crafty to fire. Captain Howman's ac-
count continues.
At 10 miles I got a visual on an afterburner plume 20 degrees
right and slightly high. I called him out to the backseater and
put the pipper on him. At 6 miles Lt Kullman got a good full-
system radar lock-on. Range was about 4 miles and overtake
900-1- knots when I squeezed the trigger. The missile came off,
did a little roll to the left, and tracked toward the "burner
plume." It detonated about 50 feet short of his tail.
I squeezed another one off at 2 miles range. This one just pulled
some lead, then went straight for the MIG. It hit him in the
fuselage and the airplane exploded and broke into three big
flaming pieces.
After determining there were no more MIGs in the area. Crafty
returned to orbit for their remaining CAP period. They returned to
base without further incident.
This battle for the skies over North Vietnam was quite a contrast
to the earliest battles. Now, in early January 1973, the air-to-air bat-
tle took on almost textbook form with negligible outside interference
from either SAMs or AAA.
Air supremacy had been achieved!
The final air-to-air box score was :
NVN 193 aircraft lost
US 92 aircraft lost
188
Glossary
AAA Anti -Aircraft Artillery
AW Automatic Weapon
CBU Cluster Bomb Unit
CINCPAC Commander-in-Chief Pacific
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam
ECM Electronic Counter Measures
EOGB Electro -Optical Guided Bomb
EWO Electronic Weapons Officer
GCI Ground Control Intercept
HE High Explosive
IP Initial Point
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
LGB Laser Guided Bomb
LOG Lines of Communication
MIA Missing in Action
MIGCAP Combat Air Patrol (for MIGs)
PACAF Pacific Air Forces
POW Prisoner of War
RESCAP Combat Air Patrol (for Rescue Operations)
SAM Surface to Air Missile
SEA Southeast Asia
TOT Time Over Target
189
Index
Aircraft
A-1, 125
A-7, 152-153
B-52, 79, 175-179, 181, 183-186
B-57, 12, 125
C-130, 53, 55-56, 134
CH-53, 153
EB-66, 26, 53, 79, 88, 132, 177-178
EC-121, 107, 128, 133-134
F-4, 11, 16, 21-23, 76, 79, 88, 107,
110, 131, 133-134, 139, 142, 152,
154, 157-158, 178
F-lOO, 12, 24, 31, 33, 114-115, 117,
120, 125, 133
F-102, 113-114, 116,120
F-105, 11-15, 17-18, 31, 35, 37, 67,
75,88, 115, 118, 125, 134
F-111, 177, 180, 186
KC-135, 15, 28-29, 31, 79, 84-85,
125, 153, 158, 177
RF-4C, 140, 153
RF-101, 27, 31-32, 124-125
Air Force Cross, 25, 187
air refueling, 28, 30
Anderson, Captain Ron, 129-130
Australian Air Force, 120-121
Autrey, First Lieutenant Daniel L., 172
ATOLL (missile) , 107
Baily, Lt Colonel Griff, 109
Beckers, Lt Colonel Lyle L., 171
Benoit, Airman Johnny A., 55
BOLO, Operation, 139, 142-145
bombing halts, 63, 78
"BRIGHAM", 119
Brown, Colonel Bill, 177, 184
Brunson, Lt Colonel Jim, 185
Burbage, Major Paul, 104
Burdett, Colonel, 74
CAROLINA MOON, Operation,
52-53
Carrier Task Force 77, 44, 57
Case, Major Thomas F., 53-55
chaff, 84-85, 88, 107, 176-177
Chairsell, Colonel William S., 138
Chute, Technical Sergeant Larry, 182
Clanton, Captain Norman G., 54-55
Clarke, Captain Art, 129-130
Crews, Major Barton P., 149
Danang AB, RVN, 53-54, 115, 120
Debellevue, Captain Charles, 109,
159-160, 162
Democratic Republic of Vietnam
(DRV), 1,4,40
Dien Bien Phu, 1
Doughty, Dan, 26
Eaves, Captain Stephen D., 159, 162
ECM, 26, 84, 135, 138-139, 145, 153,
157, 183-185
Edmondson, First Lieutenant "Rocky",
54-55
EOGB, 79, 85, 159
Feezel, First Lieutenant Tommy, 159,
162
Feinstein, Captain Jeff, 109
FREEDOM DAWN, Operation, 84
Gatef, Major Eli, 104
GiaLam,9, 112-113
Giap, General Vo Nguyen, 147
Giraudo, Colonel John, 68, 74
Griffin, Thomas M., 171
Gulf of Tonkin, 2, 112, 128
Haiphong Harbor, 6, 135, 146, 171,
185
Hall, George, 26
Hand, Lieutenant Bob, 22
Hanoi, 4-7, 78, 135, 146, 159-160,
173, 176. 183
Harris, Captain Carlyle S., 37-39, 69
Hicks, Terry, 26
HoChiMinh, 1,9
Holcombe, Captain Ken, 129-130, 132
Hoffman, Major James, 104
Houchin, Colonel Laydd, 104-105
Howman, Captain Paul D., 187-188
"INVERT", 119
IRON HAND, 133, 137, 142, 154
Johnson, General Horold K., 3, 126
Johnson, Colonel Howard C, 145
Johnson, President Lyndon B., 2-4, 9,
63, 78, 125
191
Jones, Captain Keith W.,Jr., 149
Kennedy, President John F., 12
Kissinger, Secretary Henry, 175
Korat AB, Thailand, 31, 34, 115
KuUman, First Lieutenant Lawrence
W., 187-188
laser guided bomb (LGB), 79-83, 85,
89,91, 150-152
"lessons learned", 120, 125
Levy, Lt Colonel Gene, 22
LINEBACKER!, 84-85, 88, 147, 149-
150, 152, 156, 159, 173-174
LINEBACKER II, 103, 175, 177, 185-
186
Locher, Captain Roger C, 147, 149,
159, 161-163, 165
Lodge, Major Robert A., 147, 149,
159, 161-163
Lotz, Major Blaine, 104
Lucas, Major Jon I., 166-167
Malloy, First Lieutenant DougC, 166-
167
Mao Tse Tung, 1
Marines (U.S.), 157
Markle, First Lieutenant John D., 159,
162-163
McCain, Admiral John S.J. , 159
McClelland, Major William, 16, 20
McConnell, General John P., 3-4
Mclnerney, Lt Colonel James E., Jr., 25
McMurray, Captain Fred, 171
McNamara, Robert F., 4
Messet, Captain Mike, 88-90
Meyerholt, Captain Bill, 36
MIGCAP, 21, 24, 26, 88, 107, 120,
127, 139, 147, 156, 167
MIGS, 11, 16, 21, 26, 39, 50, 71, 76,
88, 103, 107-108, 110, 112-113, 122,
126-128, 130-131, 133-134, 139,
145-146, 161-162, 167, 171, 174,
182, 184-185
Miller, Colonel Carl S., 84
Mize, Captain John, 186-187
Momyer, General William W., 16, 67,
74
Monkey Mountain, 115
Moore, Airman First Class Albert, 182-
183
Moore, Lt General Joe, 52-53, 131
National Liberation Front (NLF), 1
Navy (U.S.), 11,21-23,26,28,45-46,
56-57, 59, 62, 79, 86, 107, 135, 147,
151, 153, 157
Nelson, Lt Colonel Gordon F., 104-105
Nixon, Richard M., 78, 86, 147, 175
NgoDinhDiem, 1
NVN Air Force, 112-113
Olds, Colonel Robin, 74, 139, 141-144
organizations
2nd Air Division, 52, 132
4th TFS, 187
7th Air Force, 16, 45, 67, 150
8th TFW, 68-69, 71, 74, 83-84, 88,
92, 139
17th Air Division, 184
45th TFS, 128-129
49th TFW, 148
67th TFS, 31
307th Strategic Wing, 177, 184
333rd TFS, 141
355thTFW, 68, 74-75
388th TFW, 68, 74, 135, 138, 145
432nd TRW, 152
469th TFS, 74
555th TFS, 152
4252nd Strategic Wing, 28
PANAMA, 115
PEACOCK, 115
Pettit, Captain Lawrence, 159
PhucYen, 112-113, 145, 166, 187
Pickett, Major Ralph, 185
Piowaty, John, 74
Pitchford, Captain John, 24-25
Rawlins, Major Addison, 104
reconnaissance, 25, 45, 85
RED CROWN, 147, 149, 153, 160-
161, 171, 185, 187-188
Remers, Major Richard T. , 53-56
reprisal attacks, 3
Republic of Vietnam (RVN), 1
RESCAP,28, 31, 38
Retterbush, Major Gary, 171-172
Richthofen, Baron Von, 108
Ritchie, Captain Steve, 107-110, 159-
160, 162-163
Risner, Lt Colonel Robinson, 21-32,
34, 36-39
Rissi, Lt Colonel Don, 183
RIVIT TOP, 145
Roberts, Captain Tom, 129-130, 132
ROLLING THUNDER, 4, 12, 23, 31,
45, 67, 110, 124-125, 133-134,
145-146, 150
route packs, 44-45
Sams, Colonel M.S., 135
Schurr, Lt Colonel Harry W., 74
Shanahan, Joe, 26
Shannon, Captain Fred, 25, 74
Shields, Master Sergeant John R., 55
smart bomb, 57, 79
192
Smith, Captain Dave, 91
Stone, Captain John B., 144
Stavast, John, 26
Sullivan, Brigadier General Glenn R.
184
surface to air missile (SAM), 11, 23-
24,51,56-57,60,71, 76, 103, 110,
122, 130, 131, 133-135, 145-146,
153, 167, 174, 183-185
Swarts, Major Barry, 104
TakhliAB, Thailand, 12, 34, 75, 115,
120
Theiu, President, 1-2, 175
Thud Ridge, $1, 160, 166
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 3
Trier, Captain Bob, 24-25
Turner, Staff Sergeant Aubrey B., 55
Turner, First Lieutenant Thomas M.,55
Ubon AB, Thailand, 115
Udorn AB, Thailand, 115, 185
U Tapao AB, Thailand, 183-185
Venanzi, Gerry, 26
Viet Minh, 1, 9
Vogt, General John W., Jr., 150, 159
Walker, Major Ron, 105
Walleye, ix, 57, 59, 62
Weyand, General Fred C, 159
White, Colonel Bob, 68
Wild Weasel, 21, 24, 76, 133, 135, 157,
177
YANKEE STATION, 45-46
YOUNG TIGER, 28
Zuberbuhler, Captain Rudolph W.,
105, 171
193
*U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE ! 1985-i|.86-81'+
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